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ABSTRACT  
 
 
Over the past two decades, the relationship between political extremism and football 
fans has been the subject of academic, political and policing debates throughout Europe. At 
football stadiums, in Italy in particular, it is common to witness manifestations of racist 
intolerance and ideological statements referring to regional, national and international issues. 
Concurrently, there has been a rise in conflict between Italian police forces and hardcore 
football fans.  The fan-protagonists of such episodes are often groups known as the UltraS; 
the capital S is a neologism of this study to define neo-fascist oriented supporters. The 
nomenclature differentiates them from the wider hardcore football supporters who are instead 
referred in this research as ultrá.  
Despite their presence among the Italian curve (football terraces), the UltraS have 
been the subject of very limited methodical ethnographic study. The present study seeks to 
correct this lacuna and is the result of ethnographic research conducted from 2003 to 2006 
and updated from 2007 to 2009. This thesis seeks to evaluate the UltraS phenomenon via an 
examination of two nationally renowned groups located in the Italian capital of Rome. The 
groups, the Boys of AS Roma and the Irriducibili of SS Lazio, enact their performances on 
the respective curve of the city’s Olympic Stadium.  This research considers the UltraS 
gatherings as a form of ‘ideological communitas’. In doing so, analysis introduces and 
explains the four essential elements of the UltraS logic: the principle of non omologazione 
(non-conformism), the concept of the ‘true’ UltraS; the opposition of Tradition versus 
Modernity in the UltraS condition, and finally the attempt by them to live up to the ‘Warrior 
Spirit’. Analysis further identifies the ideological and anti-system based alliance between the 
UltraS of Lazio and Roma and other similar gatherings throughout Italy. This phenomenon, 
together with an increase ideologisation of the Italian curve, incidents such as the death at the 
hands of the police gun of the SS Lazio fan Gabriele Sandri in 2007 (and the concomitant 
violent UltraS reactions against a variety of institutions)  and the appearance in 2008 of the 
UltraS Italia, may signify the beginning of  an UltraS collective identity, and a concomitant 
emergent status of the UltraS as a social movement, which stands in opposition to the 
perceived repressive Italian State and its media allies.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction  
 
 
 
In October 2008, the world champion Italian national football team (nicknamed the 
Azzurri) played a 2010 World Cup qualifying match against Bulgaria in Sofia.  This occasion 
saw the first appearance of 150 members of the recently formed UltraS Italia. During the 
match, they chanted ‘Duce, Duce’ (‘Leader, Leader’) in honour of the long dead Italian 
fascist leader Benito Mussolini. Celtic crosses were sported and the Roman salute was 
enacted during the pre-match playing of the Italian national anthem (La Repubblica –online- 
12 October, 2008).  The Italian media were outraged; their reporting of the incidents made 
the UltraS Italia instantly notorious. This episode illustrated to Italy, and the world, yet 
another manifestation of Italian induced football-related intemperance. It also confirmed the 
existence and strength of an ideologically influenced hardcore Italian football fan: the UltraS.  
It is difficult to make sense of the emotions, logic and violence that the UltraS express 
without considering the nature of the football stadium. This locale provides for collective 
behaviours and a wide variety of associations. The common-sense correlation of the Italian 
term tifo (football supporters) with ‘fanatic’ is derived from the medical pathology of typhus 
with its classic symptoms of alternate phases of illness and well-being (Gould, 2002). A 
football fan in Italy is similarly characterised in the public eye by phases of ‘normal’ 
behaviour alongside temporary (football-related) abnormality. Social anthropologists would 
argue the case for applicability of the notion of liminal moments (Turner, 1977). Active tifo 
do not always see the entire actual match -a paradox and an absurdity in the eyes of 
‘ordinary’ fans who pay their admission at the stadium- as they busy themselves in a variety 
of tasks. Those leading the chants turn their backs to the pitch to face fellow supporters 
urging them to voice their encouragement for the team and to create a spectacle. Some 
dedicate a great amount of their time outside of the stadium prior to the match, co-ordinating 
group operations with the goal of initiating or at least maintaining the social order of this 
micro-system. In this colourful, transgressive and carnivalesque milieu, disorder and 
ideological manifestations are rife (cf. De Certeau, 1984).  
In the Italian context, the UltraS are inextricably linked with late Twentieth Century 
neo-fascism and are a crucial fixture within its Third Millennium manifestations. Their 
appearance in the curva - location in the stadium situated behind either of the two pitch 
goalposts - is fairly recent and corresponds with a political era remembered by the Italian 
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nation as Tangentopoli -‘bribesville’ (Barbaceto et al. 2002). The Tangentopoli scandal 
erupted in full in the late 1980s; it  did not only reveal the illicit financing of political parties 
and bribery of politicians but promoted a loss of faith  amongst the Italian electorate in the 
integrity of their country’s political life and indeed in wider Italian society. Such a perception 
remains and is not expected to wane in the foreseeable future. 
Before such cause and effect is elaborated upon, the explanations that scholars have 
hitherto produced to make sense of hardcore football fandom in Italy (of which the UltraS are 
the latest and most important evolution) requires examination. 
 
1.1 Hardcore football spectatorship: Italian Theories  
 
The first significant ethnographic study on Italian hardcore (ultrá) football supporters 
was carried out by sociologist Alessandro Dal Lago (1990) who studied ultrá groups in the 
three northern Italian cities of Turin, Milan and Bergamo. Dal Lago shared a similar position 
to that espoused by the Oxford Brookes University researcher Peter Marsh (1978) about the 
ritualistic nature of football-related violence. In his explanation of the behaviour of the ultrá 
supporters, Dal Lago develops three assumptions. The first is based on the freund und feind 
(friends and enemies) division amongst such supporters. This division is intrinsic to the 
nature of football given that two teams, defined by two sets of symbols, compete for victory. 
This notion could, according to Dal Lago (1990), explain the polarisation upon which the 
hardcore football supporters base their social interactions.  
The second supposition describes a football match as not only a challenge between 
two teams, but also a place where ritual precipitates clashes between friends and enemies. 
The football stadium facilitates this interaction as it is an autonomous (and ideal) place to 
express symbolic conflicts. Dal Lago identifies two factors that influence the intensity of such 
ritual conflicts. The first factor, which is the most influential, is based on the historical 
relationships of alliances or enmities amongst supporters. The second element is related to the 
events that occur during the football match that could influence the emotional equilibrium on 
the curva. The author acknowledges that symbolic violence can sometimes descend into real 
violence. Nevertheless, this ritual violence generally only occurs when the metaphoric actions 
of the hardcore football supporters are misunderstood by ordinary spectators or by the police, 
which interpret their rituals as threatening to society. 
Dal Lago’s final proposition defines the football stadium as an autonomous social 
setting where certain logics, which can appear incomprehensible to outsiders, are largely 
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rational. In a stadium, it is possible to experiment with emotions that are different from those 
experienced in ‘normal’ life. Furthermore, in a stadium, symbols attain meanings different 
from those that are manifest in ‘normal’ society. Dal Lago pragmatically divides the two 
realities of ‘Stadium and Society’. Once the fans cross the imaginary boundary between these 
two realities, they change their way of acting. He states: ‘of course, they are the same people 
or groups. What they have put on, however, trespassing the invisible membrane that 
surrounds the stadium, is another mental, cognitive and moral dress’ (Dal Lago, 1990, p. 39). 
Therefore, in the frame of the stadium, conflicts between supporters are not necessary 
socially meaningful, but should be considered as rituals, with meanings that are best 
understood via the logic of football-related figurative hostility. 
Dal Lago’s ideas inevitably lead him towards a skeptical position on the link between 
fandom and political ideology. He stressed the groundlessness of claims that the curve are 
directly linked to political groupings or, most importantly, that they are even genuine 
expressions of political cultures. Instead, he considered the ideological symbols adopted by 
hardcore football supporters in accordance with Lévi-Strauss’ (1966) concept of bricolage; 
items are taken from different sources, collated and re-contextualised with a new meaning. 
Such artefacts and their contextual use can be understood using the aforementioned logic of 
figurative hostility, notably ‘the metaphor of war’. For example, the display of Celtic crosses, 
songs such as Faccetta Nera (Little Black Face) and enactions of the Roman salute would, in 
Dal Lago’s examination, be understood as displays of ritual conflicts explained by the 
impulse to appear and be part of the show
 
 (Dal Lago and De Biasi, 2002).  
Morality is integral to other Italian explanations. The Italian sociologist Antonio 
Roversi’s (1992) research was based on fans of Bologna FC and sought to quantitatively 
evaluate Italian football spectators’ violence. The main hypothesis of Roversi’s work was that 
the hardcore football supporters should be considered as a ‘moral community’ that permit 
their members to enjoy experiences that are different from their daily routines. Such 
gatherings do not manifest anything particularly anomic. By contrast, such groups construct 
structures and collectively follow norms and symbols. Such groups thus represent, for the 
participants, a behavioural and cultural setting that satisfies their need for personal and social 
identity. This setting has a positive role as it substitutes for the often-decadent initiatory 
rituals provided by schooling, military service, and the church. However, there is also a 
negative dimension given that a world founded on strict values may restrict youngsters to the 
rigid role of a hardcore football supporter, thereby preventing them from experiencing the 
wider world. 
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In a previous discourse, Roversi (1991) identified three factors that accounted for the 
enduring oppositional stances in and around football. The first is the historical legacies ever 
evident when assessing the history of Italian football. Roversi defined the second dimension 
as the ‘Bedouin Syndrome’, which he considered contained the following characteristics:  
The principle by which the friend of a friend is a friend, the enemy of an enemy is an 
enemy, the enemy of a friend is a friend and the friend of an enemy is an enemy. (p. 
321)  
 
At the same time, He recognised that not all hardcore football supporters’ conflict could be 
similarly reduced to this dynamic. 
 For the third dimension, Roversi became one of the few Italian academics to claim 
that political ideologies do indeed play a part in fuelling rivalries and violence, although he 
provided no concrete proof of extremist groups’ involvement beyond highlighting the use of 
neo-fascist symbolism.Such ideas remain thought-provoking and indeed relevant, but they 
would certainly have benefited from the inclusion of systematic ethnographic evidence. In 
2006, Roversi attempted an evaluation of Italian ideologically oriented football fans but with 
an externalist approach (Blee, 2007). He reported no interaction between himself and the 
studied groups. In his explanation, he states: 
 
‘The research that I present in this book was carried out whilst being comfortably 
seated in my office. I needed only a laptop, an internet connection and time available 
to navigate the internet’ (p.7). 
 
Although Roversi’s works constitute an important contribution to the pursuit of knowledge 
about Italian football fandom, a pertinent criticism of this type of strategy and its limitations 
is made by Lorenzo, the webmaster of the AS Roma UltraS website. Roversi comments on 
the infamous Lazio-Roma game of 2004 (a game abandoned after  the UltraS protested 
against the repression of the police)1 and argues that two of the three Roma UltraS , who 
entered the pitch to speak to the Roma player Francesco Totti, were leaders of the Opposta 
Fazione neo-fascist group. Lorenzo affirms (and the Boys Roma confirmed to me) that the 
members of Opposta Fazione were no longer in the Roma curva and the two individuals who 
entered the pitch, even if neo-fascists, were acting alone and not as representatives of any 
curva group. A ‘netography’ gives freedom to the researcher to mediate reality, on the other 
hand used alone, it is unable to offer full and rich details of the human experience. Whether it 
increases our understanding of the UltraS is another matter. 
                                                
1
 See chapter 11 for a detailed analysis of the event. 
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1.2 Amongst the ‘thugs’? 
 
 
Ethnography can be a very powerful method for studying closed setting groups and 
for seeking to infer the motivations of the members from the privileged position of the 
‘insider’. Ethnography involves ‘being there’ and ‘being here’. ‘Being there’ because the 
researcher was once amongst the group; ‘being here’ because the reader is now able to 
appreciate (or criticise) the work as the researcher has returned from ‘field work’ and presents 
the study in an academic text (Pearson, in Hobbs and May 2002, p. viii). The thesis presented 
in this research was a product of ‘being there’ and is now at the stage of ‘being here’.  
No previous research on the UltraS has utilised an in-depth ethnographic approach, 
although, some studies claim such effort has been made. A recent example of these claims is 
evident in the study carried out by Italian criminologist Vincenzo Scalia (2009), who fails to 
detail the methodology and theoretical framework utilised for his research ostensibly with the 
UltraS. The methodology is described in just one sentence: ‘I consider this work as the 
product of ethnographic research (Atkinson, 2007), both as a former ultra and as a current 
football fan’ (p.42). The significance of the UltraS groupings, hence, cried out for an inquiry 
such as this, but investigating the individuals involved from an ‘insider’ perspective is 
notoriously complex. These groups do not usually welcome the non-partisan or the 
intellectually curious.  
The research that follows focused on two UltraS groups in the Italian capital of Rome, 
the centre of Italy’s political power. One group was the Boys, followers of AS Roma who 
have been notoriously neo-fascist since 1972. They are the oldest UltraS in Italy. The other 
group was the Irriducibili, who follow SS Lazio and who, since 1987, have attained a 
notoriety based on toughness and violence both inside and outside of the Italian borders. 
They manifest a strong oppositional attitude towards Italian politics. As Giovanni (age 40), 
one of the leaders of the Irriducibili, explained: 
‘I do not want to be too judgmental or maybe just judge the politicians, but there is a 
certain culture prevalent in Italy that favours chaos and moral degradation. We elect 
the wrong people and we have a wrong attitude towards the res publica (public 
interest).’ 
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1.2.1 Objectives of this Thesis 
 
I will begin this thesis aiming to give a detailed methodological account of how this 
research was attempted and the challenges I faced in such an investigation (chapter 2). In 
Section A (chapters 3, 4), I discuss the Irriducibili and Boys’ social world. This section 
specifically concentrates on the historical development of the UltraS territory; their 
respective curve (the curva nord of the Irriducibili and curva sud of the Boys). This part of 
the study will also include data gained from the protagonists regarding the groups’ histories. 
In Section B (chapters 5 to 10), I try to evaluate the UltraS internal and external 
dynamics. After, having identified and clarified the strand of Italian neo-fascism that informs 
the groups’ ideology (chapter 5), this section seeks mainly to make sense of the logic that 
motivates the groups attitudes and behaviours. Such inquiry intends to highlight the 
ideological boundaries of meaning in which the Irriducibili and Boys present themselves to 
the public (Corte and Edwards, 2008). Based upon the gathered data, I identify four 
significant characteristics of the UltraS logic: the principle of non omologazione (non-
conformism); the concept of the ‘true’ UltraS; the centrality of notions of Tradition and 
Modernity in their thinking and doing; and the necessity of living by the ‘Warrior Spirit’.  
Such logic is employed both inside and outside of the football stadium, which 
contrarily to Dal Lago’s (1990) analysis, is not considered by this study alien from the Italian 
society but conceived as its local and national reflection. The examination of the groups 
continues in chapter 9, which evaluates the UltraS manifestations of nationalistic and racist 
propaganda. Finally, chapter 10 examines the emergence and progressive strengthening of the 
UltraS phenomenon hypothesising the UltraS as an emerging social movement.  
Section C (chapters 11 and 12) focuses on the UltraS ‘foes’ namely the media and the 
police. In 2008, I interviewed three established Italian sports journalists. One was Franco 
Arturi, deputy director of La Gazzetta dello Sport, which is the most established and popular 
of the Italian sport newspapers. Another was Giuseppe Tassi, a sport journalist and deputy 
director of Quotidiano.net (internet edition of the Resto del Carlino, La Nazione and Il 
Giorno editorial group). The third was Gabriele Marcotti, a journalist for the British 
newspaper The Times and the popular Italian daily Il Corriere dello Sport. These interviews 
endeavour to provide an insight into the Italian media and their rapport (or non-rapport) with 
the UltraS.  
In 2009, I also questioned Dr. Domenico Mazzilli, a high ranking officer of the Italian 
police and President of the National Observatory on Sport Events of the Italian Ministry of 
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the Interior (chapter 12). Many of the answers he provided, focused on ‘technical’ points of 
view, thereby avoiding ‘socio-political speculation’, a term used by the Italian police to 
deflect analyses that they consider inopportune. The purpose of the chapter is to evaluate the 
efficiency of policing strategies for tackling violent episodes in and around the football 
stadium; these episodes often see the UltraS as the main protagonists. Moreover, for the first 
time in an academic investigation, chapter 12 reconstructs – with the help of the Italian Police 
–the complicated and lengthy development of the Italian anti-UltraS legislation and the effect 
that it has had on those whom it is meant to control. 
To safeguard the privacy of the participants and avoid the legal implications 
connected to their activities, the names of the UltraS used throughout this thesis are fictional.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Notes on Methodology  
 
 
‘(Any phenomenon) contains multiple truths, each of which will be revealed by a shift 
in perspective, method, or purpose…The task is not to exhaust the singular meaning 
of an event but to reveal the multiplicity of meanings, and…it is through the 
observer’s encounter with the event that these meanings emerge.’ (Mishler, 1979, p. 
10) 
 
 
Ethnography requires specialised skills and attitudes, but can be reduced to some very 
basic acts:  listening and engaging in conversations with members of the groups studied, 
formally and informally interviewing members on issues of interest and collecting documents 
produced by the groups (Bryman, 2008). In this study, accounts that pertain to norms, social 
values and interactions related to the Boys and the Irriducibili were collected and collated 
without journalistic or politically mediated reality. Such data were evaluated to develop an 
understanding of the lifeworld of the groups chosen. 
This research arose from ideas originating by reading of British criminologist Ian 
Taylor’s works (cf. Taylor 1969; 1971; 1982; 1987; 1989). As an orthodox Marxist, Taylor 
was one of the first academics to consider the potential of Marx’s notion of ‘resistance’ in his 
explanation of English hardcore football fans groups. According to Taylor’s writings in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, English hardcore football fans (i.e. hooligans) manifested an 
opposition arising out of the more traditional supporters’ rebellion against the changes of 
‘spectacularisation’ and ‘professionalisation’ that had occurred  in the English game since the 
1950s.  Football hooliganism, in Taylor’s Marxist sense, was a resistance movement to a 
variety of processes of ‘bourgeoisification’. Such gatherings and actions had revolutionary 
potential. This study follows Taylor’s hypothesis and is in line with Griffin’s Neo-Consensus 
theory (1991, 2000), which considers fascism (and its modern manifestations) as a 
revolutionary-resistance doctrine. In doing so, this research endeavours to make sense of the 
UltraS as a potential extra-parliamentary oppositional movement.2  
I chose the Irriducibili and Boys as the focus of this study for three motives. First, 
because of the political tradition of the Lazio region and its largest city, Rome, which offered 
fascinating insights into the way these groups represent it. The Italian curve embrace a 
political ideology, be it rossa (red-communism) or nera (black, neo-fascism), in part because 
                                                
2
 For an indepth evaluation of the topic see chapter 5. 
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of the social and political history of the locale in which the football club and stadium belong. 
Therefore, a rossa (red, left wing) city, such as Livorno3, will mainly attract left and extreme 
left fan followers. A city that is traditionally nera (black, right wing), as in the case of Rome, 
will have curve that are predominantly formed by centre-right and extreme right supporters. 
Recent data (2009) 4 show that there are 50,000 neo-fascists in Rome. The increase in neo-
fascism is particularly evident among the youth in the capital. Some eight years ago, a mere 
20 out of 400 high school students (aged 15 to 17) elected in the Consulta Provinciale 
Studentesca (District Students’ Youth Council) represented the far right . By 2007, neo-
fascists representatives were the majority and managed an annual budget of 80,000 Euros 
provided by the national government. Among the elected are representatives of Azione 
Giovane (the youth organisation of Alleanza Nazionale5, the direct descendent of the neo-
fascist party Movimento Sociale Italiano –MSI) and the school-age movement of Forza 
Nuova (the largest neo-fascist party in Italy) known as Lotta Studentesca (Student Fight). 
Furthermore, the Blocco Studentesco (Student Block) of Casa Pound Italia (a newly formed 
national neo-fascist organisation)6 elected 55 representatives to the Consulta in 2008 (La 
Repubblica –online- 23 February, 2008). 
In selecting the groups, the second motive was to examine one of the most important 
social aggregations of Roman youth: the Stadio Olimpico (the Olympic Stadium) and the two 
groups’ ‘symbolic’ territories: the curva sud for the Boys and the curva nord for the 
Irriducibili. The curva is not only a sector of the stadium, but a location in which the ‘rebels’ 
of the city can find space to discharge a collective passion for their favourite football teams 
and to manifest their opposition against the current state of affairs of Italian society, politics 
and football. Cesare of the Irriducibili (aged in his late twenties) noted that the curva  
allowed fans:‘to express our ideas to ‘public opinion’ and show that we are not only UltraS 
or, like the media affirms, ‘ thugs’ but people with a brain, able to think and unwilling to be 
ghettoized or unheard’ (field note 23). The UltraS see the curva as their ‘territory’, as a home 
to be guarded and, if necessary, defended from the ‘outsiders’. The curva is a venue into 
which welcoming friends or ‘whoever wants to know our world free of preconceived ideas’ 
(Antonio – aged 19 – Boys, field note 19). However, even if I began the study with minimal 
                                                
3
 Cf. http://firenze.repubblica.it/dettaglio/livorno-riconferma-al-primo-turno-per-alessandro-cosimi/1647958 
4
 Cf. http://tv.repubblica.it/le-inchieste/fuori-dalle-fogne/30659?video=&pagefrom=3 
5
 AN has recently merged (March 2009) with the movement Forza Italia to constitute a unified centre-right 
party under the presidency of Silvio Berlusconi. The party is called Partito delle Libertá (PDL- Freedom Party). 
Cf. http://repubblica.it/2009/03/sezioni/politica/congresso-pdl/seconda-giornata/seconda-giornata.html 
6
 Cf. chapter 5. 
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pre-conceptions and I manifested a sincere desire to know the Boys and Irriducibili’s world, 
the interaction with the groups was not always easy and friendly during the research process.  
Finally, the choice of the Boys and the Irriducibili was influenced by the need for the 
study’s sample to satisfy the requirement of transferability, a central concern of sound 
academic research (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). For the extremism of their ideology, the Boys 
and the Irriducibili are respected among similar UltraS groups. Many Italian UltraS regarded 
them as the example to follow. This dynamic of emulation, together with the nature of Italian 
fascism (in its modern form) -which tends to encourage uniformity of individuals via shared 
values, myths and beliefs (Kallis, 2000)- suggests a certain degree of transferability of the 
findings to other similar Italian groups. The logic of the Irriducibili was similar to the Boys 
regardless of the teams that they supported; so the logic of those studied might be similar to 
other neo-fascists, such as the Boys San of Inter or the Settembre Bianconero of Ascoli. 
Based on such possible transferability, this micro-scale study has macro-scale implications in 
terms of a better understanding of the whole Italian UltraS phenomenon. 
2.1 The object of Suspicion 
 
The primary problem I encountered while structuring the research was the initial 
distrust of the UltraS when seeking access to their social world. Research access is something 
approached via several dimensions; the most crucial is whether the setting in question is open 
or closed (Bell, 1969). The social setting of this study was closed due to the dislike by these 
groups of any type of media attention ever deemed to ‘unfairly’ represent them. In addition, 
there was a ‘paranoia’ concerning the constant police surveillance and intelligence gathering 
to which they were subjected. Suspicion toward ‘outsiders’ was, consequently, expected; it is 
a trait of any radical right group due to their perception of being persecuted by the State 
(Klandermans and Mayer, 2006). 
Ethnographers seeking to study extreme ideological groups have also another difficult 
task. Ideally, they need to balance their ethical convictions - which could lead them to expose 
and hinder the very groups that they are studying - with the academic ethos of being super 
partes (Blee, 2007). The latter attribute is problematic for the UltraS. The Boys and the 
Irriducibili express an ideology for which few sociologists have empathy. For instance, I 
found it difficult to accept their discourse around ‘race’ and their viewpoint on the use of 
violence. In one conversation with Todde (a 28-year old law student at the University of 
Rome, who became later in the research process the ‘gatekeeper’ of the Boys), he recalled his 
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confrontations with a Manchester United hooligan opponent before a European fixture 
between the two clubs. Todde’s boundary of violence normally admitted only kicks and 
punches; however, in this circumstance the opponent threw a bottle of beer in his face and 
attempted to ‘glass’ him. Livid in his recollection, Todde admitted that he knocked the 
opponent out and, as his head lay on a stair step, tried to jump on him. This act was prevented 
by other Boys who were aware that it could result in the death of the opponent. As more time 
was spent around the Boys and the Irriducibili, similar episodes were increasingly recalled. 
At times, those speaking asked me what I thought about their actions and what I would have 
done in such circumstances. I replied that it was not appropriate for me to judge individuals 
that I was researching, or to guide what they should think. Such a response seemed to be 
respected by my interlocutors. Nevertheless, the articulations of these accounts were a good 
sign, as far as the methodology of the research was concerned. The barriers between me (the 
‘researcher’) and them were minimal. My presence did not appear to affect their 
conversations or behaviours. In academic jargon, ‘reactivity’ was minimal (Bryman, 2008).  
Moreover, suspicion about the ‘real’ reason for research can arise from the academic 
world. Studies focusing on extreme right groups ‘solicit accounts of morally indefensible 
behaviour’ (Blee, 2007, p. 125). During his research on the extreme right UK National Front 
party, Fielding (1981) had to address such distrust and He articulated a defence shared by this 
study: 
‘It can be argued that to discuss the National Front at all is to encourage it, and that 
no book, academic or otherwise, should deal with the subject. I find this absurd. The 
argument is absurd both in terms of my personal stance, which is that we must know 
all we can about those we oppose, and sociologically, for the sociological importance 
of deviant groups is undeniable. Nevertheless, I have not written a page-by-page 
condemnation of the NF and some may find my examination of the subject too 
dispassionate. My reply is that while my instinct was to reject these beliefs as 
forcefully as they were expressed, to have done that would have prevented me from 
building up a picture of the beliefs and their significance for members. …..(p.vii). 
 
With that said, the issue was then how best to proceed with the research at hand. 
 
2.2 Overt or Covert? 
 
Ethnographic investigation requires that the researcher study a group by immersing 
themselves within a reality expressed by those studied whilst ostensibly being a member of 
the group (Chadwick et al. 1984). In my case, this was not possible. A covert approach could 
have minimised my anxiety concerning entry into a hostile social group like the UltraS; 
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nevertheless, the covert method presents shortcomings that should not be undervalued. Elms 
(1994) argues that such a role implies a duplicity that should not be ethically permissible. 
Such deception makes the groups studied ‘unable to make choices for themselves according 
to the most adequate information available, [and] unable to act as they would have wanted to 
act had they known all along’ (Bok, 1978, p. 20). Moreover, a Canadian study into the 
extreme right stressed the difficulty of exploring issues with such subjects if they perceived 
the researcher as a potential member; questions would give rise to distrust and tension 
(Barrett, 1996, p. 132). In addition, a covert role would not allow for interviews or open 
examination of behaviours, providing instead a one-dimensional view of the social reality 
under inquiry (Burgess, 1984, p. 48).  
Considering such disadvantages, I adopted an overt role, similar to that utilised by 
social anthropologist Armstrong (1998) in his enquiry on the ‘Blades’ football hooligans of 
Sheffield United FC. Hence, the covert approach to analysis of the Boys and the Irriducibili 
was not chosen for two main reasons. As noted earlier, the Boys and the Irriducibili have 
primarily aggressive and closed attitudes towards any type of perceived media inquiry that is 
considered unable (and unwilling) to represent them justly. This attitude, combined with the 
groups’ paranoia concerning police surveillance, would have created a constant fear of being 
discovered and possibly assaulted during the research process.Furthermore, given awareness 
of the thought process of the curva, I supposed that my passion for the gym and martial arts 
would result in the UltraS mistaking me as an undercover police officer. In few instances 
during the study, I had ‘to sweat’ to become accepted and risked being attacked by 
unconvinced UltraS. The second reason about chosing an overt role was based, as mentioned 
earlier, on ethics; a covert role did not provide the UltraS with the possibility of deciding 
whether they wanted to participate in this study; I considered this consequence as 
unacceptable (Cassell 1980; Erikson 1967).  
For the purpose of gaining entry into the social word of the Boys and Irriducibili, a 
minimum of knowledge about the curva way of life and values was needed. For this aim, I 
had an advantage over academic colleagues. Ethnographic research projects often have their 
genesis in the biography of the researcher (Rabinow, 1986), which was certainly the case in 
this instance, given that I had a childhood passion for football combined with a similar 
passion for martial arts. In the early 1970s, a family move from the north of Italy to Rome 
resulted in a five-year-old, myself, watching an SS Lazio side win its first ever scudetto 
(championship). The Lazio and Azzurri (the nickname of the national team) striker, Giorgio 
Chinaglia, became a personal hero of mine. The choice of club, whilst inspired by a familial 
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relocation, was also influenced by sartorial issues and resulted in a research position that saw 
me sharing passion and practise with those studied. The sky blue and white colours of the 
Lazio team shirt and the eagle insignia of the club appealed to a child like me, who was 
seemingly unaware of aesthetics and emblems. Suffering many times for the incompetence of 
the team, I remained, though, faithful to the biancocelesti (white and light blues).  
An education during the 1980s in a Rome Catholic high school of repute saw my 
passage from a simple tifoso to something more. I started playing calcio at a high level with 
the Eur-Olympia club connected with AS Roma, whilst training in Karate and Judo. This 
situation, though, interfered with academic study and resulted in a high school failure in the 
Humanities. Football offered a possible alternative to re-sits. After a successful trial with a 
feeder club of SS Lazio, the family enforced a very tough decision – football or study? The 
familial commitment to big fees for an education without a commitment from their son saw a 
parting of the ways. Leaving active football, I dedicated my life to practising martial arts, 
attending periodically the Olympic Stadium to watch SS Lazio and pursuing academic 
qualifications. By attending the stadium, I started to experience the SS Lazio world from the 
perspective of the curva; I gained insight that would later prove useful in this research. My 
curva nord activities came to a stop in 1989 as they were replaced by my study of law at the 
University of Naples. My martial arts training, instead, continued during university. In 1998, 
as I left Italy for what was presumed to be a short language study experience in the UK, my 
Lazio scarf and flag were packed in my luggage. 
In 1998 after leaving Italy and departing for what I still call the ‘London adventure’, I 
encountered many unexpected juxtapositions. Throughout this time, I maintained my Sunday 
match-day character as a fringe Lazio hardcore supporter. In London, whilst waiting on tables 
and serving at Carluccio’s deli near Oxford Street, I realised that I could put my knowledge 
of the curva nord to use. My stay in London proved to be an extended sojourn; 12 years later, 
I am now a citizen of the Metropolis and in the final year of my PhD dissertation explaining 
the UltraS phenomenon. In order to obtain bursary funding for post-graduate study, I re-
visited my Roman contacts and described the nature of my research. The Boys and 
Irriducibili knew me as a son of the Eternal City. They knew where my family lived; if I was 
not one of them, I was not too distant either. The years that I had lived in London, however, 
provided me with a distance from my Roman past that was necessary for this research 
project. By leaving the eternal city and, most importantly, because of my UK academic 
training in social sciences, I gained perspective that permitted me to understand this past 
more clearly upon my return. My perceptions were more astute as I had learned a new way of 
 20
thinking. I was similar to those who I sought to study, but I was also different. The UltraS 
were aware of this distinction as well. 
 
2.3 The Gatekeepers of Knowledge 
 
Because of the nature of this research, I needed gatekeepers to facilitate on-going 
access to my groups of interest; so negotiation for such entry was necessary. Gatekeeping is 
considered a central problem faced early in the research setting; however, as Pearson (in 
Hobbs and May, 2002) details, negotiating access is not only a logistic problem to be 
overcome to gain data, the negotiations are data. Negotiations show how the groups studied 
interact with the ‘outsiders’ and in which ways they attempt to explain their social world. 
Identifying a gatekeeper involves not only asking analytical questions about the 
organisation/group under study, it also concerns determination of the location of such 
gatekeepers (Morrill et al. 1999). The most significant gatekeepers are understandably at the 
top of an organisation or group. Therefore, I chose Todde from amongst the Boys for such a 
role. He was part of the direttivo (the equivalent of a ‘members committee’) and very 
knowledgeable about the Roman and national neo-fascist world. In 2008, He also became 
involved with the UltraS Italia. Among the Irriducibili, I was lucky to research alongside the 
Boxer, who, at 40 years of age, was one of the historical leaders of the group. 
Gaining access to the Boys proved to be less problematic than gaining access to the 
Irriducibili. The latter’s nation-wide notoriety had produced constant negative exposure in 
the Italian media and concomitant scrutiny by the police, which made any approach to its 
leaders difficult; an outsider like me needed to pass through a series of ‘filters’. Contacting 
the Boys via phone (a mobile number was advertised on their website) resulted in an 
appointment with one of their senior members in the sede (head office) located in San 
Lorenzo, one of Rome’s oldest districts.7 Once in the sede, I underwent an examination of 
sorts, which, to my astonishment, was conducted by a woman, Francesca. I found her to be an 
important member of the Boys direttivo. She had earned a high level of respect in the 
otherwise exclusively male group. Francesca was an attractive woman in her thirties. She was 
not only working at the head office, but was also a keen sportswoman who had trained in the 
Korean martial art of Taekwondo. Several pressing questions were fired at me by Francesca; 
she recollected a recent deceit by a person who had introduced himself to the Boys as a 
                                                
7
 The district of San Lorenzo was built in the late 19th century and is located near the centre of the City. Cf. 
http://sanlorenzo.roma.it/quartiere/storia.php  
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researcher, but who was a journalist intending to write an exposé on the Boys. The journalist 
published later what she considered lies about the group. She agreed to my somewhat vague 
request to be allowed to ‘hang out’ with the group. Confirming my anxieties, Francesca 
expressed her worries that I might be attacked by members at the stadium because I may be 
mistaken for an undercover police officer. For this reason she argued that one of the Boys, 
Antonio - who at 19 years of age was one of the youngest in the group but was very trusted- 
would keep an eye on me. I met Antonio quite a few times in the company of Todde. At the 
time, Todde was working in the head office of the Boys and was a diffidato (banned from the 
stadium). Antonio accepted the role as my ‘minder’. In fact, he was curious about my 
presence and my living in London, which was a city that he considered admirably ‘cool’. 
Despite the ‘cool effect’ I brought with me, the worries of Francesca became a reality. During 
the Roma-Lazio fixture of 2005, after having been invited by the Boys to watch the game 
from their position in curva sud and whilst using a tape recorder to record notes and record 
chants, I was approached by one individual who asked me in a threatening way if I was a 
guardia (police officer). Antonio immediately came over to speak with me to show that I was 
accepted and hence staved off possible violence. After a few more meetings at the head office 
and the emergence of mutual empathy inspired by my previous university background in 
Law, Todde became my gatekeeper. 
My access to the Irriducibili’s world was, instead, more complicated. The group is far 
bigger in membership – some 6,000-7,000 people gather in the curva nord – than the Boys, 
who number 200 and are just one group amongst others who meet in the curva sud. I 
attempted to contact the Boxer, who had a Rome-wide reputation. I asked the men selling 
Irriducibili merchandise at the stadium for his whereabouts. They became increasingly 
agitated and hostile as I questioned them. I decided not to persist with this line of inquiry. My 
neighbour at the game, overhearing my request, explained that the Boxer was a person with 
strong personality who is known by every Lazio footballer, the club management and all 
regional sports journalists. My neighbour went on to indicate that he controlled his own 
publicity.  
Having failed to meet with the group at the stadium, I pursued the Irriducibili in their 
sede near the Roman working class district of Ostiense, wherein they held meetings and 
prepared banners and choreographies for the matches. The owner of an adjacent shop 
informed me that the office was rarely opened because of supposedly constant surveillance 
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by the Digos (Divisione per le Investigazioni Generali e le Operazioni Speciali)8, the elite 
anti-terrorist police unit that operates in every Italian province. Fearing arrest, the Irriducibili 
meetings were discreet without a routine program or timetable. The Irriducibili’s 
merchandising warehouse was the next point of contact that I explored. The Irriducibili 
produced dedicated designer label hats, jackets, shirts, scarves and stickers amongst other 
merchandise. After a few attempts, I found the telephone number for the warehouse. By 
telephone, I underwent endless security ‘screenings’ from the workers in the merchandising 
warehouse to be permitted to speak by telephone to a person near to one of the four leaders. 
Having taken my phone number with a promise to call me back, I waited – and waited – for a 
response from a representative of the Irriducibili. Desperate and ready to give up, I spoke to a 
member of the group who had lived in London previously. He promised to help me speak to 
the Boxer. Knowing the importance of the Irriducibili for my research, I also played my 
trump card. The Italian mother figure (La Mamma), the fulcrum of Italian families and 
society, is revered and a topic of sociological enquiry in itself. Eventually my mother called 
the warehouse again explained to the interlocutor that I was a student, and would fail to 
receive my PhD if I could not speak to the Boxer. The ‘mother avenue’ obtained what I and 
other sociologists before me had tried in vain to achieve. The Boxer agreed to meet with me 
at the Olympic Stadium. I met him during a Lazio-Inter match in 2005. As usual, he was very 
busy with preparations for the match, choreographies and chants. At the same time he was the 
only leader who was not banned from the stadium. He, thus, had the responsibility to lead his 
‘warriors’. After asking me questions about my research and why I chose the Irriducibili, he 
agreed to be my gatekeeper. The Boxer had relatives in London and liked the city, but most 
of all; he was quite impressed that I was working as an academic abroad. We agreed that no 
information about the Irriducibili would be discussed with the Boys and viceversa. From that 
moment, my access to the Irriducibili’s social world became a reality. After long 
negotiations, I obtained the authorisation for the research from the other three Irriducibili 
                                                
8
 The Digos was established in 1978 via decree of the Minister of the Interior in the context of the reform of the 
Italian Secret Services. The main aims of the unit are to investigate and repress:  
- national and international terrorist organizations;  
- subversive associations which promote social divisions inciting violence for racial, ethnic, or religious motives  
- associations which pursue the objective of the destruction of the independence and of the unity of the Italian 
State or the change of the constitutional order by illegal means. 
- military or para-military associations  
- links among national and international terrorist organizations with the flows of clandestine immigration and 
international weapons traffic  
- informatics terrorism 
- phenomena of  "group violence " promoted by ideologies  
- episodes of violence at sports events accomplished by organized factions  
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leaders – Giorgio, Giovanni and Federico. Once in the field, a combination of ‘snowball’ and 
convenience sampling was utilised to access data (Bryman, 2008).  
 
2.4 Data Collection and Analysis  
To gather data9, I used triangulation. As the term suggests, this approach employs 
more than one method to collect information (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995). I employed 
the ‘Participant as Observer’ role (Gold , 1958); the UltraS knew of my researcher status and 
interacted with me regularly. I observed the subjects participating in a variety of activities at 
the stadium (preparing the choreographies, participating in match day and commenting on the 
clubs and rival fans). Just as important, I observed the groups outside of the stadium during 
their interactions with society, at their sedi (head offices) or leisure locations such as pubs. 
With some members of the groups I adopted a more ‘formal’ research role, with others a 
more relaxed open approach, depending on circumstances. The crucial element of my 
strategy, however, was a ‘sympathetic attitude’ (Fielding, 1981). This approach implies 
suspension of the researcher’s political ideas and preconceptions in an effort to obtain an 
objective inquiry. The duration of such observations ranged from four hours in the mornings, 
to daylong immersion at the stadium or at their head offices. At times, observation periods 
extended to late in the evenings at pubs. The groups accepted me; my closeness to them was 
important to the reliability of my accounts. I believe that good ethnographic research goes 
beyond the fieldwork milieu. As Hobbs argued, the researcher’s experiential and interpretive 
faculties continue to function long after the gate to the field has been closed (Hobbs, in 
Hobbs and May 2002, p.  48). Reflections made outside of the fieldwork context are crucial 
in what follows and serve as a good barrier to any accusations of ‘going native’ (Armstrong, 
1998). 
I complemented the Participant-Observation method with semi-structured interviews 
focusing on influential members (7individuals) and casual conversations with 21 individuals 
(Haenfler 2004) carried out mostly at their sedi, but in a few instances at the stadium. Some 
members, such as the leaders, were interviewed several times. The length of the interviews 
varied according to the interest of the UltraS members in voicing their opinions. The semi-
structured interviews were recorded with a digital recording device, then transcribed, coded 
and analysed. Casual conversations and observational notes were also written using a 
notebook. In some circumstances, including at the stadium or during meetings, I wrote notes 
                                                
9
 The data of this research research were collected between  2003 and 2009. 
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into my mobile phone and, when home, immediately expanded the brief words into more 
elaborate field notes. In writing the field notes, I followed one of the maxims of ethnography: 
not speaking to anyone about what had occurred until the field notes were completed. Such 
precautions avoid the possibility that such ‘chats’ can ‘rob note-writing of its psychological 
immediacy and emotional release, writing the day’s events becomes a stale recounting rather 
than a cathartic outpouring’ (Emerson et al. 1995, p. 41). Writing is an integral part of the 
research from the outset (Anderson, in Hobbs and Wright, 2006, p. 55). My field notes 
include narratives and, most importantly, indications about how the UltraS represent 
themselves and react in their surroundings. Field notes are essential to explanatory analysis 
(Katz, 2002). Figure 1 shows a field note, one of the first taken while trying to access the 
Boys group. 
 
Fig1: Sample of Reflexive Fieldnote (2004) 
 
Gathered data and consulted documents ranged from newspaper articles, the groups’ fanzines 
(see Fig. 2), their websites, and the musical genres that they favoured.  
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Fig 2: Doc: 23 and 40.The Boys  L’ Onore di Roma (left) and the Irriducibili  
La Voce della Nord (right) 
 
These documents were collected before starting the study in the preparation phase and during 
the research process. In the preparation phase, such a strategy helped me to become 
acquainted with the groups and provoked thoughts about issues and specific topics to 
examine. Such information was important during the initial contact with the groups as I was 
able to demonstrate knowledge about their culture and history. I exchanged e-mails with 
some group members who helped me not only to organise meetings, but also to acquire 
information. Figure 3 shows a recent email from Todde, which was sent to arrange a meeting 
in London in 2009 to speak about the UltraS Italia. 
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Fig 3 :Docum 80; Todde’s email (2009) 
 
 
 
Data were coded according to specific topics of interest (Haenfler, 2004): ideology, 
personal traits, organisation, repression, politics, media, and norms. The data were read, 
compared and re-read to identify phrases, terms and patterns of behaviour (Bogdan and 
Biklen, 1992). For instance, from the groups’ traits topic, the themes of non omologati (non-
conformist) and the ‘Warrior Spirit’ emerged. I continued to refine these themes while 
collecting new data.In seeking to achieve an outcome that would be both reliable and 
authentic (Lincoln and Guba, 1985), I complemented triangulation with participant 
validation, negative case analysis and data saturation. This method helped to make evidence 
clear and logical. Most importantly, this research strategy highlighted the ‘Framing’ 
processes of the groups and their implications for understanding the interplay between the 
groups and ‘the outsiders’ (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995; Guba and Lincoln 1989; Lincoln 
and Guba 1985). To this end, I provided to Todde and the Boxer a copy of their interviews 
and a summary of my study (Dodge and Geis, in Hobbs and Wright, 2006), underlining my 
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evaluation about the groups’ logic and the concept of the football stadium as the 
contemporary Agorà. The latter concept was readily accepted (see section B). The logic of 
the groups was also well received as a fair representation of UltraS. The race analysis was 
acknowledged, although they both disagreed to a degree with the conclusion. More 
specifically, they both denied and played down the racist display as part of the ‘normal’ 
football rivalry dialectic. This response was expected; such research ‘dialogue’ aims not to 
generate agreement or consensus, but to note the unavoidable differences between the 
concerns of ethnographers and those whom they have represented (Emerson and Pollner, 
1992, pp. 95-96). 
I maintained regular contact with the Boxer until he was arrested with the other three 
Irriducibili leaders in 2006 for what became known as the Lotito affair. Claudio Lotito, the 
President of SS Lazio, became hated by the group in this period. In 2005, the Irriducibili 
accused Lotito of financial speculation – at the expense of the team – in his effort to build a 
new stadium for the club. The dispute soon spiralled with numerous threats made against the 
President. The Irriducibili then declared their support for Giorgio Chinaglia, who sought to 
facilitate the purchase of the club by an elusive Hungarian-based business group. Chinaglia 
was subsequently found guilty of financial manipulation and obstruction of the Consob (The 
National Commission for Societies and Stock Market).10 The leaders of the Irriducibili, while 
declaring that they were unaware of the non-existence of Chinaglia’s investment group, were 
also arrested on similar charges (see chapter 12). I was unable to go to Rome to meet the 
Boxer and speak directly with him about the latest developments because he was under house 
arrest. One of my friends went to the Irriducibili’s warehouse to collect a scarf of the group 
on my behalf. After her visit to the warehouse, she called to tell me that the warehouse had 
been raided by the police the previous day. One of the group members, who was nearby, told 
her to go to a shop in the centre of Rome to collect the scarf. In doing so, she found the owner 
of the shop to be nervous and reluctant to show her any product that bore ideological 
symbols; however, upon mentioning the name of the Boxer and explaining my study, he 
revealed a hidden scarf. From that moment, via different sources – including Todde – I was to 
learn details of a long-term police operation targeting the UltraS of the Italian capital.  
My relationship with Todde remains unchanged. We met in London in February 2009 
before the occasion of the Arsenal-Roma match (European Champions league fixture) where 
he would have met some members of the UltraS Italia; he will likely play an important role 
                                                
10
 Cf. La  Repubblica. (online edition).(2007,28, November): 
www.repubblica.it/2007/11/sezioni/sport/calcio/multa-chinaglia/multa-chinaglia/multa-chinaglia.html) 
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in future inquiries that do not have football as the exclusive topic. The research process is, 
thus, continuously negotiated and unfinished. What is presented here can be considered a 
classic ethnography. Friends were made and lost and the research both matured and regressed 
over time. It is a journey that is often avoided because not all want to interact with what 
Fielding (1981) would term ‘an unloved group’ nor seek to support the groups studied, but in 
this case the groups under investigation were afforded a sense of indulgence not usually 
permitted by their critics. 
What follows intends to evaluate the groups’ shared social world; in such setting that 
the UltraS motivations take shape (Klandermans and Mayer, 2006). 
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SECTION A 
THE BOYS AND IRRIDUCIBILI’S SOCIAL WORLD  
 
 
 
Fig 4. The Olympic Stadium, Rome 
 
The football stadium is ostensibly a ‘non-location’, a political and cultural ‘free zone’. 
It is at the same time an integral part of the city and indeed of the nation, where people 
regularly gather to collectively express passion for their football teams. Such passion 
involves celebration, joy, intimidation, and antagonism (cf. Tuan, 1977).  
The Boys and the Irriducibili curve are located in the city’s Olympic Stadium, the 
main sports stadium of Rome. The stadium is part of the historical sports complex of the 
Foro Italico 11 and originally was named Stadio dei Cipressi (Cypress Trees Stadium). The 
construction of the stadium began in 1928 under the direction of architect Luigi Walter 
Moretti. When finished in 1937, the structure became part of the fascist project that sought to 
give the capital a ‘sport city’ ethos, thereby symbolising the importance that fascist leader 
Benito Mussolini gave to the Italian sporting body in his pursuit of a fascist-led national 
identity (Bianda et al. 1983). The project was called Foro Mussolini and was renamed Foro 
Italico (Italian Forum) after the war and Mussolini’s death. During the fascist period (1922-
1943), the stadium hosted sports events, parades and fascist rallies. In May 1938, it was the 
site of celebration for the visit of Adolf Hitler. In December 1950, the architects Carlo 
                                                
11
 For more information on the stadium a reader is directed to Bulletin du Comité International Olympique, May 
1958, No. 62; The XVII Olympiad Rome 1960 (Volume One) and D.Goldblatt.(2004). Soccer Yearbook: The 
Complete Guide to the World Game. London:DK Publishing. 
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Roccatelli and Annibale Vitellozzi began work to enlarge the stadium (named at the time 
Stadio dei Centomila or Stadium of the One Hundred Thousand). It was to become the 
‘Olympic Stadium’ in honour of the XVII Olympic Games in 1960, which were hosted by 
Rome. Since then it has staged major international sports events.12  
The Olympic Stadium  manifests demarcations that reflect the city ; it hosts the 
fixtures of both teams that are supported by the UltraS of this study. Such a setting, however, 
did not tell an obvious story to the inquisitor. There were layers of meanings and, in a 
Foucauldian (1970) sense, levels of excavation to be explored in the search for what was 
‘really’ happening. This section endeavours to inform the reader of the sense of place 
occupied by both UltraS groups. It provides an explanation of the historical development of 
the curve (wherein the Boys and the Irriducibili articulate their societal and political non-
conformity) and of the concomitant tales told around the groups’ respective histories and 
organisations. In this section, I set out the crucial social historical aspects of the UltraS. 
Chapters 3 and 4, elaborate the main social history and key cultural features of the Roma and 
Lazio UltraS, bringing out in particular their distinctive social identities.  This section, 
therefore, sets the scene in a sociological sense, enabling later sections to explore the UltraS 
in greater analytical depth and empirical detail. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
12
 The stadium was restructered for the 1990 World Cup hosted by Italy. The curve were brought nearer  the 
pitch by nine metres; more seats were covered, plastic seats and two large screens were installed for 
broadcasting. The capacity of the stadium was reduced to 82,000 (all seated) giving the stadium  14th position in 
the list of the world’s largest football stadiums and second position in Italy after the Meazza Stadium in Milan. 
The stadium hosted several Italia ’90 World Cup matches including the final between Germany and Argentina. 
Cf. http://puntosport.net/gli-speciali-di-puntosport/i-templi-del-calcio/11782/stadio-olimpico-roma.php 
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Chapter 3 
Rome and Glory: The curva sud and the Boys  
 
The complex evolution (due to many schisms) of the curva sud  and its hardcore fans 
is perhaps best described by the following flow chart (below), which has been reconstructed 
with the help of Lorenzo, the webmaster of the best known site dedicated to the AS Roma, 
www.astromaultras.it, and Todde: 
1967: The Beginnings 
Guerriglieri curva sud [Curva sud Warriors], Fossa dei Lupi [Wolves Den], Pantere Giallorosse 
[Yellow-Red Panthers] 
 
1970’s – Continuation and Innovation 
Fossa dei Lupi and Pantere Giallorosse 
Boys (1972), Fedayn (1972) 
 
 
 
 
1977 Fusion 
Commando UltraS Curva Sud (CUCS) 
 
1980’s - Accommodation 
Boys, CUCS and Fedayn 
 
1987 - Schism 
Boys and Fedayn 
 
 
 
                                
                                    Vecchio CUCS                  CUCS GAM 
 
1990’s – UltraS emergence 
Boys, Fedayn, La Vecchia Guardia [The Old Guard], Opposta Fazione [Oppposite Faction], Frangia 
Ostile [Hostile Faction], Arditi [Temerarious], AS Roma UltraS, Lupi [Wolves], CUCS 
21st Century  
AS Roma UltraS, Boys, Fedayn, Padroni di Roma [Owners of Rome]; Gruppi di quartiere [Groups 
Representing Roman districts such as S. Lorenzo- Primavall], Giovinezza [Youth]; Arditi, Offensiva 
Ultras, Eterna Legione. 
 
The starting point of Roma’s tifo can be traced to the late 1960s when groups of 
young fans – the majority aged around 16 years – began to gather in numbers on the curve of 
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the Olympic stadium (C.f. Garsia,2004).  These were the first AS Roma hardcore, organised 
fans. As was then fashionable, the nomenclature to celebrate the groups was borrowed from 
military heroism (hence the tag of Arditi, Eterna Legione) and from predatory animals 
(Wolves and Panthers). A few years later, at the beginning of the 1970s, the Boys Roma was 
formed; they displayed since their origin a neo-fascist ideology in both their modes of 
following and articulations of support.  
In 1977, the Fedayn, Pantere and Fossa dei Leoni gatherings collectively constituted 
the Commando UltraS Curva Sud (CUCS).13This fusion was considered necessary to 
strengthen the sense of unity among AS Roma supporters. The CUCS appeared for the first 
time in a Roma-Sampdoria fixture with the longest banner ever seen in an Italian curva at the 
time (42 metres in length) which proclaimed their name. Under this banner, all other AS 
Roma groups spontaneously gathered (Garsia, 2004). From this combination of words and 
artefact, the CUCS became the most nationally recognised representative fan entity of AS 
Roma, respected by similar groups because of their organisational capabilities and, when 
required, their fighting ability. From the end of the 1970s until 1987, the CUCS were one of 
the most important Italian supporter groups, manifesting the two important traits of the Italian 
hardcore football fans groups: consistency in numbers and cohesiveness in choreography and 
‘spirit’, which was considered as a combination of loyalty, loudness in chants and a 
willingness to trespass into ‘territories’ belonging to rival fans at and around both home and 
away games (Cf.Garsia, 2004).  
The shared enthusiasm, which brought the CUCS together, was also the reason for 
their demise. In 1987, schisms developed in the CUCS that centred on the club Presidency. 
President Dino Viola sold team captain Carlo Ancelotti to AC Milan and replaced him with 
Lionello Manfredonia, a former Lazio player hated by Roma supporters as he was, in their 
eyes, the personification of Lazio. He had, unforgivably, once made insulting gestures to the 
Romanisti during a derby game. Manfredonia’s arrival split the CUCS into the Old CUCS 
(who were prepared to forget the insult) and the CUCS-GAM (Group Against 
Manfredonia).14 The radical and tougher elements of the latter then shifted the curva ideology 
to one that supported both the football club and the City of Rome and used the slogan Roma e 
Gloria (Rome and Glory), underlining not only the pursuit of football glory but, just as 
importantly, the glory of the capital city, the one-time centre of power of the Roman Empire. 
Around the time of the schism, the Opposta Fazione (Opposite Faction) appeared in the 
                                                
13
 Cf.http:// asromaultras.it 
14
 Cf. http:// asromaultras.it 
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curva sud. This group was an elitist, self-selecting gathering that had been founded for 
showing other AS Roma groups the UltraS values founded as they were on an intransigent 
mentality based in neo-fascist ideology. To this end, the group was notably ‘hard’ in fights 
and offered no compromise in their opposition to the football establishment. The Opposta 
Fazione was an example of ‘true’ UltraS. 
From the late 1980s and inspired by Opposta Fazione, political ideology became 
more evident in the curva sud. Out of this development, the UltraS started to emerge. At the 
time, many vecchi (older leaders) retired as they were disappointed by how their world was 
changing, although they did not stop being Roma tifosi. In 1993-1994, the CUCS re-grouped 
and some of the CUCS, in their view for the good of Roma, decided to unite with the older 
CUCS (Garsia, 2004). However, changes in the curva sud were unstoppable and the CUCS, 
being unable to attract many new members, lost their ascendancy. In 1999, the Boys became 
the leaders of the curva sud.   
 
‘The Boys brought a massive contribution to the CUCS acting with a behavioural logic 
that was tough and intransigent. This occurred until they decided to show their banner 
again for the Roma-Liverpool Champions Cup final. Many misunderstandings and a 
thousand differences (one was the political ideology promoted by the group) provoked 
the group to leave the CUCS and exist autonomously. The Boys wanted to be an 
‘action group’ capable both of facing the ‘enemy’ immediately and commanding 
fear… During that period, the Boys were always the first to look for a battle (against 
rival fans) and never found anyone capable of making them retreat. In spite of the 
many difficulties; warnings from the authorities, repression from the police, we were 
always at our place to defend the city and the shirt. It has not been easy, but today we 
are proud to be still admired and feared. We have never hidden and never will.’15  
 
Such a statement underpins the pride that the members of the Boys have for both their history 
and its associated logic. Since their constitution in 1972, as the above document illustrates, 
the Boys have sought to be an elitist group. Despite the 35 years between their inception and 
this research, the beginnings of the Boys are still considered a road map to some 
contemporary aficionados. A perfect representative of the group is Todde; he originates from 
a middle-class family, lives in an affluent Roma district. Todde, as previously mentioned, has 
a university background in law and a passion for history, especially that of the Roman 
Empire. He is able to perceptively articulate his opinions and beliefs, despite the potential 
risks of being considered a ‘hooligan thug’. His arguments pertaining to the nature of the 
Boys are informed: 
 
                                                
15
 Document obtained from the Boys in 2005. 
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‘In 1972, Antonio Bongi manifested the first steps of the ‘furie giallorosse’ [yellow-
red furies]. Their political sympathies, their rivalries with other groups and their anti-
system- oppositional style were displayed long before the UltraS movement had 
made its first steps in Italy. The Boys of San Inter (1969) and the Boys Roma (1972) 
were the pioneers of the UltraS thinking; of a behavioural style to be adopted seven 
days a week not only inside the stadium and not only during a meaningless football 
match that lasts only 90 minutes.... ’ 
 
The above passage demonstrates not only the sophistication of the UltraS arguments used to 
cite historical and political events when describing the evolution of the groups, but can be 
considered a ‘world-view’ or at least the foundation of a distinctive cultural trait that makes a 
fundamental claim on the identity of group members. 
Presenting the very first picture of the Boys then in the curva nord (see below), Todde 
explains the early days:   
‘They are all kids, you can see from the faces. They gathered in the curva nord, 
which was -and still is - occupied alternate weeks by Lazio fans or by other teams’ 
supporters because there was no place for them in the curva sud being as they were 
the antithesis of the typical curva sud Roma fans which was at the time mainly 
communist in sympathy. Their motto was ‘Odiati e Fieri! Boys Roma oltre la morte!’ 
[Hated and Proud! Boys Roma Beyond Death]’ 
 
 
Fig. 5. Beyond Death: The Boys in the mid-1970s 
 
Whilst talking, Todde revealed a manuscript written by Antonio Bongi, which accounts for 
the origins of the Roma UltraS: 
‘We were in curva nord and we had the right [negotiated with the club officials] to 
have our own banner and four free tickets every match. We arrived at the stadium 
when the gates opened because we needed to position ourselves. I remember being 
impressed by the Torino UltraS who had already 50 banners in their end; I tried to 
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emulate them to save our voices. We started our chants when the referee whistled the 
beginning of the match. We had 200 drums, megaphones even electric trumpets 
connected to car batteries that made an infernal noise. We organised the buses to go 
to away matches and every now and then even the mothers of some of the members 
joined us!... I remember yellow-red trains (the same colour of the Roma team kit 
used) of carriages packed full of Roma supporters.  
 
I then had my first experience with violence. The first fights astonished me. It was at 
Torino in 1973. The UltraS of Torino - notoriously left wing sympathisers - came to 
our end with sticks and wearing motorbike helmets. They stole our banner and some 
of us were assaulted. They tore and burnt the banner of the R.C. Giuliano Taccola [a 
Roma UltraS group] in the Maratona end; perhaps the most beautiful banner of the 
yellow-red supporters…These were the first signs of the ‘piombo years’ (bullet years) 
with political divisions evident even in the stadia. In the curva sud groups such as 
ours appeared. On the muretto (the small wall) appeared the banner proclaiming 
Guerriglieri della Sud (Warriors of the Sud) with their extreme right wing ideology. 
On the opposite side appeared the Fedayn from Quadraro-Cinecitta16. They were 
communists; their leader Roberto Rulli was a well-known militant and idealist. The 
Fossa dei Lupi (the Wolves den) was from Monte Cervialto, led by Stefano 
Scarciofolo and Vittorio Trenta. The Brigate Giallorosse came from Torrespaccata. 
The Commandos Lupi was organised by guys from Monteverde. Then there were the 
Pantere Giallorosse (The Panthers) and other minor groups…’ 
 
Although the history of the group is important for understanding the cultural roots of 
the Boys, this enquiry required a snapshot of the Boys of the 21st century. Marco (in his mid-
20s) was willing to articulate the group structure and organisation: 
Q: How does a Roma supporter become one of the Boys?  
M: It is a pretty close group… it occurs mainly via friendship. We are a group with a 
strict organisation. We have a strong nucleus at Pomezia (a small township outside 
Rome) then another nucleus at Cerveteri (another Roman township) and another in 
Rome. We thus have some problems meeting mostly because of the distances 
involved but hold evening meetings over a pizza or beer. We meet weekly [in the 
head-office]. If Roma plays in the afternoon, we meet at 11 at the head office; if 
Roma plays at 8.30 in the evening, we meet at 6.30. 
 
Q: How many members are active in the Boys? 
M: Thirty; then we have people that pay for the membership but as I see it only do so 
for fashion ,being one of the Boys is pretty cool; they want ‘to be’ but not ‘belong’ 
working very little for the common good of the group. ‘Active’, means coming to the 
stadium regularly helping with banners etc.. we are a 30-strong elite, the others within 
number around 200. 
 
Q: I heard the Boys have some selection criteria to avoid the cani sciolti 
(mugwumps) can you explain how selection is made?  
M: The group grows via contacts; for instance I belong to the Boys and I can 
introduce a friend. The group then see if they like him or not and eventually he 
                                                
16
 The Quadraro district is home to a considerable number of Roma Fedayn and Lazio Irriducibili. It is a 
populous working-class districts of Rome which traditionally supported the politics of the Italian Communist 
Party (PCI). 
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becomes part of the group or he is rejected. In this way there is an informal selection 
and we have time to impart the ideals and values that he should possess in belonging. 
Our group is based on friendship and most of all trust… you must understand that it 
helps in extreme situations in the street knowing your mates will help you. You also 
see how a guy performs in the street. If you are afraid in the street, you are afraid in 
the stadium. We have a special sign that one is part of our elite group which is the 
insignia of the rising sun [symbolising the re-birth trait of fascism] worn on our hats. 
 
 
The sense of bond and togetherness is something forever stressed by the Boys. The 
UltraS members live ‘their’ battles in what they perceive as unfriendly locations, in the 
Italian society – where their ideology places them as ‘strangers’ – and within the football 
stadium where their very existence is challenged by the Italian authorities, the football 
institutions and the police. For this reason, la curva and their sedi are conceived of as places 
of refuge where they can share their feelings with their peers or in neo-fascist terms with their 
camerati (comrades). 17 
 
Q: Basically, you have a group within the group?  
M: Yes, you can get our membership card and come with us in the stadium but only 
‘the elite’ are the vanguard of the Boys. You understand who is part of the elite 
because when we are about to start action the people displaying the rising sun are at 
the front. We have a defining chant repeated three times in the curva when we begin 
confrontations against our opponents [be they police or rival UltraS]. A leader shouts: 
‘Chi siamo noi?’ [Who are we?] which is repeated three times; the collective answer 
in rhyme is ‘contro il sistema la gioventu’ si scaglia, boia chi molla e’ il grido di 
battaglia’ [Against the system the youth fight, damned are those who give up the 
battle chant]. There is a strong structure and sense of order. This can only be 
understood by taking into consideration that ours is a way of life that exists beyond 
the stadium. We have our dress code and language .The word ‘comrade’ is often used 
as is the Roman salute. The Celtic cross as a pendant or depicted in our tattoos is 
widely evident. We are, you might say, a subculture within both the stadium and 
society.  
 
Q: How is the group structured?  
M: We have a charismatic leader - the ‘big boss’ Paolo Zappavigna [Zapata], and we 
have the’ nuova guardia’ (direttivo) consisting of five guys. Then come the ‘ordinary’ 
guys. 
 
The Boys leadership has changed several times; mostly via violence. The usual procedure is 
that a group from a Rome district emerges and gets involved in violence with pre-existing 
leaders. The most recent change in leadership was brought about by two cousins. One – the 
toughest – was the ‘warrior’, the other was more of a politician. The leader Paolo Zappavigna 
was in control of the Boys group from 2001 until his death in 2005. Paolo died while this 
                                                
17
 The etymology of this term derives from camera (room) and evokes feelings of privacy and intimacy and a 
common safe location (Dechezelles,  2008). 
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project was being researched at the young age of 40 in a motorcycle accident. In 2001, 
Zappavigna found the Boys in a difficult situation; in the group were people considered at 
times out of control, disrespectful to the hierarchy and quickly prone to violence for its own 
sake in and around the football match. This for Zappavigna was not the UltraS code. Such 
reprehensible behaviour had to be stopped, consequently, Zappavigna and his cousin Paolo, 
together with other members of the direttivo, re-established order in the Boys. Crucially, the 
Boys were only one gathering amongst half a dozen in the curva sud; they did not control the 
others, nor did they claim to. In turn, the others left the Boys alone. In this accommodation, it 
was each to their own.  
 
Q: Marco, How do you become a member of the Boys direttivo? 
M: Seniority in years as well as charisma; in the direttivo there are people aged 18-30 
and me.  
Q: So why are you in the direttivo? 
M: Because I am charismatic!! [laugh]… 
 
 
The concept of ‘charisma’ emerges as a constant attribute admired and desired in both the 
Boys Roma and Irriducibili. Several studies in political science have focused on this concept 
and its link to the leadership of extremist gatherings (both political and religious) to make 
sense of group dynamics (Der Brug and Mughan 2007; Madsen and Snow 1991). It was 
evident that both UltraS groups had at their apex a charismatic leadership – Paolo 
Zappavigna for the Boys and Giorgio, Federico, Giovanni and the Boxer for the Irriducibili. 
As Der Brug and Mughan (2007) underline, the charismatic leader ‘is obeyed not by virtue of 
a custom or a law, but by virtue of the faith he inspires’ (p. 31). The main determinants of the 
success of charismatic leaders are also their perceived personal and exceptional merits 
(Charlot, 1971, p. 43). For an UltraS, such men are not only respected by their ability to fight 
but for the strong convictions about how to lead their lives.  
 
Q: Marco, How are the messages on the banners agreed? 
M: Some 80% of the ideas start from the ‘big boss’; if the youngsters want to propose 
an idea this is taken into consideration democratically by the direttivo that analyse it 
and give their evaluation. The idea is studied and revised until Thursday then on 
Friday and Saturday 3–4 Boys take care of the banner in 2-3 different places and the 
banner is made. For derby games, the preparation is longer with 10-15 Boys working 
on them because the banners can be very large. 
  
Q: How does the group find money for its activities?  
M: From selling apparel (hats, scarves, stickers, shirts, sweatshirts, flags etc..) 10% of 
income goes to the Boys as a group and 90% goes to the shop owner. Then self-
taxation monies we earn are given to the cause and other monies come from 
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collections at the Stadium from the other supporters via a box where people, if 
willing, leave donations. 
 
Q: Which gemellaggi [group twinnings] do you have?  
M: Our ‘gemellaggi’ are political; the only friendship is with Taranto and abroad 
with the ultrá Sur of Real Madrid. The ultrá Sur often come to Italy and are allied 
with the Irriducibili. Our ‘big boss’ introduced them to the boss of the Irriducibili. 
We have also gemellaggi with Benfica of Lisbon and Panathinaikos of Athens who 
share our ideology.   
 
We have problems, however, because not all our direttivo can travel abroad because 
of restriction orders on movement. You have to consider that we [Roma neo-fascist 
UltraS] have a specific hate for the English based on our ideology, we are not like the 
Irriducibili who have some sympathies for them because they share the same style. 
We are first Romans then UltraS our style of supporting is ‘Italian’ not British!! The 
English are a shit race by nature, they are arrogant. There is an old saying ‘dio 
stramaledica gli inglesi’18 [God curse the English!]. We support the Irish Republican 
cause....  
 
Q: Is there one particular gathering that you dislike?  
M: The fights with other groups arise mostly out of traditions; an exception is Siena. 
This is a hate born in our generation and our people that will continue in ten years 
time and longer [Siena fans are renowned ‘communists’ which elicits hostility from 
the Boys.]. 
 
 
In the above responses, Marco mentions two elements that differentiate the UltraS behaviour 
from other hardcore football supporters (ultrá). Both elements are influenced by political 
ideology. Political ideology not only strongly characterises the UltraS actions outside of the 
stadium, it also directs their behaviour as football supporters. The first element of note is the 
gemellaggi (twinnings or friendship with a similar group); the main criterion for such a 
twinning is ideological. Such twinnings are generally based on the value of rispetto (respect), 
which means that groups sharing similar logic can enjoy this status. The UltraS respect only 
camerati, regardless of nationality. The Roma UltraS had twinnings with comrades from 
Benfica (Portugal), Hammarby (Sweden) and Real Madrid (Spain), while the Irriducibili had 
twinnings with Espanyol, Real Madrid (Spain) Werder Bremen, Lokomotiv Leipzig and 
Lipsia (Germany), Panathinaikos (Greece) and Paris St. Germain (France).  
A second crucial element is the reluctance in making twinnings with English groups. 
The Boys are more vehemently opposed to the English than the Irriducibili, which had in the 
past established a twinning with Chelsea fans. The Boys articulated aggressive sentiments, as 
Marco demonstrates in the previous statement, towards anything from the UK. This sentiment 
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 A slogan pronounced for the first time by the Italian–fascist journalist, Mario Appelius during the Second 
World War (Cf. Sposito, 2002). 
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was not without contradictions, considering that quite a few members considered London to 
be a ‘cool’ city. The ideological hatred that they had for the English maybe explained as part 
of their Italian neo-fascist make-up. Anti-English sentiments are traceable to the Second 
World War and arise from the role that the UK played in the defeat of Italian fascism. 
However, Marco’s hostility towards the English is not shared by all in the neo-fascist world 
and is not reciprocated by extreme right groups in the UK. International political alliances of 
the extreme right movements support this distinction. The neo-fascist Forza Nuova, chaired 
by the Italian born Roberto Fiore and quite popular among the Irriducibili, has close links 
with the British National Front and the UK Third Position (The Times-online-16 August, 
2009). The Third Positionist magazine Political Soldier has a web store titled Final Conflict 
that sells merchandise of national and international neo-fascist groups. As Figure 6 shows, 
the Irriducibili and its paraphernalia are quite ‘trendy’.19 
 
Fig 6. Badges to wear for the Final Conflict 
 
This enlightening history and ideological explanation was intended to illustrate the 
complexity of the UltraS and the evolution of the curva sud. Having roles in both football 
and beyond, being an UltraS can be understood as a lived philosophy in which individuals are 
– ideally – prepared to agitate, articulate and ultimately assault in pursuit of a variety of aims. 
                                                
19
 The web sold the Irriducibili badge  for the price of £1.00 . The group is introduced as the hardline nationalist 
and fascist supporters of Lazio Football Club. Website accessed Monday, 26 January 2009 
http://politicalsoldier.netfirms.com/shop//catalog/product_info.php?products_id=1070 
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The causalities described in academic accounts (see chapter 1) are clearly inadequate to 
explain the composition of the UltraS. Furthermore, the UltraS of Lazio, whilst similar in 
some respects to the Boys Roma, are also different as the subsequent account illustrates. 
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Chapter 4 
 
‘Dare, Believe, Be Reckless’: la curva nord and the Irriducibili  
 ‘ 
The first curva nord UltraS group, the Commandos Monteverde Lazio (Greenhill 
Commando Lazio)  appeared in 1971.20 This pioneering gathering manifested a fashion for 
neo-military analogies21 seeking a public profile with their 22-metre long banner.22 Others 
were to join these gathering around the impressive banner whilst football success brought 
additional new members. In May 1974, SS Lazio won the scudetto. This victory and the 
ensuing euphoria provided a motivation for aspirants seeking similar participation and 
nomenclature.23 The Folgore (named after the elite parachute regiment of the Italian Army 
that is much admired by neo-fascist youths) emerged, followed by the Boys and, again 
drawing on the military, the Marines. Some of the latter groups combined to constitute the 
Eagles Supporters, which were formed in 1976. The Eagles Supporters were spectacular for 
the time, accompanied as it was by drums, smoke bombs, confetti and thrown rolls of toilet 
paper. Their attendance averaged 2,000 members per game, which increased to 5,000-6,000 
for important matches, particularly those played against Juventus and Roma.  
A few years later in 1978, the neo-fascist Vikings appeared. They gathered in the 
curva sud and displayed on their banners the Viking drakkar and the sun. 24The ideological 
imprint of this group did not impress everyone on the curva nord and in the late 1970s fights 
often broke out between supporters of the extreme right (among these the Vikings) and the 
more moderate Eagles Supporters. The 1980s, though, were the years in which the Lazio 
UltraS started to increase significantly their notoriety throughout Italy. The SS Lazio’s 
UltraS were respected and feared by many Italian hardcore supporters for both their passion 
and the originality manifested most obviously in their choreographies and chants. Such 
admiration brought alliances with similar groups from Bari, Torino and Trieste. The 1989-
1990 season was important for the curva nord as both Roman teams played home games at 
the Flaminio stadium since the Olympic stadium was being refitted to host the 1990 Italian 
World Cup final (Cf. Melli and Melli, 2005). The Flaminio Stadio, whilst smaller than the 
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 The term UltraS is used in this case because contrary to the Roma Curva Sud ,the curva nord has historically 
a strong link to the Roman neo-fascist youth movement; hence since the beginning the fans groups were 
ideologically oriented. 
21
 Monteverde is the name of a long-standing district of southwest Rome. It includes in its boundaries Villa 
Pamphili, Rome’s biggest park . 
22
 Cf. http://news.lazio.net/2004/03/22/ultras-uniti-nella-guerriglia-ansa/ 
23
 Cf. http://.ultraslazio.it 
24
 Cf. http://ultraslazio.it 
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Olympic stadium, was ideal for football supporters because of the proximity of seating to the 
pitch; in short, supporters were closer to the players. The same season, however, was 
characterised by strong repression of the UltraS by the authorities, as the latter were keen to 
avoid hooligan-related publicity prior to the World Cup. As was occurring elsewhere, the 
Lazio curva nord of the early 1980s saw new fan gatherings that reflected wider social 
changes. The subsequent years illustrated the importance of fan power in the Lazio context. 
The 1982-1983 season saw new groups: Gruppo Sconvolti (Sconvolt Group), UltraS 74 and 
Gruppo Rock (Rock Group).25 Significantly, in 1987, for the first time during a match, the 
central wall of the curva nord did not display the Vikings’ banner. The exclusion of the 
Vikings signified the arrival of a hitherto unknown group. For the first time the banner of the 
Irriducibili was present. This group was to become the main force of the curva nord and the 
Italian UltraS.  
The Irriducibili tell their own stories without external interpretation regarding their 
origins and evolution. In 2005, the Boxer articulated the origins of the Irriducibili by 
providing a document written by the direttivo: 
 
‘Our story starts in the eighties when the Italian UltraS movement was passing 
through a period of renewal. Many small factions were appearing in the various ends 
aiming to present a strong ‘mentalita’ (attitude) uncompromising in its philosophy 
against the system [as represented by the Italian authorities and the Italian football 
establishment] which was no longer manifest by the existing groups which the 
newcomers believed had  lost their initial vitality.  Every Lazio home match was 
organised meticulously; our new group met in a bisca [amusement arcade] in the 
Monteverde district and came up with the idea of wearing football scarves coupled 
with sewn-on football patches in the British style. In the meantime, the co-existence 
with the Eagles became tenser. Quarrels began over the different way of supporting 
[but most importantly] by the fact that many were leaving the Eagles to join our 
group. A Lazio-Barletta game saw the first scuffles between the factions [Irriducibili 
and Eagles] which needed police intervention. 
 
The Irriducibili appeared for the first time in mid October 1987 during a Lazio-
Padova Serie B match. We [Irriducibili] invited to the game many committed to 
Lazio to meet at the ‘muretto’ [a small wall in curva nord] and dislodge the Viking 
group who always gathered there. The name ‘Irriducibili’ was original and suggested 
we would not compromise with the club or the media as many other fan groups had 
done. We wanted to support our team without moralismi [being judgemental] and 
‘sectarism’ [being too harsh] against the previous behaviours of past UltraS which 
had created tension in the Lazio environment. We wanted to express a sense of 
discontinuity from the past, even choosing our own transportation for away matches. 
Instead of the bus provided by the Eagles [supporters club], we chose the train which 
gave us independence from scheduled travel. This proved popular and large numbers 
of fans began to travel with us. We adopted as our mascot Mr Enrich, a little man 
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 http://sslazio1900.it/lazio_curvanord.asp 
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who kicks furiously - the kick signifies rebellion - against the political and football 
system.’ 
 
Although not officially confirmed by the Irriducibili, the origin of their mascot Mr. 
Enrich may have been Andy Capp, a British newspaper cartoon character created by 
Reginald Smythe in the mid-1950s. Andy Capp was a politically incorrect and aggressive 
male, symbolic of the English Northern working class. At the same time, the Irriducibili 
caricature is younger than Capp and wears different clothing – buttoned down sleeveless 
‘polo’ shirts and a ‘pork pie’ hat popular in the British ‘Ska’ and ‘Skinhead’ subcultures of 
late 1960s. 
 
     
Fig. 7: Mr Enrich and Andy Capp: separated at birth? 
 
Since the late 1980s, the Irriducibili of SS Lazio have controlled the part of the curva 
nord which is in close proximity to the pitch. To enter their ‘land’, one must be known or 
invited and must pass the gatekeepers of the Irriducibili – men chosen by virtue of their sense 
of perception and their willingness to challenge ‘outsiders’. The Irriducibili make it their 
business to know everything that occurs in the curva nord. Upon accessing this area, the 
curious would see, at times, men collecting money to fund both social campaigns and the 
materials used to make the banners and pyrotechnics which are crucial to the match day 
spectacle. No extortion was practised; no unofficial tax was levied on those who entered. 
Contributions were voluntary and those collecting were trusted with the monies. In this space, 
the Irriducibili controlled the content of the banners and the nature of the chants. From here, 
the match-day organisation was co-ordinated; fans located here watched the match, discussed 
the game and provided a wide variety of commentary, be it insulting, encouraging, political 
or merely transgressive. The self-appointed leaders of the commentary, armed with tannoys, 
urged the rest to join them. At times, the Irriducibili would single out supporters who were 
not singing. The 'ordinary' (i.e. non-Irriducibili and non-UltraS) fans in proximity that were 
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not participating faced criticism by the protagonists and were encouraged to be more 
participatory with comments along the lines of: 'Come on guys lets sing all together for our 
team; why do you fucking come to the stadium if you do not support your team?' On occasion, 
the leadership could send a few of the Irriducibili to speak to the non-participants to 
encourage them in the virtues of vocal support (field note 34). The Boxer’s document 
elaborates further upon the group challenging beginnings: 
 
‘The Irriducibili’s beginnings were difficult.  We had some flags bearing our name 
but we were different from the ‘ordinary UltraS; we were more unpredictable, ‘Being 
original’ was our motto and every time the more ‘ordinary’ fan looked at us, he 
wondered what we would have organised. At a Lazio-Verona fixture, drums were 
first used for supporting the team. Before a Lazio-Ascoli fixture, we published for the 
first time the ‘Mr Enrich’ fanzine which became very popular in the curva nord.  In 
December 1987 at a game in Genoa, nearly all the Lazio supporters travelled by bus - 
but we  used the train and at the train station 800 supporters who had travelled by bus 
met and followed us; we led this parade all the way  to the Genoa’s Marassi stadium. 
It was to become the new way to ‘introduce’ ourselves to rival supporters. From that 
day, all Lazio fans knew that every away match there was an unofficial bianco-celeste 
train travelling aboard it wearing the Mr Enrich insignia as the self-appointed 
vanguard of Lazio.  
 
The 1989-90 season was the one that Lazio played in the Flaminio stadium. We 
(Irriducibili) were against the refurbishment of the Olympic stadium considering it a 
waste of public money and voiced this opinion in chants at the stadium. This was also 
the year of serious constant and heavy police repression. The first ‘diffide’ (stadium 
banning orders) were issued against us limiting our personal liberty and giving police 
the power to ban from any sports events those whom they ‘considered’ ‘dangerous’. 
During the Lazio-Atalanta fixture the first serious battle between the Irriducibili and 
the riot police occurred; a similar battle occurred at the Roma-Lazio game when we 
voiced our condemnation against the ‘diffide’ with a famous banner stated ‘Dio salvi 
gli UltraS’ [God Help the UltraS]. 
The 1990-91 season saw a return to the now totally changed Olympic Stadium.  We 
did not like it and immediately in an attempt to oppose the diffide that were being 
thrown at us made a banner which read: ’12 in campo? Solo quando lo vogliamo noi!’ 
(Twelve on the pitch? Only when we want it)26 and from that moment we refused to 
chant anymore in the stadium. We decided to strike [no chanting and banners] in the 
first 45 minutes of the match; no other UltraS did this. We also gave up 
choreographies for the derby stating instead our feelings on a banner which read:" lo 
spettacolo colora la curva, la solidarieta’ la rende grande’ [The show makes the curva 
alive, but solidarity makes it great!] We were thus accused in the media of not caring 
for our team. To the contrary the Irriducibili wanted to state how supporting was not 
compulsory, other values also counted, most of all friendship - especially with the 
guys that were banned.’ 
 
                                                
26
 The slogan stressed the importance of the tifosi as the twelfth player as they encouraged the team to never 
give up. Many Italian sports journalists acknowledge the importance of the tifosi in commenting on the 
performance of Italian teams. 
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Not all appeared so negative. The 1990s were also the years of the Union Flag emblem of 
Britain, which was adopted as the global flow of players’ talent provoked new symbols to be 
displayed at Lazio games. In 1992, SS Lazio signed England international Paul Gascoigne. In 
response, the Irriducibili made a banner depicting a pint of English beer and the message ‘it’s 
ready for you’ in honour of his somewhat notorious level of alcohol consumption. During the 
1992-1993 season, the food tycoon Sergio Cragnotti arrived as SS Lazio president and 
brought new hope to the team (Melli, 2000). The same year brought the dissolution of the 
Eagles Supporters. New times brought new personnel and new leaders to the curva nord: the 
Irriducibili. The new president negotiated with the Irriducibili who continued to challenge 
the police. The following account collected from the Boxer tells this story: 
 
‘In the 95-96 season after we stopped Cragnotti selling Beppe Signori; we became the 
most creative curva in Italy. In 1996 the coach Zeman was sacked and Dino Zoff 
replaced him; the Roma derby saw the players received in the curva nord by a 
massive Mr Enrich that covered  the curva and a giant  ‘Lazio’ made up of blue 
balloons. In the 97-98 season the curva nord produced four great choreographies: a 
giant imperial eagle with our motto ‘Osare Creder Spavaldi di Essere’ [Dare, Believe, 
Be Reckless]; the symbol of SS Lazio with the writing ‘Nobilta’ UltraS: da Sempre’ 
[UltraS Noble: From the Beginning] and the banner ‘Noi Piu’ Forti dell Indifferenza’ 
[We are Stronger than the Indifference] by the way of protesting against police 
repression. In January 2000, we created a museum at the Olympic stadium containing 
effigies of the club’s renowned historical figures ranging from founder Bigiarelli to 
Beppe Signori to celebrate the centenary…’  
 
 
The season 1995-1996 was an important one for the group. In this year, their new 
fanzine La Voce Della Nord (The Voice of the North) was published for the first time. It soon 
became the magazine of choice for the whole curva nord. This same season, as the Boxer 
stressed above, witnessed the first strong challenge towards the group by Lazio club 
management, chaired by Sergio Cragnotti. The struggle began in June 1995, when SS Lazio 
top scorer Beppe Signori was sold to Parma. The supporters retaliated with a demonstration 
outside of the head office of SS Lazio, which forced the club to cancel the intended sale (Cf. 
Beneforti and De Salvo, 2000). In 1999-2000, as the club celebrated its centenary, the fans 
did likewise. Before a Lazio-Bologna fixture in January 2000, the curva nord’s celebrations 
began at 10am at the Piazza della Libertá, where the club was founded.27  Over 25,000 
supporters paraded from the piazza to the Olympic stadium. The curva nord, and in particular 
the Irriducibili’s choreographies, were the real entertainment of this day, based as they were 
                                                
27
 Cf. http://ultraslazio.it 
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on a photo-mural of the great people in Lazio’s history. By remarkable coincidence, Lazio 
won its second scudetto in the same season.  
The curva nord is unquestionably controlled by a mixture of charisma on the part of 
the Irriducibili leadership and a sense of respect among the other fans that is invariably 
bound up in fear. Those who poked their noses in the Irriducibili’s business or were seen as a 
threat to the group would be taken care of either immediately in the curva or outside the 
stadium, days later if necessary. However, the Irriducibili did not threaten or assault those 
that they considered insignificant. The violence used, said the protagonists, was being 
employed only when needed. The hegemony of the group and their leaders among the curva 
nord youth was palpable. The young tifosi think that being an Irriducibile is ‘cool’ and enjoy 
wearing their hats, swetashirts, tshirts and other merchandise. The former’s peripheral status 
on the curva has served them well. They could recount in school on Monday their brush with 
the powerful Irriducibili. Their daring is rewarded by the possibility of being considered 
‘hard’ by association.  
The account of the Boxer focused on the history of the group; whilst fascinating, it did 
not inform of their way of financing or how they chose statements for the banners displayed 
in the curva and outside the stadium. Seeking elucidation on such matters, I tried to speak to 
one of the Irriducibili’s leaders, Giorgio. In his forties, Giorgio was not only one of the 
historical leaders of the Irriducibili, but also had been linked by several Italian media reports 
to Forza Nuova.28 Inevitably, the journalistic sources hypothesised a link between the party 
and the Irriducibili; however, this assumption was found to be incorrect. Giorgio was a very 
confident individual, eloquent and passionate in his convictions, as was demonstrated by 
what is known in Roman circles as the due pizze in faccia (‘two pizzas on the face’, a 
derivative of the Roman slang meaning literally ‘two slaps in the face’) episode. The incident 
occurred in August 1999, when the then president of SS Lazio, Sergio Cragnotti, decided 
without precedence to make his club supporters pay an entrance fee to attend the Formello 
(Lazio’s training ground) to watch the squad train. Furthermore, he informed supporters that, 
if wanting to follow Lazio to away matches, they could do so only by using Francorosso tours 
29
 - a company which offered ticket sales and away game packages at a higher price than the 
Irriducibili. The latter started a campaign at the stadium against both of these impositions and 
Cragnotti’s management via banners and chants. In response, the SS Lazio management 
appointed as mediator Guido Paglia, the communications director of the Cirio food company, 
                                                
28
 See chapter 5 for an analysis about Forza Nuova. 
29
 A large Italian travel/holiday company owned by Alpitour. Cf. htpp://alpitour.it 
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one of Cragnotti’s businesses. In the course of mediation, Paglia promised to try to rectify the 
problem; however, this promise was not honoured, thus infuriating the Irriducibili. The battle 
lines were drawn. In October, Lazio management forbade the UltraS from watching the team 
train at Formello. In response, Lazio supporters met for a fan summit at a Rome hotel 
organised by the Irriducibili’s direttivo. On this occasion, Paglia accused the Irriducibili of 
being the main cause of the dispute with the management. In response, Giorgio struck Paglia 
with two slaps (the ‘two pizzas’) to the face and kicked him in the buttocks. Negotiations, 
against all odds, continued with the club and eventually the entry charge to Formello was 
abolished and the Francorosso ticket to away games continued to be sold by the Irriducibili. 
The chief negotiator in this dispute that demonstrated the power of the Irriducibili was 
Giorgio.  
I interviewed Giorgio in 2006. While working in the merchandising warehouse, he 
allowed a few questions to be informally put to him. The first question concerned his 
upbringing. He responded: 
 
‘I was living in a district of Rome in the 1970s called Quadraro, a place where 
exponents of Autonomia Operaia lived. You cannot understand what it meant for a 
kid like me aged 14 having ideology. In that period, being a Roma fan meant being 
communist and being a Lazio fan a fascist, so at times I had lots of fights and took 
beatings from these people [Communists].   The satisfaction was when I grew up and 
became figlio di mignotta [literally ‘son of a bitch’; meaning smart in fighting, 
respected and feared] I was not a kid anymore from that time those who opposed me 
had to be careful….’ 
 
Our discussion continued as follows: 
 
 
Q: Giorgio, When did you first become a member of the Irriducibili?  
D: ‘The Irriducibili were begun in 1987 but we all have a past in other Lazio groups; 
we [the leaders] have roughly 25 years of militancy in the curva. They originally 
called us the ‘cani sciolti’ (mugwumps) and then in 1987 we created this group’.  
 
Q: Why this name - Irriducibili?  
D: ‘It is a name taken from an old choreography we produced. The name also reflects 
the nature of the group and many members identify themselves in the word’.  
 
Q: Who chooses such words and symbols?  
D: ‘Sometimes we the ‘direttivo’ choose them; otherwise the young propose them to 
us; we have an office for group activity; it is an ‘ideas factory’ where we meet and 
exchange proposals.  The same procedure is adopted not only for the choreographies 
but also for banners on topics that do not have anything to do with football. The 
group is very attached to the symbol of the ‘imperial eagle’ and the motto that truly 
represents us is under the eagle and reads: ‘Osare, Credere, Spavaldi di Essere’ [Dare, 
Believe, Be Reckless]’. 
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Q: What is your employment status?  
D: ‘My job now is pursuing the commercial possibilities of the Irriducibili 
(merchandising, distributions of the products etc..) There is a commercial part of the 
Irriducibili which goes under the ‘Original Fans’ brand. We supply our products to 
shops in franchising agreements throughout the Lazio region and abroad. The label is 
represented by an old English cartoon of the 70s Mr Enrich - a non-conformist rebel; 
he is as we are - against the 'system'. 
 
 
What was interesting in Giorgio’s statements was his social class. Coming from a similar 
working class root as the Boxer, he was able to lead a group that included many from middle-
class backgrounds. This social dynamic was also present in the Boys. This cross-class 
element has been also a characteristic of the Italian hardcore tifo since its origin (Dal Lago 
and Moscati, 1992). Nonetheless, this trait becomes more significant when focusing on the 
UltraS, given that fascism is ideological glue that is stronger than class-consciousness.  The 
Boys, for example, can count educated individuals among those in their group leadership. The 
Irriducibili and Boys included members studying at university (one of the recurrent degree 
courses was law); others amongst them were successful shop owners or small 
businesspersons, some were from solid working-class origins and others from the poor 
Roman districts. The UltraS were not gatherings by virtue of socio-economic determinism; 
they bonded because of their shared enthusiasm for both the football clubs and Mussolini’s 
ideas. 
One element that both the Boxer and Giorgio omitted from the group history was the 
challenge that the Irriducibili experienced to their curva nord hegemony. As many writers in 
the cultural studies tradition (Fiske, 1993; Hall 1997) as well as the Foucauldians would 
argue, whenever there is power there is resistance. The Irriducibili were forever claiming 
both football and ideologically purity. Despite this claim, they were to face accusations of 
compromise due to their ‘merchandising’ business. In 2006, the Irriducibili suffered a schism 
that resulted in the creation of a group called the Banda Noantri (Our Gang).30 
To understand the Irriducibili-Banda Noantri relations, one might compare the 
situation to that of the old mafia, not because this study agrees with such a correlation – so 
often used by the Italian media to make sense of the UltraS31 – but because of the similarity 
in how new leadership and groups emerge. Every UltraS group was founded by overthrowing 
                                                
30
 This group evolved later into the In Basso a Destra (Low on the Right), which is presently part of the curva 
nord. The name indicates both the location of the curva nord where the group is located and their political 
orientation. 
31
 See chapter 11 for an evaluation about the relationship Italian media and UltraS.  
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the established entity. This overthrow was usually accompanied by accusations that its 
predecessor had grown fat, lazy and complacent with regard to the group’s reputation. The 
one who takes power will inevitably face a similar threat to its hegemony. The Irriducibili 
were no different. In 2006, they faced accusations that they had lost their willingness for 
confrontation. The Irriducibili’s merchandising operations led to allegations of being more 
concerned with appearances and enjoying notoriety based on designer garments than that 
based in action and fighting. They were challenged with the insult of manifesting the 
characteristics of embourgoisement; that they had compromised and were now money-driven 
and pursuing a form of branded notoriety. Year before, in overthrowing the Eagles the 
Irriducibili had stated their dislike for any kind of market in the curva, even using the mantra: 
No al Mercato in Curva Nord (No to the Market in curva nord). In the eyes of their emergent 
critics, the Irriducibili had betrayed one of their founding principles.  
The Banda Noantri sought to re-establish in the curva, in their own words, ‘A model 
of pure UltraS’. They were similarly neo-fascists, but did not display their banners to avoid 
police attention (La Repubblica-online-14 November, 2007).  The group was originally 
composed of some 40 men aged between 18 and 28 who identified themselves as ‘pure and 
tough’, always ready to fight – as the Irriducibili had espoused previously. Uncompromising 
and feared for their propensity to fight, this group was considered by the Irriducibili akin to 
the ‘Casuals’ – a collection of football hooligan groups present in Britain in the 1980s (Cf. 
Giulianotti, 1993). They were an extreme version of the Irriducibili.  
The apparent schism was more ideological than actual. Codes, norms and respect 
were extended among the comrades, especially when they shared space in the stadium. The 
Irriducibili and the Banda Noantri remained comrades; their ideology maintained a climate 
of co-existence, even if it was disturbed by occasional disagreements. The story of Gabriele 
Sandri throws light on these dynamics. Sandri was a Lazio supporter, known to the Lazio 
UltraS. In 2007, he was killed by the gun of a police officer who was intervening to stop a 
fight between Juventus and Lazio fans at a petrol station along the Arezzo motorway 
approximately 120 miles from Rome (Corriere della Sera –online- 11 November, 2007). 
Sandri worked as a disc jockey in exclusive Rome nightclubs and was a proactive campaigner 
against drug use in such establishments. Originating from an upper middle-class background 
(his family owns a clothes shop in the affluent Balduina district), Sandri was also a comrade 
who was regularly amongst the Lazio UltraS gatherings at Piazza Vescovio in the Trieste 
district, part of what is known as Rome’s Zona Nera (Black Zone) because of its populace’s 
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sympathies for the Far Right.32 Significant figures of both the Banda Noantri (now called In 
Basso a Destra) and the Irriducibili were present in the car in which Gabriele Sandri was 
travelling before he was shot. They travelled as friends and stood together as they buried their 
mutual friend.  .   
By contrast, the AS Roma curva sud consisted mainly of four co-existing entities: the 
Fedayn, the ultrás Romani, a group who display neo-fascist sympathies, and the openly neo-
fascist Padroni di Roma and Boys Roma. Such compromise illustrates that the curva could have 
very different arrangements for co-existence. The UltraS demonstrate their ability to negotiate 
and survive schism without damaging one another. The UltraS are not merely a spectacle of 
sorts, but are thinking subjects, capable of effective survival strategy and of intelligent 
articulations of both their raison d'être and modus operandi.  
                                                         
                                                      *** 
 
The chapters in this section have tried to underscore not only the differences in the 
development of the curva nord and the more fragmented curva sud, but they have also 
endeavoured to explain their ideologically inspired similarities. In this regard, the first central 
element to notice is the mutual good relationship between the Irriducibili and Boys, which is 
in line with the progressive attenuation among the two roman curve of their historical enmity. 
This is important to observe because it can be used to gauge the power of ideology, which 
may overcome traditional football fans rivalries, and to examine later in the thesis the 
emergence of the UltraS as a social movement (see chapter 10). 
Apart from the highly structured nature of both gatherings, the Boys and the 
Irriducibili additionally evidence two interconnected ideological traits, namely a strong group 
unity and elitism. The groups manifest an internal cohesion fostered by ideology and culture, 
which are at the base of the intensity of the relationship between groups’ members and the 
construction of the ‘others’. Furthermore, the UltraS are elitist. The elitist trait of the Boys 
and Irriducibili is represented in the way they portray themselves as the ‘super-hardcore 
                                                
32
 From the 1970s, this location witnessed the emergence of neo-fascist groups and gatherings of youths 
sympathetic to such ideologies. The district is also remembered in notoriety for the death of Francesco Cecchin, 
a young member of the MSI who died in 1979 having fallen from a wall in Via Montebuono whilst seeking to 
escape radical left militants. In the eyes of the latter Cecchin was guilty of posting far right electoral posters and 
needed banishing. The local branch of the far right Forza Nuova party annually commemorates the death of 
Cecchin in nearby Via Benaco, where the local branch of Azione Giovani (Youth Action) - the youth movement 
of Alleanza Nazionale - is also found. In the nearby Piazza Vescovio stands a ‘Scottish’ pub called Excalibur, 
which is very popular amongst the Lazio UltraS. (Cf. Il Messagero 29/06/07) 
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supporters’ always against any compromise with the hypercommercialisation of modern 
football and ever-ready to ‘act’ both socially and physically to promulgate their general ethos 
and specific style of supporting. The concept of being ‘true’ or more true than the fellow 
congregation is one of the most important ideas that emerge from this study and it helps to 
grasp the UltraS logic; the next section of this study intends to accomplish such task.   
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SECTION B 
 
MAKING SENSE OF THE ULTRAS LOGIC 
 
 
 
 
Fig.8: A motto to live by (Irriducibili) 
 
 
The phenomenon of the UltraS is complex and its essence not easy to capture. The 
overall focus of this part of the thesis is to explore the main political and cultural aspects of 
the UltraS, which emerged from intensive fieldwork with this social formation.  I begin 
chapter 5 examining the political ideologies of the UltraS, with particular reference to the 
Italian neo-fascist youth movement, more specifically the Ordine Nuovo, Forza Nuova and 
Casa Pound Italia groups.  In chapter 6, I explore how the UltraS constitute forms of 
Communitas. Chapter 7 examines how UltraS may be understood with specific reference to 
the cultural-ideological tensions between tradition and modernity.  In chapter 8, I address the 
‘warrior’ masculinity espoused by the UltraS with specific consideration of the position of 
women in relation to these social gatherings.  Chapter 9 investigates the UltraS stance 
concerning issues of ‘race’, notably their relationships towards immigrant groups in Rome, 
especially East Europeans.  Finally, in the concluding chapter (10), I examine the historical 
shift from ultrá to UltraS identity, exploring in particular how this transformation may be 
explained with reference to Italy’s social system.  Overall, this section examines the multi-
faceted sociological character of the UltraS, demonstrating that no single line of explanation 
can account for the UltraS social, cultural and political complexity. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Political Ideology and the UltraS 
 
‘Nessuna resa nessun lamento, linea di condotta….combattimento!’ (No surrender, 
No complaint; our line of behaviour… Fighting!). Irriducibili 
 
 
In 2005 when I met Federico (40 years old and co-leader of the Irriducibili) for the 
first time, he vehemently stressed that it would be irrational for any individual to try to join 
the Irriducibili without possessing neo-fascist sympathies. Ideology, he elaborated, was how 
the Irriducibili defined themselves as fascists (field note 23). When asked what role political 
ideology played in the curva, Antonio (Boys) answered:  
‘We are openly fascists and we think that everyone can see this in the 
curva...symbols, banners, chants express clearly what we think. Politics is present in 
the life of everyone so why being surprised that is also present in the stadium? You 
cannot imagine the pleasure we have in burning a picture of Che Guevara at the 
stadium! Even when we fight, politics play an increasingly important part...’  
 
Consequently, all who claim membership to the Boys or Irriducibili must be prepared to 
publicly proclaim their adherence to the main tenets of fascism. Ideology gives meaning and 
justification to the UltraS actions and reinforces the cohesion of the groups and their 
individual identities. For this reason, an evaluation of the UltraS would be incomplete 
without an elaboration of the roots of their ideological credo.  
 
5.1The Movimentist roots of the Italian Neo-Fascist Youth 
The impulse for political action among fascists and their heirs through the 20th and 
21st centuries is promoted by the perception of both crises and decadence in the political, 
social and economic domains of Italy. Italian fascism, in its original doctrine – before the 
movement became a party and took power in the 1920s – functioned as an evolutionary 
dogma agitating for radical changes in the social, political and economic realms of the nation. 
Fascism played this role because of its radical socialist roots. But what defines Italian 
Fascism? British historian Roger Griffin (1991) defines this political doctrine as, ‘a genus of 
political ideology, which has at its core, in its various permutations, the pursuit of a mythical 
palingenetic (renewal) derived from a sense of populist ultra-nationalism’ (p. 27). Italian 
Fascism is populist because, even if the State is ruled by an elite class, the legitimacy of 
political power is conferred by the people (Eley, 1986).  Following the Neo Consensus theory 
of fascism (Griffin, 2000), this research considers Italian Fascism – and its modern 
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manifestations – as a revolutionary-oppositional creed. As the American academic Eugene 
Weber (1974) states:  
‘fascism, too easily defined as counter-revolutionary, is not a counter-revolution, but 
a rival revolution: rival of the communist one which claimed to be the only one 
entitled to the label.’ (p. 28)  
 
The fascist response seeks a ‘phoenix-like’ renewal in what Griffin terms a revolutionary 
political and cultural order, embracing all ‘true’ (believers) members of the national 
community. Giovanni (Irriducibili), in defining what means being a fascist, stresses the 
revolutionary trait of his ideology: 
 
‘For me, a fascist is not on the right of the political spectrum; the right should be 
meant as the party of the industry and the rich. Defining yourself as ‘right’ means not 
being ‘Fascist’ but being something else. Mussolini was socialist and fascism has 
social roots. Fascism was never pro-capitalism and was anti-communism; it was 
revolutionary, a Third Way.’ 
 
Fascism was born in Italy after the First World War, animated by a strong socialist 
and radical component presented by the Revolutionary Syndicalists (RS).  Revolutionary 
Syndicalism originated out of the extreme left faction within the Italian Socialist Party 
(Procacci, 1970). The RS claimed that, in an economically underdeveloped Italy, socialists 
had to appeal to national sentiment to win over the masses and dramatically improve 
industrial production. In such an under-developed economy, only the nation could pursue the 
economic progress presupposed by classical Marxism. This political vision is identified as 
National Socialism (Gregor, 1979). Two factions have co-existed within fascism, the pro-
bourgeoisie (conservative) and the revolutionaries (or Socialists-Movimentists). It is on this 
Socialist- Movimentist component that the present study focuses on to make sense of the 
UltraS because this component has been historically the predominant one in most of the 
Italian youth neo-fascist groups (Lanna and Rossi, 2003).  
The message of the Movimentist fascists was simple and social in nature: they wanted 
socializzazione to transform the economy into one in which the means of production of the 
industry and services would pass from private to public hands (Cf. De Felice, 1975).  
Corporatism33, according to fascism, would overcome class struggle; workers and employers 
would be united in corporations related to the linked economic activity represented in 
Camera dei Fasci e delle Corporazioni (in the Chamber of Fasci and corporations) and 
                                                
33
 Corporatism was a political system in which legislative power is exercised by the corporazioni that represent 
the nation’s economic, industrial and professional groups. It was a ‘Third Way’  between capitalism and 
communism based on the principle of class harmony over class conflict (Michelini, 1999).  
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controlled by the government. The instigator of such a political strategy was Nicola 
Bombacci, a friend of Mussolini and a former communist who became the adviser of 
Mussolini during the period of the Italian Social Republic in 1943 (Salotti, 2008).  
After the Second World War, the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI)34 represented 
within its structure the same division of fascism, the moderate (conservative) faction and the 
Movimentists one. The youth of the MSI, regardless of their social class and similar to the 
many extraparliamentary groups, represented a large majority in favour of the latter ideology 
(Rao, 2006). This fascination is comprehensible; revolutionary doctrines tend to appeal to 
youth because of what Weber would call Wertrational, which is best explained as a striving 
for a goal that in itself may not be rational, but is pursued regardless through rational means 
(Weber, 1958). Such values come from an ethical, religious and philosophical holistic 
context; they are not rationally chosen. The fascist Movimentist ideas aimed to tune and 
aggregate anti-system protest, young people, the unemployed, and the underclass to radically 
change the State system. The youth component of the MSI reinforced its identity via the 
experience offered by the Campi Hobbit (Hobbit Camps).35 During the late 1970s and early 
1980s, it found its sage in Pino Rauti (Cf. Rao, 2006). As a leader of the group Ordine Nuovo 
(New Order), Rauti articulated and opined on issues including anti-capitalism and Third 
Worldism, which argued that the underdeveloped Third World is a consequence of Western 
colonialism. Within the MSI, Rauti strenuously opposed the conservative, more moderate 
faction that was inclined to govern in political coalitions with the Christian Democrats. Today 
Rauti’s ideological inheritance is evident in the Mayor of Rome, Gianni Alemanno, who was 
the youth leader of the MSI Fronte della Gioventú (Youth Front) from 1988 to 1991. 
Alemanno promoted the ideological agenda of the Movimentists wing of the MSI. During the 
1995 MSI Congress, held in the city of Fiuggi under the leadership of Gianfranco Fini36, the 
party adopted classical conservative positions and in so doing abjured its fascist legacy 
(Nello, 1998).  This political decision, whilst important from a democratic point of view, 
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 The Italian Social Movement (Movimento Sociale Italiano -MSI) was the political formation that continued 
the legacy of fascism after Italy became a constitutional republic. The party was constituted in 1946 ; it merely 
proclaimed 10 principles, the main ones of which were: Italian territorial unity, the independence of the nation 
and, contrary to some suppositions, the promotion of an European Union based on equality and justice 
(Cf.Almirante and Palamenghi-Crispi, 1958). 
35The Hobbit camps were cultural events for youth organised by the Fronte della Gioventú. They were called 
Hobbit in honour of the main protagonist of the mythological world of J.R.R. Tolkien, which articulated neo-
fascist sentiment against modernity. The camps were places to play music  and debate about issues such as the 
media, unemployment, the condition of women and ecological problems (Rao, 2006). 
36
 Gianfranco Fini, President of the Chamber of Deputies and former president of  Alleanza Nazionale, is one of 
the leaders of the newly formed PdL and he is a popular Italian political leader. 
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created many controversies within the neo-fascist world as Giovanni’s statement 
demonstrates:  
Q: Who do you think are the worst enemies and conversely the best friends of 
the Italian radical right?  
G: ‘That is a very easy answer; the worst enemies are people from our background 
and tradition who became ‘moderate’ for greed or power; people such as Gianfranco 
Fini  and all his friends in Alleanza Nazionale. The worst thing for us is to cease the 
battle against this system in Italy; we value anyone fighting the system, even if they 
have different ideology from us. For instance, we did a banner praising Carlo Giuliani 
who was killed by the police during the Genoa G 8 protest because we value warriors 
even if their politics differ from ours; fighters for their ideals often pay a high 
price.’37  
 
During the 1995 congress, the MSI underwent a transition to become Alleanza Nazionale 
(AN). The congress is known as ‘the schism of Fiuggi’ since a faction of the MSI did not join 
AN, but remained faithful to the post fascist ideology of the old MSI, forming a new party 
named Movimento Sociale Fiamma Tricolore led by Pino Rauti (Nello, 1998). Alemanno 
remained in AN promoting the ideas of the Movimentists of the MSI albeit in a somewhat 
more moderate fashion. Alemanno later became the leader of the AN faction Destra Sociale 
(Social Right).38 He was perceived by the Irriducibili and the Boys as the only respectable 
politician in AN because he did not repudiate his political roots as did Gianfranco Fini. 
During the 2006 Rome Mayoral electoral campaign, Alemanno was supported by the 
Irriducibili, who occasionally displayed banners in the Olympic Stadium urging others to 
vote for him.  
The Movimentist identity of fascism is present today in the majority of the Italian 
neo-fascist youth and is certainly recognisable amidst the UltraS. This study identified three 
neo-fascist groups that ideologically influence the UltraS: Ordine Nuovo; Terza Posizione 
(Third Position; its legacy is present today in Forza Nuova) and Casa Pound Italia.  These 
groups claim, in one way or another, to be followers of the philosopher Julius Evola and the 
previously mentioned ‘socialist’ ideas of Nicola Bombacci.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
37
 See chapter 12 for an examination of the Genoa G8 episode. 
38
 The Social Right promotes a social economy providing a range of services to citizens including the most 
disadvantage groups. It promotes a strong defense of traditional values and national identity; among its political 
priorities there are an efficient regulation of the immigration, the protection of environmental heritage, the 
promotion of Italian history, art, and architecture and food. The Social Right is an important political component 
of the newly formed PDL.  Cf. htpp://destrasociale.org 
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5.2 Ordine Nuovo 
 
  
 
Fig. 9: The double-edged blade emblem of Ordine Nuovo on the left  
and the Boys’ flag on the right (2008) 
 
Ordine Nuovo (ON) was one of the major Italian post-war youth neo-fascist groups. 
Its roots can be traced to the magazine Imperium (Streccioni, 2000). This publication, which 
began in the 1950s, aimed to organize former neo-fascist youth. However, Imperium 
published only four editions before being closed down by the Italian government in 1950, 
charged with endeavouring to reconstitute the Fascist Party, which became a crime under 
Scelba’s law passed in June 1952.39  Among the members of the Imperium editorial board 
were Pino Rauti, Giano Accame, a journalist and former member of Mussolini’s Social 
Republic who died in 2009, and philosopher Julius Evola (1898-1974). The editorial trait of 
Imperium consisted of an idealistic, ethical and ideological intransigence, which made the 
magazine required reading among the extreme right of the Italian neo-fascist youths. Evola 
was known to have stated that, whilst in contact with other neo-fascist youth groups, he felt 
more sympathy towards the youth of Imperium because they vehemently expressed their 
intransigence towards defending traditional values (Baldoni, 1996). Between the 1940s and 
early 1950s, the ideas evident in Imperium spread throughout the MSI. The purist 
(Movimentist) strand of Imperium became very popular amongst the MSI youth, who 
promoted a revolutionary stance on politics against the perceived decadence and corruption 
of the Italian political system (Cf. Baldoni, 1996). Nevertheless, such an influence was not 
appreciated by the top men of the MSI, who had accepted democratic methods as a means to 
obtain power and were seeking to develop a reliable, moderate European, conservative-right 
political party image. The purists were opposed to MSI leadership and strategy, wishing to 
recover fascist traditions as a means to lead the battle to regenerate Italy. The ON was against 
                                                
39
 Mario Scelba was the Italian Prime Minister between 1954 to 1955; he is remembered in posterity for the 
promulgation of law 645 which forbade the exaltation and defense of the Fascist regime and the Fascist National 
Party. Cf. http://associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it/materiali/atti_normativi/XIII/pdf/l1952_00645.pdf 
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collaboration – even strategic collaborations with democratic political forces. Ordine Nuovo 
youths were considered the ‘tough and pure’ of the Italian neo-fascist world (Giampietro, 
1994). ON believed that the MSI betrayed the original aim of its foundation, namely ‘the 
continuity’ with social and political battles fought under the experience of Mussolini’s Social 
Republic (cf. Giampietro, 1994). The ON detached itself from the MSI in 1956 at the party’s 
fifth national congress in Milan. According to the ON’s doctrine, the two most important 
values of the neo-fascist militant were ‘order’ and belief in a spiritual elite. Adherents 
considered themselves akin to heroes fighting to defend traditional values. The ideology of 
ON was mainly based on the teachings of philosopher Julius Evola.  
Stated simply, Evola’s philosophy condemns modernity and democracy and manifests 
elements of totalitarianism and racism. Against notions of egalitarism and fiercely anti-
communist, Evola sowed the seed of what became known as the Third Position. In doing so, 
Evola promoted values that were antithetic to those presented by the Italian bourgeoisie, as he 
sought a revolution to produce a ‘traditional society’ that, whilst based on the concept of the 
State, radically transcended the economic dimensions of existence (Evola, 1993). Tradition 
was central to Evola’s doctrine (and to the UltraS). The society promoted by Evola was anti-
democratic and based on superiority of birth. He suggested that only individuals born to the 
higher caste were capable of reaching the most elevated levels of spirituality. He indicated 
that society should be built on the values of ancient civilisations, the population divided 
hierarchically according to natural qualities evident in the individual. Such differentiation 
was inherited and not based on economic or material criteria; the noble caste, however, were 
at the top of the hierarchy. The warrior caste in any society, Evola argued, should also be 
located at top of the social hierarchy - above even the priest caste (Evola, 1993). 40 Evola’s 
warriors manifested important traditional virtues: obedience to authority, love of discipline 
and order, a willingness to sacrifice (both others and self), a capacity for great courage and a 
sense of honour. The ethos and spirit of the ‘warrior’ is evident in many UltraS statements. 
Giovanni (Irriducibili) articulates this idea as follows: 
‘We will always fight for socially important topics, especially if ‘some’ want to 
discourage us. We are not doctors, lawyers or sociologists; our destiny is to fight both 
the football ‘system’ within the Lazio (i.e. the SS Lazio management) and fight 
Italian society for our ideology….’ 
 
                                                
40
 For an appreciation of Evola’ thoughts Cf. J. Evola (1996). Cavalcare la Tigre. Roma: Edizioni Mediterranee; 
J. Evola (2001). Gli uomini e le rovine . Roma: Edizioni Mediteranee.  
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For neo-fascist warriors, such as Giovanni, the first battle was against oneself; the warrior 
forever fought his weaknesses. According to Evola, modern man has less capacity than the 
warrior has to win over his negative ego and could be easily charmed by temptations that 
pervert the spirit. In the ideology of ON – and generally in all Italian neo-fascist youth groups 
– there is a constant negative reference to modernity, which, as shown later, is also expressed 
by the UltraS. This expression manifests itself in a criticism of a society in which 
materialistic values are believed to have dominated spiritual ones - the small trader over the 
hero.  
The ON ideology rejected modern institutions and both Marxism and Capitalism 
because they were based on the triumph of materialism and economics over politics and 
spiritualism. At the same time, the ON ideology rejected elements of group identity and 
concrete political and social referents, focusing instead on the broader abstract notions of 
nation and people (Ferraresi, 1995). ON promoted a heroic, elitist and warrior vision of life 
based on the trilogy of anti-egalitarianism, anti-democracy and anti-communism. Their target 
was to recover ‘traditional values’, such as honour, hierarchy and loyalty; firstly from within 
the individual and then, once internalised, to be preached using exemplary behaviours defined 
against the ever-increasing societal moral degeneration (Ignazi, 1989). For ON, the master 
race was the Aryan people, who were represented par excellence by soldiers, military heroes 
and warriors, as exemplified by the Nazi regime’s SS and the Japanese Samurai and fighting 
orders (Cf. Ferraresi 1995; Sternhell 1989). The inheritor of the majority of the ideas of ON is 
the Movimento Sociale Fiamma Tricolore (MSFT). The link between the UltraS and ON is 
not only evident when evaluating the ideology of the groups -as will be explained later - but 
is also represented historically by the previous leadership of the Boys Roma. Guido 
Zappavigna, who was a cousin of Paolo Zappavigna, the leader of the Boys until his death in 
2006, was a member of the NAR (Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari; Revolutionary Armed 
Nucleus). The NAR was a terrorist group that operated in Italy between 1978 and 1981 
(Colombo, 2007). It was constituted by members of the youth section of the Roman MSI who 
were inspired by the ideas of  ON. 
 
5.3 Terza Posizione and its 21st century inheritor: Forza Nuova  
 
Terza Posizione (Third Position) was founded in 1978 and, it is widely acknowledged,  
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was the natural evolution of a youth group called Lotta studentesca (Students’ Fight). 41It was 
intended to destabilise the current constitutional framework of Italy and to seize power by 
creating a State that rejected Marxism and capitalism (hence the name of Third Position). 
This operation would ideally have been carried out through a revolution that was gradually 
implemented and led by an elite avant-garde (Cf. Adinolfi and Fiore, 2000). Initially a youth 
political movement was strongly influenced by the ideas of Julius Evola. It manifested the co-
existence of apparent extreme left within the radical right. In the 1970s, the TP fought side-
by-side with Roman squatters of Palmarola (a Roman district) against the left-led local 
administration that sought to evict them. These types of actions are remarkably similar to 
what the UltraS identified as ‘social campaigns’. Marco (Boys) explains their involvement in 
such social campaigns in the following: 
‘One time, we protested against the inefficiency of the management of the electricity 
supply company (ACEA) for Rome’s working-class districts. This problem did not 
touch the affluent middle class districts, so we displayed banners stressing this 
problem on a demonstration following the death of a person last year due to electric 
cables being left without maintenance by the ACEA. We support, although are not 
involved directly, the Social Mortgage initiative led by the guys of Casa Pound  and 
of the rock group ZetaZeroAlfa [see chapter 7]. Many causes have realised that a 
banner publicising their battles hosted by us in the stadium is more effective that 
making a CD. The banner is often shown for 30 seconds on national TV and can have 
a big impact.’ 
 
The political actions of TP were based on two strategies. The first wanted to target 
youth to ‘educate’ them on the idea of revolution and, if necessary, the use of violence to 
achieve political changes. The second strategy was to create a strong hierarchy-led structure; 
from this, an elite group would form who would manage power. Propaganda, cultural 
programs and violence against political opponents went hand-in-hand to achieve the ultimate 
aim of erasing the dominant Italian political system. At the same time, TP declared its 
solidarity with international ‘liberation’ movements ranging from the Basque separatists to 
the Republican movement of Northern Ireland and even the openly ‘communist’ struggles of 
the Nicaraguan Sandinistas (Flamini, 1985). The nucleus of their ideas was outlined by Judge 
D’ Ambrosio during criminal proceedings against Gabriele Adinolfi, who had been charged 
with crimes linked to the constitution of the Third Position. The Judge affirmed that the 
doctrine’s movement was based on four crucial elements: tradition, national independence, 
anti-imperialism, and militancy (Streccioni, 2000).  The concept of tradition focused on the 
                                                
41
 The group originated in Rome via an alliance of five high school student groups who had become detached 
from the influence of the MSI (Streccioni, 2000). Two years of activity, focused on educational issues, evolved 
as the members grew up and moved towards more adult political issues. Eventually the three leaders, Roberto 
Fiore, Gabriele Adinolfi and Giuseppe Dimitri, founded Terza Posizione . 
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identity of the Mediterranean people, from which TP argued came the ‘new’ Italians who 
were inclined to revolution and radical transformation.  National independence described the 
group’s determination to detach Italy from any international alliance and thus retain its 
autonomy in national and international decision-making. Their publication, Terza Posizione, 
made constant references to two concepts: popolo (people) and revolution. The popolo took 
the form of a myth of a populace who manifested positive and enduring neo-fascist values. 
This concept explains the inclination of TP to support the inhabitants of poor Roman districts 
in their socio-political struggles. Revolution meant not only seeking radical change in the 
Italian social system (as a substitute for old political establishment) but also sought to destroy 
the current ‘mentality’; to promote the value of personal sacrifice to achieve a social and 
political uprising (Cf. Adinolfi and Fiore, 2000).  
The ideas of TP have not been lost over time; 30 years later, they are currently alive in 
Forza Nuova. In origin, Forza Nuova (New Force) was an internal faction of the MSFT. In 
1997, the AN leader, Pino Rauti (the former ON leader), decided to expel Forza Nuova from 
the MSFT, believing that it was becoming too powerful and the catalyst of internal dissent 
(Padovani, 2008). Forza Nuova was founded by the expelled faction on September 29, 1997. 
The ideology of Forza Nuova (FN) is well-known within the Roman (and Italian) curve. FN 
was mentioned many times during the ethnography by both the Irriducibili and Boys. 
Crucially, the UltraS, though, stressed their position of non-subordination. FN is also one of 
the political parties that receives sympathies from well-known AS Roma football players, 
such as Daniele de Rossi and Alberto Aquilani (La repubblica-online- 01 October, 2008). FN 
is led by Roberto Fiore, who is a former European Parliament MP.  From 2003 to 2006, FN 
collaborated in the creation of a political cartel called Alternativa Sociale (Social Alternative) 
led by  Alessandra Mussolini (who is a niece of Benito Mussolini) and which included the 
Fronte Nazionale (National Front), Azione Sociale (Social Action) and Forza Nuova. The 
cartel aimed to make alliances with the centre-right coalition of Prime Minister Silvio 
Berlusconi whilst stressing their autonomy. The project, however, was dismissed by 
Berlusconi, who did not wish to endorse the politics of Roberto Fiore because of his neo-
fascist past. Determined to operate in the legitimate theatre of the Italian democracy, 
Alternativa Sociale ran for the European Union elections of 2004, the Regional elections of 
2005 and the national elections of 2006. The coalition, however, did not produce the hoped-
for results, obtaining a mere 0.7% of the votes for the Chambers of Deputies and 0.6% for the 
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Senate.42 The alliance subsequently crumbled and, in recent years, Forza Nuova has started a 
political crusade with more revolutionary overtones and, as a consequence, has obtained an 
increase in membership and has opened many (64) new sections.43  
Not all Italian neo-fascists groups have as their primary purpose the pursuit of pan-
European unity or even the pursuit of a supra-national policy as remit. Some seek to address 
local issues. Such activism leads them to assist those who they perceive as helpless to the 
injustices of the powerful. The recently formed organisation Casa Pound Italia (CPI) 
demonstrates this tendency. 
 
 
5.4 Casa Pound Italia and the UltraS 
 
 
‘If a man isn't willing to take some risk for his opinions, either his opinions are no 
good or he's no good.’ Ezra Pound44 
 
 
 
Fig. 10: The fascists of the third millennium (Casa Pound Italia)45 
 
When I began my research, according to media coverage, FN and the Movimento 
Sociale Fiamma Tricolore (with its strong ideological ties to ON) were considered the most 
popular groups within the Olympic Stadium terraces; this was not the case. The above 
quotation represents one of the most explicit slogans of Casa Pound Italia that encapsulates 
                                                
42
 Cf. http://repubblica.it/speciale/2006/elezioni/camera/riepilogo_nazionale.html 
43
 Cf. http://forzanuova.org 
44
 Cf. http://forzanuova.org 
45
 Cf. http://kataweb.it/multimedia/media/6043835 
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their action-based ideology. Whilst Casa Pound Italia is a rival to FN for the hegemony on 
the youth, they share the same Movimentist foundation; the Third Positionist Adinolfi is in 
the Gramscian sense the most respected intellectual in Casa Pound Italia. In 2005, Todde 
informed me about this group and its popularity amongst the Roman neo-fascist youth. This 
was also the first time that the link between Casa Pound Italia and the Boys and UltraS of 
Lazio became evident.  Naturally, I sought to find out more about Casa Pound Italia. 
Before becoming a national association, Casa Pound Italia was a building squatted in 
Rome in 2003 by youth of the Occupazioni Non Conformi (Non Conformist Occupations-
ONC) whose aim was to reclaim social spaces in Rome for youth by occupying houses or 
locations left vacant by local councils. The name Pound was chosen in honour of the 
American poet Ezra Pound who argued against the negative influence of the banks in society. 
The banks promoted money as the crucial ethos of the western civilisation. Pound identified 
banks with the concept of usury (Accame, 1995). The ONC, present in the Roman 
neighbourhoods, are Casa d‘Italia, Casa Pound, and Casa Montag. The organisation that 
leads the ONC is Casa Pound Italia. Casa Pound Italia organises events and activities of a 
counter-cultural ethos; it manages libraries throughout Italy, organizes conferences and 
meetings that are often attended by ‘left’ leaning intellectuals and writers. The peculiarity of 
this youth group is the inclusion of many female militants who have the same status, dignity 
and opportunities as the men.  CPI also ran an Irish-type pub called the Cutty Sark in the 
Colle Oppio district near the historic centre of Rome, which was notorious for neo-
fascism in the 1970s and was the location of a fundamentalist faction of the MSI’s 
Youth Front.  
Casa Pound Italia believes in the right to private property, but not as a reason to 
exploit others. CPI promote campaigns on social issues, such as disability rights, and collect 
medicines for the impoverished in countries such as Iraq. The housing campaigns, led by 
Casa Pound, claim to have obtained homes for hundreds of formerly homeless Roman 
families. They support orphanages and solidarity projects for the Afghans and the Karen 
population.46 CPI numbers 300 militants and 200,000 sympathisers throughout Italy. 47 The 
most famous slogan of Casa Pound Italia is to promote the ‘fascism of the Third 
Millennium’, which signifies an attachment to tradition, but at the same time a revision of 
fascism to address current societal issues and problems. One of the most popular projects of 
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 One of the long lasting struggle in the World, the Karen ethnic group have claimed their independence from 
Burma since 1949 (Fong, 2008). 
47
 Cf.http://roma.repubblica.it/multimedia/home/5203008/2 
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Casa Pound Italia is the Mutuo Sociale. The aim of the project is to create a regional 
organisation with public money that works to build a public infrastructure that takes into 
consideration the quality of life of the individuals. The project is supported by the Boys and 
Irriducibili who in the past advertised such ideas via banners and their fanzine distributed in 
the Olympic stadium, as shown figure 11.  
 
Fig 11:Docum 12,The Boys advertise one of Casa  
Pound projects aimed to tackle the  
housing emergency in Rome (2004) 
 
This organisation seeks to sell properties via mortgages - at discount rates- to families 
who do not own houses. Such sales are to be arranged without interest rates and in 
instalments that do not go beyond 1/5 of the family income, which would stop if the members 
of the family become unemployed, thereby excluding profit-making speculation from banks. 
As explained earlier, CPI is influenced by third positionist Gabriele Adinolfi. Adinolfi’s 
political commitment is prolific; as an organiser of several editorial ventures, most notably 
Orion and Rinascita (Rebirth), he also runs a website blog of counter-information called  
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Noreporter. The Polaris association 48 of this blog offers a variety of cultural activities as well 
as political debates concerning the ideas of Julius Evola and Nicola Bombacci. In 2007, after 
joining the Movimento Sociale Fiamma Tricolore (MSFT), the avant guarde ideas of Casa 
Pound and its young leader (age 35) Gianluca Iannone collided with what he considered the 
‘hunger for power’ strategy of the MSFT and lack of internal dialectic with all components of 
the party. Briefly, after the election of 2007, the MSFT leadership wanted to cooperate with 
the centre-right coalition of Silvio Berlusconi. In retaliation, the MSFT expelled Iannone in 
May 2008, creating a schism in the neo-fascist world and a new neo-fascist political group. 49 
In 2005, I met the representatives of Casa Pound together with four Roma and Lazio UltraS 
in the UltraS favourite pub, the Cutty Sark, which is considered in both extreme right and left 
circles as ‘the most hated pub in Italy’.  
 
Fig 12: The membership card of the Cutty Sark  
pub in Rome. 
 
 
5.4.1 Aboard the Cutty Sark 
 
‘CONSTRUIREMO IL MONDO CHE VOGLIAMO!  
La vita, cosi’ come ci ‘e stata confezionata, la gettiamo volentieri nel cesso.’  
LET’S BUILD THE WORLD THAT WE WANT! This life, in the way that it has  
been shaped, is just worthy to be thrown in the toilet (Casa Pound).50 
 
The Cutty Sark is both a pub and a cultural association. A visitor needs to be invited 
before accessing the pub. Located near one of the most historic Roman streets, the black 
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 Adinolfi’s ideas, which were popular among the terraces, can be summarised in the following statements: Re-
affirm the concept of national sovereignty. Give the nation a role and a destiny. Defuse the globalisation ‘bomb’ 
and overcome capitalism. Build social economies based on the three concepts of work, solidarity and 
commitment. Reject servility to money. Pursue the spirit of justice and cultivate common sense. Realise the 
people’s lobby that will fight and oppose political and economic oligarchies. Form the ‘elite’ (leadership) in 
spiritual, cultural economic and organizational spheres. Make a [counter] cultural revolution. 
49
 Cf. http://ladestra.info/?p=20691 
50
 Cf. http://casapound.org 
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armoured door sports the symbol of Captain Harlock, a Japanese cartoon character created by 
Leiji Matsumoto (former member of the Japanese Communist Party) in 1978.51  
 
 
 
Fig 13: Captain Harlock, the warrior of the Cutty Sark 
 
This cartoon strip has become a sort of heroic narrative of the Roman youth neo-fascism 
world. Harlock’s story depicts the ‘Warrior Spirit’ proposed by Julius Evola.  Harlock lives in 
the futuristic year of 2977, a time of peace due to the welfare state created by technologic 
development. Machines are working while people relax in front of the television in a state of 
apathy. The media-human link was deemed dangerous by Matsumoto and this is relefected in 
his cartoon. In Harlock‘s world, television rules individuals’ lives and eliminates any positive 
impulse or motivation to improve the human race. Humans are unable to make decisions and 
are fed on fake happiness by the media. In such a state of lethargy, humans are incapable of 
feeling emotion or believing in ideals or values. There is only one man who understands the 
decline of the human race and who tries to resist - Harlock. Harlock has escaped from this 
human degeneration aboard his Arcadia galactic vessel. He tries to isolate himself in outer 
space, taking only the few necessities needed to survive. Aboard his vessel, he becomes the 
pirate ‘Captain Harlock’ and is, hence, hated by the authorities and considered a risk- freed as 
he is from this artificial emotionless society.  
The danger of cultural conformism is a common neo-fascist theme .Captain Harlock 
represents the ideal type of neo-fascist rebel. He is called to save people from an empty and 
superficial state of being. The Italian Neo-fascists youth perceive today’s world as a 
progressive process of moral ruin; civilisation has created a post-industrial society that, whilst 
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 Cf. http://capitanharlock.com 
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highly technological, erases cultural individuality to produce emotionally sterile humanity. 
Harlock is a ‘national revolutionary’ combatant that is willing to resist any hegemonic (and 
politically correct) societal discourses. The parallels between Harlock and Italian neo-fascists 
(and UltraS) are obvious. However, caution should be used in considering the use of cartoon 
characters by the UltraS as ‘juvenile’, even if it can appear at a superficial level of analysis. 
Cartoon characters are, as chapter 7 will show, figurative heroes (Mooij, 1998) for the UltraS. 
They are part of the UltraS culture and a means for the groups to represent their lifeworld and 
logic and to set behavioural examples in a setting, such as the curva, attended by the youth of 
the capital city. 
Once inside the Cutty Sark, varieties of artefacts are available to read. Its walls are 
decorated like the eponymous old. The interior is adorned with pirate flags depicting skulls, 
English and European football scarves and stickers from global extreme right groups 
alongside similar stickers produced by Irish nationalists. One such sticker states:  England out 
of Ireland. As explained earlier, for some Italian neo-fascists, England still is considered an 
enemy by virtue of the Second World War and its dominant Christian creed of Protestantism. 
Inside stand men and a few women, mostly aged in their 20s and 30s. Some of the former 
sport military style trousers and t-shirts. Some of the t-shirts bear slogans celebrating Casa 
Pound or mottos such as ‘The fascism of the Third Millennium starts with squatting’, which 
publicly states a commitment to the Casa Pound housing strategy.  
That said, the pub is heterogeneous in dress code, ranging in style from skinheads in 
their sub-cultural garments to people such as Todde adorned with elegant casual clothing. 
Most everyone had tattoos, mainly Runes52 or those which come under the genre of ‘Celtic’. 
My visit to the pub coincided with a bout of tension between Casa Pound and local extreme 
left groups that centred on advertising space use to promote their contrasting initiatives. 
Every evening, Casa Pound propaganda leaflets that had been placed in strategic places of 
the city were removed by the extreme left groups.  It was an ‘underground’ propaganda war 
that the city largely ignored, but one that had become more evident during elections. The 
Cutty Sark had been attacked several times by Roman extreme left militants and was once hit 
by a bomb in 2001, which caused only structural damage. People in the pub explained that 
danger came their way, not only by virtue of them drinking in the pub ,thereby, declaring 
their political sympathies, but also when outside the venue for their spreading of propaganda, 
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 The Runic Alphabet have been used for centuries as tools of divination and emerged in the Third Reich 
because Himmler (the Chief of the Schuttzstaffel – the SS) was  interested in occultism and in esoteric meanings 
of the runes. The symbol of the Schutzstaffel was created by the union of two Siegs, the rune of victory that has 
the shape of a thunder bolt (Mosse, 1984). 
 68
most notably leafleting political statements on the city advertisement boards. Security for the 
pub and people was thus paramount. Members volunteered to undertake security shifts both 
at the door and along the nearby streets in order to spot potential trouble. In expectation of the 
inevitability of having to fight for their cause, nearly every one of the pub staff was a 
practitioner of boxing or Muay Thai.53 
After an hour of drinking Dublin-brewed Guinness, Todde made introductions to 
three men in their early 20s from Casa Pound. One was a university student and Lazio UltraS 
(Paolo). The other two (Carlo and Luigi) were members of the Boys. A scenario enfolded of 
four UltraS of rival Roman factions speaking calmly about their battles over beer. This was 
not the first time that respect and friendship were evident between the two UltraS groups. In 
one of the documents in my possession written by the Boys direttivo, the group honoured, 
after one month, the death of an Irriducibile of Lazio, Sandrino.   
 
 
 
Fig. 14: Docum 22 (Boys) 
 
‘It is one month from his death and it is just to remember a guy of 20 years who died 
prematurely. Sandrino, Irriducibile laziale and friend forever. Mate in many football 
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 Muay Thai (Thai Boxing) is a full contact martial art that originated in Thailand. It is often called the ‘Art of 
the Eight Limbs’ in recognition of the permitted use whilst fighting of the four limbs plus hands, shins, elbows, 
and knees.  
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matches and in many evenings out and an enemy in many derbies. When the evening 
before the derby we met, we mutually exalt our works for the event. A guy who, even 
if very young, has been able to gain respect among many Roma UltraS; because the 
mentalita’ [logic of life, but also ideology] is more strong than the rivalry... in curva 
nord, the spirit of Sandrino will be always alive with others that are part of this great 
past (curva nord). He was one of the few Lazio fans who could come to our muretto 
[small wall] in curva sud because he was a true UltraS with a great heart and because 
he was our friend....’ Boys 
 
Returning to the Cutty Sark, when I asked the UltraS why they engaged in violence, 
the resounding answer was the determination to test themselves in physical confrontation. 
They spoke specifically about fights at the most recent Rome derby. When asked how they 
could by-pass rivalries and a history of violence to cease hostilities and drink in the same 
space, one answered and the rest agreed, ‘we are all camerati, we believe in the same ideals, 
that’s why!’  I was curious about this unusual answer and I questioned the Lazio UltraS about 
what would happen if, in and around a football match, there was a fight involving his 
comrades Todde, and the other two Boys Roma answered:  
‘We would not get involved. We have loyalty to our group, so we have to fight even 
if we see my friends from the other side of the barricades. So [to avoid this moral 
dilemma], we prefer not to be present in the situation.’  
 
I then asked what he would do if he saw one of his camerati from Lazio being beaten up by 
Roma fans, Todde answered that he would fight side-by-side with the Lazio camerati. As 
seen earlier in the study, this was further evidence that being fascist was more important to be 
either laziale or romanista; ideology for the UltraS tends to overcome any football-related 
rivalries. All four UltraS explained this behaviour by arguing for a substantial difference 
between ‘ordinary’ fans and them; the love for the team was important, but their ideology and 
being a comrade (and hence sharing a way of life) was more significant. It is, therefore, 
possible to understand why many UltraS groups, even if football rivals, are united against 
those who they perceive as the common political enemy. I asked if there was a specific 
UltraS group that was particularly hated. They replied that such status was accorded to their 
equivalents in Naples. They recounted an unspecified recent match between Napoli and 
Roma during which a fan of the former group, supposedly the son of a Camorra (Neapolitan 
mafia) boss, was stabbed.  This event created tension between the two sets of fans and 
rumours of revenge had been sent from the notorious crime ‘family’ when Roma next visited 
Naples. On the day of the return fixture, the Boys (and other AS Roma fans) were indeed 
attacked with Molotov cocktail incendiaries at a motorway service outside of Naples. This 
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episode, whilst extreme and probably unprecedented, indicates the risks that are evident in 
UltraS life when involved in such gatherings. 
While speaking, Gianluca Iannone, the leader of Casa Pound Italia, started to interact 
with us. Iannone is not only an articulate leader, but also, following the ancient Latin motto 
Mens Sana in Corpore Sano (sound mind in a sound body), is a keen martial artist as he is a 
Thai boxing instructor. Iannone is also a highly respected politician among both the Italian 
neo-fascists and many political opponents, who recognise in him the ability to convincingly 
explain ideas and political strategies. He explained to the gathering that he had a busy few 
days ahead because Casa Pound was hosting comrades from England, Greece, the former 
Yugoslavia and Spain. Whilst listening to the talk about football and the status of Lazio and 
the Roma team, he interrupted to condemn UltraS football-related violence. Those present 
listened with great deference; a ‘sage’ was speaking. The UltraS violence was to him 
unnecessary and of poor judgement; violence was an extreme political tool to be used only 
when needed,  not wasted on a ‘fucking football team’ and, most of all, not to be manifest 
when families were watching the match at the stadium, hence putting them in danger.  He 
agreed with the four that the use of a knife in a fight was the act of a coward. Iannone’s 
strong condemnation of the UltraS violent behaviour supported the argument that the UltraS 
could not be manipulated by anyone - including their more respected comrades in the neo-
fascist movement. They were non-conformist; they were in their words non omologati.54   
The martial arts link assisted again in this occasion as it enabled me to establish an 
empathic link with Iannone. After having heard some stories about the Cutty Sark, I asked the 
leader what Casa Pound was about and the nature of its enemies. He briefly spoke about the 
dangers of globalisation, which he saw as promoting the problem of illegal immigration and 
the evil of the capitalist system. The latter system was destroying Italian society because it 
made Italian people slaves to the banks and took away their control over their own lives. He 
considered the banks as a legal form of usury that destroyed the life savings of people and 
increased their debts, instead of helping them to build their life.  This discourse represents the 
idea of the State of Casa Pound; for them, the State is a spiritual and ethical expression of a 
community that is needed to supersede superficial individualism.55 The Casa Pound 
comrades left and I continued speaking to the UltraS. I heard their reasons and perceived 
their pathos, but what was revealed was still illogical: how could such young people dedicate 
themselves to an ideology that was so extreme and, for this reason, could never succeed in 
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 Cf. http://casapound.org/chi_siamo.html 
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assuming power in Italy?  I asked whether their ideology would ever prevail in Italy. Paolo 
replied and the others agreed:  
‘We know we have chosen an ideology that will make us lose most of the time, but 
we believe in it and what we want to do via our battles is to live our belief and values 
and most importantly set an example to live.…’  
 
The neo-fascist rhetoric (adopted by Paolo) is a powerful means because from its stated 
position it offers a perceived solution to a problem that many cultures have not been able 
solve: how can one live for decades with absolute defeat, with deaths and a sense of failure. 
In the seemingly ‘tired’ Italian democracy, extremism and immobility have coexisted since 
its constitution. Nothing ever seems normal. For instance, the alternative State in the South of 
Italy provided by the Mafia and other criminal fraternities exists within the north-south 
divide, which sits in a society that has a seeming absence of ethics in public administration 
with overarching chronic governmental instability. Nothing of significance is really 
accomplished in this region; any change is cosmetic (Jones, 2003). 
Since the 2008 schism from the MSFT, Casa Pound Italia has started to cultivate 
political ambitions. In 2009, I saw the emblem of Casa Pound on the wall of a street in the 
centre of Rome. I asked Todde to explain the symbol that, to my knowledge, was not part of 
the neo-fascist tradition. 
 
 
Fig. 15: The turtle emblem of  
Casa Pound Italia 
 
Todde claimed that the turtle (depicted in Fig. 16) with its shell was the symbol of the 
patria, which is based on the concept of a strong and closed community in which individuals 
find their self-realization. I then studied the symbol and I found out that the eight arrows 
(four black and four white arrows) converge at the centre, signifying unity (field note 100v). 
From a reading of the website of Casa Pound Italia, it was possible to identify a well-known 
occult symbol. The eight arrows of Casa Pound were exactly the opposite of the Chaos 
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symbol, where the arrows start from the centre and point outward in all directions. This 
symbol represents Chaos Magic, a form of magic that originated in England in the 1970s 
(Hine, 1995). Through a variety of rituals, chaos magic practitioners believe that they can 
change both their subjective experience and objective reality. It is a form of magic that exalts 
individualism, the opposite of what Casa Pound Italia preaches, which is unity against 
hardship. This connection with the occult highlights one of the other fascinating lines of 
enquiry related to Italian neo-fascism: the link to esotericism and the occult, which found an 
authoritative exponent in Evola.  
 
Fig. 16: The Chaos symbol 
 
 
*** 
 
Todde, speaking about CPI and most importantly the Boys, underlined the importance 
of symbols for those sympathetic to fascism. The Boys had as their most significant symbol 
the double bladed axe, representing the affinity of the group’s ideas with the Italian tradition 
of Ordine Nuovo. Symbols, as well as clothing, music and rituals are part of the UltraS 
culture and enable a sense of commitment among the groups’ members that would endure, 
even in the face of possible social marginalisation. An evaluation of extreme right groups 
such as the UltraS cannot discount the powerful role of the culture in promoting the groups 
existence (Cf. Blee, 2007). The significance of culture is revealed in the following chapters, 
which also evaluate the UltraS logic. 
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Chapter 6 
 
The UltraS communitas and the idea of  Non Omologazione  
 
 
 
As emerged in section A, the Irriducibili and Boys are organised gatherings; they are 
also driven by a series of shared norms, values, standards, behaviours and collective 
hierarchies shaped by political ideology. The UltraS find self-preservation of the group to be 
more important - contrary to the ‘ordinary’ hardcore football fans –than the football club that 
they support. The group must be defended in all circumstances and in all contexts. This sense 
of self-preservation was best expressed by the Boxer: 
‘We wish to create a strong group based on militancy, which is represented by 
dedication. We strongly support our social campaigns and rebut the media’s false 
information. We will always fight back the repression of the police.’ 
 
The use of the term ‘we’ in the above statement points out the UltraS collective perception of 
not being treated fairly. The ‘others’ are represented by the Italian State, the football 
institutions, the police and the media that perpetrate their perceived discriminations. The 
direttivo of the Irriducibili and the Boys function to reinforce collective identity and, more 
specifically, the consciousness of belonging to a ‘respected’ group (Klandermans and Mayer, 
2006; Friedman and McAdam, 1992).  
Until now, the study has generically characterised the Irriducibili and Boys as groups, 
but I argue that they are more than simply groups. The Irriducibili and Boys might best be 
considered as a form of ideological communitas (Ferguson, 1999). The concept of 
communitas is different from that of a community (Hirsch, 2007). Individuals experiencing 
communitas might indeed find all of the elements that stereotypically define a community 
(people committed to one another and supporting one another), but can also be considered as 
part of a group that is undergoing ‘a never ending shared ordeal’. As Rubenstein (1992) 
explains, society functions to define the differences between individuals, by limiting their 
interactions and dividing them, whilst communitas serves to unify, bond, and transcend 
structural relationships (p.  252). A communitas occurs in situations where individuals are 
driven together by a common experience of trial; it involves intense feelings of belonging that 
originate from having to rely on others in order to survive. In communitas such as the UltraS 
,  identity is not lost, as Le Bon would claim (1895) , rather according to Vider (2004): 
identity‘ is shifted from a personal definition of ‘self’, emphasizing one’s own values and 
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history, to a social definition of self which emphasises the values and history of the group’ 
(p.143).  The Irriducibili and Boys are strengthened when individuals emphasise group 
similarities over individual peculiarities. 
In the case of the UltraS communitas, several shared ordeals serve to test the 
members. Such ordeals range from the constant worry of being banned from their curve by 
the Italian authorities to the sense of stigma (and discrimination) that they constantly 
perceive. In this regard, the UltraS communitas constitutes an efficient coping strategy for 
coping with stigma. Most scholars regard stigma as a social construction – a label attached by 
society – and point to variability across time and cultures in the specific attributes, 
behaviours, and groups that are stigmatised (Goffman, 1963; Crocker et al., 1998). Stigma 
exists in labelling, negative stereotyping, social exclusion and should always be considered 
within relations of power (Link and Phelan, 2001). In the UltraS, stigma originates from the 
group’s status as hardcore football supporters, considered by the Italian media to evidence 
mindless thuggery and dysfunctional elements of both Italian football and society.  There is 
also an ideological stigma attached to the UltraS as communitas. The Irriducibili and the 
Boys feel devalued in the eyes of others for their adherence to fascism56.  
‘It is not a secret that the Boys were one of the first groups that brought ideology to 
the stadium. The stadium remains a place where we can be ourselves; so our ideology 
at least can be manifested albeit with difficulty. If we articulate our ideology in 
society is difficult to find a job - who wants to give a job to a ‘fascist’?’Sara (Boys). 
 
The UltraS discrimination and stigma discourses are consistent with those of the Italian youth 
neo-fascist movement who, over the years, have developed a strong rhetoric of 
marginalisation (Dechezelles, 2008). They also appear to have the same consequences; those 
so labelled continue in their ways. In 2009, I asked Todde if he felt marginalised for his 
beliefs and if this feeling would lead him to abandon his neo-fascist convictions and live a 
more socially acceptable way of life. He answered: 
‘Being openly fascist is very hard for me because it might prevent me from finding a 
job; this is the reason why I asked my father to help me starting my bed and breakfast 
business in Rome. Therefore, I can be independent and continue being myself. 
However, I do not care what they think about me; I will remain an UltraS and a 
fascist. ‘ 
 
Todde’s attitude was shared by other members of the UltraS direttivo. They were, at times, 
discouraged, but also strongly motivated to continue being part of the group. The very nature 
of communitas, such as the UltraS, may explain this apparent contradiction. To those sharing 
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 After the  constitution of the Italian Republic a strong stigmatisation of fascism was present for anyone who 
was a member or sympathiser of a neo-fascist group (Klandermans and Mayer, 2006). 
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their ideology and way of life, the UltraS offer both emotional and practical support (in some 
instances even money to pay for the lawyers of those who were arrested or banned from the 
stadium). In the words of Major and O’Brien (2005), one might see in the UltraS the 
seductive trilogy of: ‘social validation for one’s perceptions, social consensus for one’s 
attributions, and a sense of belonging’ (p.405).One might then understand why, in numerous 
Italian football terraces, there are many aspiring ‘Captain Harlocks’ with their politically 
incorrect ideas. In this frame of mind, the arrests of the UltraS and others are perceived as 
attacks by the State. Such attacks do not push the communitas to a crisis or force their 
disintegration. By contrast, such attacks reinforce their myths and rhetoric; therefore, giving 
them strength and enhancing their power of social identification and ultimately recruitment 
among like minded youth.  
Nevertheless, a member of the Irriducibili or Boys cannot experience communitas if 
he/she is not in a liminal state (Cf. Turner, 1969). When in a liminal state, while coping with 
the ordeal of being estranged from society, the UltraS experience a stronger sense of 
ideology-based cohesiveness that reinforces their sense of communitas. While the shared 
ordeal is an essential trait for any notion of communitas, ideology and culture create strong 
bonds among ‘militants’. The feeling of unity is strengthened by the meaning of being a 
camerata: any comrade must be helped when in difficulty. This philosophy of mutual help is 
evidenced most obviously when the UltraS clash with rival supporters, particularly those 
manifesting a different ideology, and when confronting the riot police squads or the media.   
Todde explains this feeling of brotherhood: 
 
‘All the members of the group are camerati; you are willing to put everything on line 
for them, even your life. If a comrade dies or is being hit by a DASPO (banning 
order) or is in prison at  Regina Coeli (Rome’s prison), he  still remains in our heart, 
he never disappears from his group, he is always present. The group has a strong 
identity, of which we are proud.’ 
 
Socialisation to the ideology, to the communitas and the curva, can occur at an early 
age. The most representative example of this assertion was the son of the leader of the Boys 
who often attended the curva. When in curva sud, he was taken care of and treated with great 
love by the UltraS. Family can, thus, play a crucial socialisation role; in this nucleus, youths 
learn not only to love their teams but are socialised to oppose the ‘system’. 
The appeal to an adolescent is, instead, evident at the entrance to the football stadium 
and in being part of such communitas. The youngster enjoys the UltraS sense of charisma 
together with their colours, banners and chants.  The emotions that are experienced exercise a 
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fascination on the youth, which is added to the excitement of the football match. Access to 
the communitas in this adolescent and young adulthood stage is explained by Antonio (Boys) 
who argued that the Boys need different types of people to guarantee survival of the group.  
Contrary to what people think, the Boys need not only ‘fighters’, they also need people who 
are skilled at drawing banners, at selling merchandise and others with computer skills. To be 
a ‘true’ member of the Boys, though, is not so easy (field note 90). There are two types of 
activism; the ‘sympathisers’ and the ‘elite’; both types possess the membership card and 
consider themselves as Boys or Irriducibili.  The structure of the UltraS communitas is 
represented by figure 17. 
 
 
Fig. 17: Visual representation of the UltraS  
Communitas 
 
To be a ‘sympathiser’ is relatively easy and is obtained by buying the groups’ membership card. 
Among the ‘sympathisers’, we can find the ‘show-off’ who wants to be part of the gatherings 
because being an UltraS ( hence a neo-fascist) could be considered the Italian 21st century 
rebellion du jour. Adolescents, throughout history, are attracted to idealism, group 
conformism and causes that offer a sense of sacrificial choice. UltraS, with their fascist 
symbolism and quasi-mystical values, provide a sense of polarisation that is attractive to the 
psyche of any youth (Hebdige, 1981). The UltraS ideology and logic offer- as all totalitarian-
based ideas do- abstract ideals (cf. Firth, 1973). Many of these ideals are integral to football 
fan cultures as they are based on celebrations of faith, loyalty, courage, myth, legend and the 
hero or warrior. This can be an unpredictable values and ideas mixture. The ‘sympathisers’ 
may join the UltraS because of the ‘Fashion’ element. ‘Fashion’ is the essence of modernity. It 
is tied to dissatisfaction, another feature of modernity (Marcuse, 1964). ‘Fashion’ exists through 
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imagination; we witness narcissistic and competitive displays that aim to give strength, provide a 
sense of pride and, at the same time, provoke envy, admiration and anger (Cf. Simmel 1950, p. 
343; Heller 1985, p. 304). ‘Fashion’ also exists as a sense of hierarchy, as ‘Fashion’ has been 
described as an emulation of prestige groups (cf. Simmel, 1957). Dressed for a range of leisure 
pastimes, the adorned body possesses a multitude of displays (Simmel 1950, p. 344).  The 
UltraS indulged in the cultivation of a range of 'looks' that in turn encouraged the 'show-off' (cf. 
Ehrenrech 1983). In Lash's (1978) argument, such representations may well attract the 
chronically bored and those seeking instantaneous intimacy. The UltraS could, therefore, be said 
to feel grandiose in their adornments and displays.  
The ‘elite’ (which includes the direttivo) are by contrast the ‘true’ UltraS who are 
present, no matter what, at every match both at the Olympic Stadium and away. The more that 
we move away from the ‘elite’, the less intense become the black (extreme) shade of ideology 
(and concomitant motivation); it will never go beyond a dark grey, because both the ‘elite’ 
and the ‘sympathisers’ choose to belong in these groups due  to their preceding and 
prevailing political socialisation. If a newcomer wish to be part of the ‘elite’than must 
undergoes a ritual passage from ‘ordinary’ to true UltraS.  To be part of the ‘elite’, the 
direttivo needs to trust the individual and to see him/her put the Boys or Irriducibili at the 
centre of their lives. These individuals firmly believe in the communitas ideology and way of 
life. This passage is also due to the worry that the group may be infiltrated by police and to 
satisfy the aim to be an elite group.  
Only tried and tested members are allowed to cooperate and participate in the 
‘elite’activities. Gino (in his twenties), who was working in the magazine of the Irriducibili 
and was part of the ‘elite’, explains that at the beginning of his time with them, it was 
difficult to bond with the ‘elite’. The phase during which an aspirant attempts to attend the 
head office of the group and become involved in as many activities as possible is 
complicated. This phase is difficult for the newcomer because every member seems to know 
each other and the novice feels excluded. On the other hand, if the newcomer shows ‘balls’, 
there is a strong chance that will be accepted (field note 78) and one day become part of the 
‘elite’. Showing that one has ‘balls’ means many things, ranging from not being intimidated 
by the police and rival fans to always being there when needed by the leaders. What Gino 
describes illustrates the liminal phase of a newcomer in their effort to gain access to the 
communitas. Three stages constitute a rite of passage in every culture: separation or 
preliminal, transition or liminal, and reintegration or postliminal (Van Gennep, 1908).  
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The preliminal phase in the Irriducibili example is represented by a newcomer 
detaching from their friends with whom they were watching the match. In this phase, it 
becomes evident that being a 'true' UltraS is so meaningful for the individual (who, it can be 
assumed, strongly shares the group’s creed) that they wish to be part of the gathering. Turner 
(1969) describes as liminal the next phase experienced by Gino when he is no long an 
‘ordinary’ fan, nor an Irriducibile. ‘Liminal entities are neither here nor there; they are 
betwixt and between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention, and 
ceremonial.’ (Turner, 1969, p.95). The liminal stage experienced by Gino serves as a trial; 
the newcomer discovers the depth of the meaning of being part of the communitas. 
Reinforced by ideology, the test –if passed – creates a tie that is stronger than that present in 
‘ordinary’ social groups. The postliminal phase, after a period of liminality, is when the 
newcomer is integrated into the group with a new status, which, in the case of Gino, was 
acceptance into the Irriducibili as part of the ‘elite’. Such comradeship is eventually born out 
of humility, ordeals, transition, and marginalisation.  
The communitas of the Boys and Irriducibili allow an individual to construct 
meanings and be part of a gathering that provides a sense of refuge and a sense of being in 
the ‘right place’. The self is refocused from the individual to the ‘elite’. As mentioned earlier, 
to become a ‘true’ Boys/Irriducibile, the initiate must demonstrate a series of attributes (or at 
least an absolute willingness to accept them as directed by the leaders) that allow them to be 
considered trustworthy. Furthermore, when the occasion requires it, the members must use 
violence against those perceived as the enemy and thus must be prepared to suffer violence 
enacted on them in the course of such hostilities. Leaders share a sense of presence; they 
articulate their ideology as one who stands up for that which is socially ‘just’ and for the 
cause of their football teams, but most importantly they are prepared to fight for the 
communitas’ causes. This strong sense of unity promotes in the Irriducibili and Boys an 
unusual, autonomous vision of the world and of justice, fairness and respect that drive the 
members’ lives and make them loyal and consistent in their membership in the communitas. 
This logic of life is explained by Giorgio:  
  ‘Irriducibili means ‘our way of life’, our way ‘to be’ in everyday life not only at the 
stadium. For example, for two years now we are in a battle against the president of 
Lazio, Claudio Lotito which only those who share our ‘mentality’ could endure. He is 
tormenting Lazio and its supporters; many have thrown in the towel and do not come 
to the stadium because of him. For this reason, we are resisting and fight. The system 
[media, police, politicians] think that Irriducibili is synonymous with ‘no-brain’; there 
are indeed some like this in the UltraS but we speak about our mentality ; we in 
reality fight this monster [the system] that has 30 heads and we try every now and 
then to cut one of the heads off. As far as the values of the Irriducibili are concerned, 
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we do not want to be associated with people that go to matches and do gratuitous 
violence. We are the Irriducibili of Lazio; we think about the team and its future and 
we do what we consider just. Friendship and respect are the things that we have 
gained a reputation for over the years. In the beginning, we were feccia (scum) to 
many and we are still considered so to some, but in life, there is feccia that can teach 
even the ‘respettabili signori’ (respectable gentlemen) how to live.’ 
 
For Paolo (24 year old), the Irriducibili logic was beyond personal interests and could never 
be corrupted and compromised. The logic to which Paolo and Giorgio refer to involves a set 
of symbolic and behavioural codes that lead the collective and individual actions of the 
Irriducibili and Boys members. The UltraS celebrate and are convinced in their deviance 
based as it is on ethical belief; their logic supports them in any situations providing ‘ethical’ 
justifications to their actions including violence.  
Whilst few wish to join such communitas, many are fascinating by it. The UltraS, 
consequently, provoke both consternation and fascination because they are perceived to be 
different from the norm. The difference is founded in liminality and communitas. To many 
this is a deeply human pursuit. 
 
6.1 The norms of the communitas  
 
The Irriducibili and Boys take ritualised procedures that are accompanied by a political 
ethos into the public domain. This ritualised modus operandi can function simultaneously on 
many levels and, like symbols, have a multiplicity of meanings for the participants (Turner, 
1974).  Most are mannered and stylised such that they contain elements of role, script, audience 
and stage (Goffman, 1967). The UltraS ritual is enacted within boundaries of the football culture 
and most importantly of the fascist ideology focusing on the celebration of masculinity, youth, 
strength, the regenerative power of violence and notions of mystical unity (Cf. Gentile, 
1975). The precise role required of an UltraS is continually negotiated, but it exists in confines 
that are articulated as ‘norms’ (cf. Mead, 1938, p. 192; Cicourel 1973).  As Boissevain (1974, p.  
84) argues, norms are significant because they are the ‘window dressing’ of motive and partly 
decide the arena and the issues. In 2005, the Irriducibili ‘elite’ devised a test to socialise 
members to the norms of their communitas. The test was presented with irony but, behind the 
humour, were manifestations of the most important norms of the Irriducibili, considered the real 
Laziali. Figure 18 depicts the test. 
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Fig. 18: Test: What kind of Lazio fans are you?  
 
 
The test is clear to the aspirant UltraS. There are different scenarios and the Irriducibile 
newcomer needs to choose what they would do in a specific situation. The more points the 
newcomer accumulated, the less they were considered a ‘real Laziale’ and Irriducibile. For 
instance, case number 3 awards 100 points to those who would insult an elderly lady when 
aboard a train; 50 points would be awarded to those who perform the Roman salute with a joint 
of marijuana in their hands (an Irriducibile, or a fascist, is against any drug use); 50 points 
would be awarded to one who steals beverages from the stadium vendor. Those who gained 0 
points would be regarded as a real Laziale (and Irriducibile); those who gained more than 200 
would be regarded as a ‘fake’ and, thus, no longer accepted to be a Laziale because the test 
found him to be a liar. The test was also meant to show the public that the Irriducibili, whilst a 
communitas inclined to violence, lived by a code of conduct (see chapter 8).  
The norms of the Irriducibili were not dissimilar to those of the Boys. Obviously, the 
violence of the UltraS is a trait that perturbs various ‘others’ and this feeling is 
unquestionable; however, their violence, although condemnable contains a raison d'être. The 
use of a knife, for instance, was deprecated; it was seen by both gatherings as an act of 
cowardice. Federico (Irriducibili) preferred the use of fists, but utilised, if needed, belts and 
batons. He considered an attack as ‘gutless’ if the entity you were with clearly outnumbered 
the rivals. Moreover, Federico considered ambushes as cowardly as attacking rival groups 
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that may contain women and children.Todde agreed and explained his conception of violence 
and the socio-historical tradition in which Roman knife violence exists: 
‘There is a big tradition of knife carrying in Rome, since the times of the Popes and 
the Rome of the ‘bulli’ [local gangsters], when someone would say ‘hey you have 
looked at me bad’ and a fight would arise, but it was done with a sense of equality 
and both parties were armed. Traditionally, the ‘rule’ was 'famo a calci a cazzotti' 
[let’s use punches and kicks]. The knife problem became evident when one tifo of 
Genoa, without any provocation, was stabbed in the heart by rival fans when he was 
speaking to his girlfriend at a phone booth! This provoked a reaction in the UltraS, 
who pledged an agreement which has lasted for 10 years.’ 
  
Todde refers here to the death in 1995 of Genoa supporter, Vincenzo Spagnolo. He 
died because of a stab wound inflicted by a Milan supporter. Todde explained more 
about the nature of accommodating violence: 
 
‘Then came a group of Roma UltraS - [BISL - a group which fights using blades] and 
changed the slogan 'basta lama basta infami' [stop blades stop scum] into ‘basta 
infami solo lame’ [Stop Scum Only Blades], which meant the scum, i.e., police 
informers, should be punished with knives if necessary. I do not even know if they 
are in the curva anymore. For them, real UltraS only enter a police station when 
arrested. This gathering also argued that a man needed courage to stab a person and 
face the consequences. I am personally against it because such actions destroy the real 
values and codes of the street, namely, fight without dirty tricks. We fight with the 
fist and sometimes with batons or chains, tables, bottles, but we remain in limits that 
are not sadistic. Of course, you hit opponents to cause harm, but it is very different 
from inflicting stabbing wounds.  
 
Here in Rome, there is not one football Sunday where someone is not stabbed, often 
by youngsters- not by our group.  Now, during a fight involving 10-15 persons when 
someone falls or turns his back, he risks being stabbed. The stab is given 90% of the 
time to the backside because, if the perpetrator is arrested, he will not be charged with 
Attempted Murder. Wounding from the waist down sees the lesser charge of Bodily 
Harm.  The purpose of such a wound is meant to signify that you have been hit from 
behind as you ran like a coward.’ 
 
Todde’s account was informative on many levels. It stressed that a code existed among the 
Boys, but he also admitted that this code was not uniformly shared by all curva sud, which 
underlines its fragmentation in comparison with the hegemony of the Irriducibili’s curva 
nord. It is, consequently, seemingly accepted that the young and foolhardy or impulsive could 
enact wounding in defiance of the Boys. The admission underlines the absence of desire of 
the Boys, or the lack of ability to enforce ‘moral’ codes concerning violence outside of their 
gathering in curva sud. The articulation, whilst seeking to locate the use of a knife within the 
masculine norms of old Rome, explained that wounding was perpetrated in such a way as to 
avoid the possibility of serious criminal charges and to humiliate rather kill those on the 
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receiving end. The fact that such acts are perpetrated makes the response of the Italian State 
and the police justified. 
 
6.2 Non Omologazione: The Non-Conformists 
 
The concept of non omologazione (non-conformism – to the duality of the Italian 
State and the Italian football establishment) is one of the four core elements of the UltraS 
logic and a crucial viewpoint to the strong alienation of the UltraS from the wider Italian 
society. Both gatherings despise what they consider to be omologati (conformist). Giorgio 
explains the concept of being omologati:  
‘Omologati means ‘under control’ of the current political system; in line with the 
rules of the game. A simple citizen who works in an office is omologato; their system 
of life is imposed by dominant power and values and they conform. It does not break 
the balls of the powerful. We are as politically incorrect as our symbol – Mr Enrich; 
we do not answer to any political parties regardless of ideologies; we have members 
who can be supporters of political parties but they never speak in that setting for the 
Irriducibili – neither will they try to exploit our name. We dislike Italian politics; it is 
a farce! We are not like the so called ‘disobbedienti sociali’ [social disobedient]57 or 
extreme communists that state their rebellion to society, but are comfortably helped 
by their parties (PDS; Rifondazione Comunista). It is easy to be a ‘disobbediente 
sociale’ blocking the train containing our soldiers going to Iraq [indicating the desire 
of Italians to remain uninvolved in the Iraq offensive /war] and actually we agree with 
them and would have done it with them, but, unfortunately, if we attempt something 
similar, the police would have shot us; we would have the Digos (anti-terrorist units) 
in our homes. We fight the system without political protection; you risk your skin 
[meant be courageous] like we do! 
Remember, however, that we are an opinion-making force. Last week, we advised 
supporters not to go the stadium in protest against the Lazio President and 15,000 
accepted our suggestion.58 We scare political power because if, hypothetically, we 
leave our UltraS identity and we move into politics, we could do damages.’  
 
What can be gathered from Giorgio’s explanation is the other side of the non omologazione 
coin; as emerged earlier, the UltraS communitas are profoundly anti-system. More 
specifically, the ‘system’ concept has a national dimension, which includes the Italian State 
and football, but also an international one with rhetoric around anti-capitalism, anti-Anglo-
American politics and anti-globalisation.The character of Paolo Zappavigna, the leader of the 
                                                
57
 The term is applied to radical left militants who do not recognise the authority of the State. 
58
 Giorgio clarified to me that the President of SS Lazio Lotito’s management was guilty in the eyes of the 
Irriducibili of managing Lazio ineffectively and specifically of not spending enough money to reinforce the 
team. Such a policy was creating disenchantment among the fans and fewer of them attended the stadium. At the 
same time, from a more prosaic perspective, one consequence was a decrease in the sales of the Irriducibili’s 
merchandise. 
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Boys and a feared figure by many in the Italian hardcore football supporters movement, was 
the ultimate personification of such anti-system philosophy: 
 
 ‘Our motto is always sided and never conformist, never together the force of disorder 
(a clever play on words that targets the police who, in Italy, are forever identified 
with the term forze dell’ ordine -Forces of Order).’59 
 
 
Zappavigna’s loathing for the omologazione and for the ‘system’ is a powerful and appealing 
message central to Italian neo-fascism in and out the football terraces. The UltraS concept of 
being always against institutions is demonstrated by the following statement made by the AS 
Roma Opposta Fazione group (see Chapter 3).  
 
‘….. The opposta [opposite] mentality emerges in opposition to the modern 
[supporter]; rebellious to the rules imposed by a life and a system lacking ideals. The 
‘opposto’ UltraS does not have [football] myths, neither does he make the game [of 
football] his reason for living; instead he  exploits the stage of the stadium to show 
rebel spirit, to shout to the world that he will not compromise. The UltraS is 
‘opposto’ because ‘against’ is the way of life for those who lead: slave of nothing and 
no one, fight the arrogance of those who wear a uniform [the police] and the 
hypocrisy of certain media.’ Opposta Fazione-Roma (early 1990s) 
   
The Irriducibili and Boys’ anti-democratic sentiments are evident. Nonetheless, a reader 
should not consider this attack against the democratic system as only originating from the 
UltraS; extreme left ideology has in common with Italian neo-fascism revolutionary and 
resistance potential. This potential is also reflected in the Italian football terraces. When 
Livorno FC was promoted to Serie A (in season 2003-2004) after 55 years in lower divisions, 
the attention of the national media focused on the politicization of their curva. The Livorno 
Brigate Autonome Livornesi (BAL-Livorno Autonomous Brigades) was the most extreme 
Leftist in Italian football. They would praise Stalin and Lenin, and regularly sing Bandiera 
Rossa (Red Flag; the Italian communist anthem and the music equivalent of the Fascist 
Giovinezza).60 The BAL are also respected abroad; in 2009 The FC Livorno played a 
friendship match against the Turkish team Adana Demirispor. The match was organised by 
the supporters of the Turkish team because of their love for the Livorno team and its BAL, 
                                                
59
  Cf. La Repubblica. (online edition; 2007,11, November): www.repubblica.it/2007/11/sezioni/cronaca/tifosi-
morto-2/eversione-ultra/eversione-ultra.html 
60
 The anthem of The Red Flag has become the official anthem of the Italian proletariat and the Italian 
Communist Party. As with other music based on social struggles it seems that Bandiera Rossa originated in the 
north of Italy in the Pianura Padana region around the 1800. It became widely diffused during the Biennio Rosso 
(The red biennium 1919-1920) which culminated with the workers’ occupation of many iron works in the north 
of Italy. 
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which are considered the only one to challenge the capitalistic and burgeoise  football system 
(Corriere della Sera-online- 03 September,2009). For their politicisation, the BAL came 
under the scrutiny of the Digos, who consider them similar to the Irriducibili and Boys as an 
extraparliamentary formation. 
Being non omologati means more than just being anti-system. Moreover, the non 
omologazione principle is reflected in the UltraS relationship with political parties that share 
their ideology.  
Q: Giovanni, Are you – Irriducibili – linked to any Italian parties? 
G: If people want to call us politicised yes we are but, and this is crucial for us, we 
are politically incorrect. We do not worship any parties even if we have some 
political roots in common. We never bring symbols of political parties into our curva. 
We do not manifest deference in favour of anyone be they the Pope or the President 
of the Republic. The media speak about politics only when  we use the stadium to 
send our messages, but they forget or pretend to forget very important national and 
international football matches where the big names of Italian politics are present to 
show that they follow football for opportunistic reasons- namely to gain votes.’ 
Giovanni (Irriducibili) 
 
Therefore, the Irriducibili and Boys, should not be considered a subordinate political section 
of neo-fascist parties that intend to increase their votes and proselytes among the youth of the 
curve, as is often suggested by the media. This view of the UltraS is simplistic and underlines 
a lack of knowledge about these groups.  The Irriducibili and Boys can be considered 
authentic extraparliamentary groups, which – with a love of their football team – express a 
political ideology and, with it, visions of how society should be shaped autonomous from any 
political parties or pressure groups. They refuse to be subordinate to any political groups, 
even if sharing similar values. Their autonomy from formal politics was forever stressed. 
Marco (Boys) argued this vehemently by stating, ‘although I attend meetings with people 
from Forza Nuova or MSFT, I do not have any membership card, we are completely 
autonomous.’ Perhaps the most striking example of the autonomy of these groups occurred at 
the 2006 regional elections in Lazio. The list of Alleanza Nazionale candidates included 
Giulio Gargano, a politician with a long history in the Christian Democrats and, thus, not 
particularly appreciated by those with a neo-fascist vision of society. However, Gargano was 
supported by both UltraS groups because he was willing to lobby for the reform of diffide 
(football stadium banning orders) alongside the left-leaning Green MP, Paolo Cento. Cento 
was, at the time, the nearest interlocutor in the Italian parliament of the Irriducibili and Boys. 
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Even if Cento was championing the rights of the UltraS, the Irriducibili were far from 
Cento’s personal political ideology61.  
The communitas of the Boys and Irriducibili are territorial; no one, not even a group 
linked to a party that they support, can enter their ‘social space’ and dictate. Aware that they 
can move votes and opinions amongst sections of Roman youth, they do not want to lose this 
potential by being subsumed by any neo-fascist groups or parties. At the same time, both 
gatherings have relationships with politicians who they consider useful in the defence of their 
interests as UltraS.  From this perspective, they might be considered a political and pragmatic 
lobby aimed to ensure self-preservation. 
                                                                      *** 
Once in the stadium, the UltraS ideology finds an arena for action that they are denied 
in the wider everyday society by both public order policing and the banalities of everyday 
life, with its requirements of the workplace, neighbourhood and the pursuit of individuality. 
Inside the stadium occupying ‘their’ territory, the neo-fascist UltraS are willing to push their 
ideas using slogans, banners and violence. A neo-fascist outside of the stadium watches 
almost inertly the assumed decadence of the Italian society; however, inside the stadium, 
passivity changes into action. Such men - and women - believe that their only choice lies in 
opposing the decadent present to both make them feel alive and superior to the rest of their 
fellow citizens. Theirs is a rage against Reason. For the protagonists of neo-fascism the 
project of the Italian democracy has proven a failure. They see the construct of the nation 
State as a failure in permitting both corruption and in being unable to control those 
considered alien to Italian life. The football system is similarly decadent, the ‘beautiful game’ 
aesthetic is tarnished by the hideous realities of individual venality and corporate finance. In 
this setting, fascist ideology plays a crucial role in facilitating interactions with others and, 
consequently, serves to help the individual pass from theory to action; the unthinkable 
becomes thinkable. Ideology provides, as Geertz would argue (in Corte and Edwards, 2008), 
a consistent structured system of symbols, values and beliefs by which the groups interpret 
society and football. The UltraS logic operates as a selection tool and helps the ‘elite’discern 
who is part of their world and who is not. The latter need to be fought.  
                                                
61
 When politicians and the UltraS meet, the latter can use the elected individual in their pursuit of self-
preservation; the former deny that the party machine can influence them in any way. Concomitantly, career 
projections from the curve to Parliament were occasionally sought and sometimes attained. Some leading curve 
individuals attempted to become MPs due to their ability to create consensus and procure the youth vote (cf. De 
Sisti, 1996). In Reggio Calabria, the Curva of Reggina once had in their group Giuseppe Scopelliti who, for 
some five years (from to), was (and remains) the Alleanza Nazionale’s Mayor of Reggio Calabria -one of the 
biggest cities in the south of Italy.  
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Chapter 7 
The ‘true’ UltraS and the Modern world 
 
‘I am proud to be a Boys, a ‘true’ UltraS  group that is part of the history  
of the curva sud.’ Todde (Boys) 
 
An important element in making sense of the UltraS logic is represented in the above 
quote; the sense of authenticity mentioned by Todde is a significant trait that the Irriducibili 
and Boys share and can be identified in the concept of the ‘true’ UltraS. Authenticity in this 
study refers to, ‘the sense that one's life, both public and private, reflects one's real self.’ 
(George, 1998, p. 134; Vannini and Franzese 2008). The sense of authenticity expressed by 
the concept of ‘true’ UltraS is the strong affirmation of the UltraS communitas. It is another 
means by which the UltraS strengthen the ‘we’ versus the ‘others’ dynamic. Those who do 
not express their logic are not ‘true’ UltraS and do not deserve to be respected. Giovanni 
(Irriducibili) explained another facet of being a ‘true’ UltraS, ‘if I see anyone smoking pot or 
taking drugs in curva or near me, outside the stadium, I will slap him.’ Giovanni’s statement 
stresses the difference between being a ‘true’ UltraS and being part of the superficiality of 
contemporary youth. He underscores the UltraS drug-free living philosophy, which is not 
considered dominant in the wider society or in the football terraces. The ‘true’ UltraS, in 
Giovanni’s opinion, does not approve of recreational drug use by themselves or when 
evidenced among their peers; this aversion against any types of drugs is one of the norms of 
the communitas.  
 
 
Fig .19: The ‘No drugs campaign’ leaflet of the Irriducibili  
supported by the curva nord (2005) 
 
 
In such statements and drawings is evident the UltraS collective stance against the 
shallowness and individualism of the youth culture fuelled in the UltraS eyes by a mediocre 
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and valueless society. This attitude can be understood as a symbolic opposition against this 
society (Haenfler, 2004).  
Authenticity was also expressed by the involvement of the UltraS in their social 
battles. Giorgio explains: 
‘One of our social battles is against paedophiles; one of our banners at the stadium 
advertised the ‘telefono azzurro’62 because we consider the stadium and our curva an 
extraordinary ‘palcoscenico’ (stage) and a means to fight ‘social battles’. With our 
battle against paedophiles, we had also the support of the tifosi who, whilst distant 
from our ideology, are willing to collaborate with us on the issue. No other organised 
manifestation held at Piazza Venezia (the historical piazza of Rome and the place 
renown for Mussolini’s fascist celebrations) compares to the power of expressing  our 
ideas in the curva nord ; la curva is our piazza; our powerful piazza!’ 
 
 
Giorgio’s statement not only shows the will of the UltraS to campaign for issues that they 
consider ‘just’, it also demonstrates the radical nature of the ‘true’UltraS. The Boys and 
Irriducibili are extreme in everything they do. Opposition to the imposed social standards and 
expectations enables the UltraS to forcefully follow their path in life, which is in the end 
guided by their ideology (Haenfler, 2004). They speak the unspeakable and, in so doing, 
further isolate themselves from mainstream society.  
 
7.1 The Power of Culture (in ideology) 
 
The concept of the ‘true’ Irriducibile or Boys is not only constructed around ideology, 
it is also based on cultural practices. The centrality of culture in ideological youth gatherings 
is pointed out by Blee (2007), who cautions us from making the mistake of considering only 
ideologies and ideas as the essential tools with which to create bonds amongst those we 
consider ‘militants’.  I contend in this study that, to understand militant groups, such as the 
UltraS, one needs to focus on how culture is used in both internal and external interactions to 
shape the sense of ‘similarity’ and, just as significantly, the sense of  ‘difference’ 
(Dechezelles, 2008). The uniqueness of such an analysis provides explanations of how such 
groups both recruit and survive. 
How one uses the concept of culture in such inquiry is complicated. At one level, 
culture is a form of mental programming (Hofstede 1983; 1991); nevertheless, it is also 
visible among the UltraS in four ways: symbols, heroes, rituals and values. Amongst the 
                                                
62
 Il Telefono Azzurro is a non-profit-making association founded in 1987 which aim  to protect children from 
abuse; it operates a free telephone line to report any crimes against children. 
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UltraS, all four elements combine to create a sense of ideology. Figure 20 illustrates such a 
process.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      Fig. 20:  The cultural model of the UltraS 
 
This four-part analysis requires elaboration. I begin with the symbols that represent the most 
readily available manifestation of the UltraS culture. Due to their significance, symbols are 
located at the boundary of the above circle. Research can explain the meanings of the groups 
studied via an investigation on how symbols are used in everyday discourse (Spradley, 1979). 
Symbols advance ideas and make those ideas appear to be tangible (Sandelands, 1998). The 
UltraS symbols, often connected with the idea of tradition, comprise words, gestures and 
objects that have particular significance recognisable only by those who share their specific 
culture and logic. In the case of the Boys and Irriducibili’s, recurrent symbols are the term 
camerata or short sentences that are used to end a dialogue, such as In alto I cuori (keep high 
our hearts) or Saluti Romani (Roman salutes). The main UltraS symbols are loaded with 
significance and include the Celtic cross, the Eagle (for the Irriducibili), and the sword. 
Symbols are also represented by clothes and music, as I will detail later in the chapter.   
 
IDEOLOGY 
IDEOLOGY 
 
IDEOLOGY 
 
 
IDEOLOGY 
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Fig 21: the symbolism of the heroic.  
An Irriducibile Tattoo and motto:  
‘Honour and Fidelity 
According to Hofstede (1983; 1991), heroes can be real or imaginary and exist as 
behavioural models. For the UltraS, Benito Mussolini is an individual hero, but so are the 
deceased comrades of the Fronte della Gioventú (Youth Front) - killed by the hated 
communists during the late 1970s and early 1980s in Italy. Whilst often remembered as 
individuals, such people also exist in a collective sense of heroism. Heroes are also the 
diffidati’ (the UltraS hit by the stadium banning orders) and their leaders, such as Paolo 
Zappavigna and the Boxer who represent for the Boys and the Irriducibili examples of ‘true’ 
UltraS. As mentioned earlier, cartoon characters such as Mr. Enrich for the Irriducibili and 
Lupin III63 for the Boys are UltraS figurative heroes aimed to socialise the youth of the curve 
to their lifeworld. Similar to Harlock, Lupin III represents an anti-system hero, a ‘gentleman 
thief’ who steals from the rich, not only to his advantage, but also to help the needy.   
 
Fig. 22:Boys pin representing Lupin III 
 
                                                
63Lupin III exists in Japanese (manga) comics as the Nephew of Arsène Lupin, a character created by French 
writer Maurice Leblanc. (Cf. http://lupinthe3rd.net/files/profili/lupin.htm) 
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Rituals define a culture and, via them, the Irriducibili and Boys seek to distinguish 
themselves from the ‘non believers’. One of the rituals used by the UltraS is the ‘gladiator 
salute’way of greeting. Such a salute is also used as a hidden way to profess their ideological 
identity and widely shared by the Italian neo-fascist community (see Fig. 23).  
 
 
Fig. 23: The leader of Forza Nuova Roberto Fiore and the ‘gladiator Salute’ 64 
 
Travelling to an away fixture by train or car is also a form of ritual, as it serves as a time for 
the preparation of banners and choreographies for the forthcoming match. Every UltraS 
‘elite’member has a role in such activities. The leaders generally chose the catch phrases; 
amongst the Boys Paolo Zappavigna (the leader of the Boys) decided the slogan, and 
preferred ironic catch phrases. If the banners had an ideological motivation, then a member of 
the ‘elite’, such as Giovanni (for the Irriducibili) or Todde or Lele (for the Boys), carried out 
the task of putting  words on  cloth. The length of the preparation of the choreographies 
depended on the type of match. The ordinary games saw the preparation of  banners generally 
at the head office when the banners were not large. For the much anticipated derby, the 
location of the preparations changed. Large warehouses were rented outside of Rome that 
provided enough space for the preparation of the choreographies and production of banners. 
The parading of banners and displays of graffiti were significant for the ‘true’ UltraS; such 
words and slogans not only promoted the values and logic of the communitas, but warned the 
‘outsiders’ of their territory and the danger faced if they trespassed beyond said boundaries. 
                                                
64
 Cf. http://milano.repubblica.it/multimedia/home/5013924/1/4 
 91
While symbols,  heroes and shared rituals may be the most visible parts of a culture, 
values are fundamental to every culture (Hofstede, 1991). For the UltraS, 
values are broad tenets that state a preference for certain behaviours over others (Hitlin and 
Piliavin, 2004). The spirit of the ‘warrior’ encapsulates all of the values that the ‘true’ UltraS 
should follow: those around honour, faith, the sense of duty and fairness, which should be 
expressed in both ‘battles’ and daily interactions.65  
Being a ‘true’ UltraS relates to how participants present themselves to the ‘others’. 
The Irriducibili and Boys express this trait via the concept of ‘Style’ (cf. Hebdige, 1981). 
Marco (Boys) explains: 
 
‘We wear elegant casual clothing in contrast to many of the curva sud supporters. We 
dress casual. We take care of the aesthetic, we want to show off our ideals and hence 
we want to present ourselves in a decent way- with ‘Style’.  This way of dressing and 
thinking has to be a daily choice, not one reserved only for the stadium.’ 
 
 
UltraS ‘Style’ is a collective presence that is associated with symbolism, image and identity. 
It exists beyond notions of social class. ‘Style’ is manifest most obviously in their clothes, 
posture and gait. In the above statement, Marco connects their clothing with a way of being 
and, most importantly, with the function of promoting the group. Such a casual ‘Style’ is very 
popular among both the UltraS and the Italian neo-fascist youth. Instead of the black bomber 
jacket or the Doc Martens boots of the stereotypical European extreme right groups, the 
UltraS wear expensive jackets, such as those made by the English Stone Island or 
Aquascutum or the Italian CP Company. The UltraS not only adopt and appropriate a ‘Style’; 
they at times create ‘Style’. One of the Boys’ more popular items of merchandise is the Diabolik 
sweatshirt taken from the eponymous Italian cartoon character .66  
 
                                                
65
 Cf. chapter 8 for a more detailed analysis.  
66
 The cartoon character, Diabolik, was created by Angela and Luciana Giussani in 1962 and appears in a 
publication titled Casa Editrice Astorima. He is a ruthless robber who, using sophisticated technologies, with 
the beautiful Eva Kant, steals money and jewels from rich families, banks or from people who have obtained 
money via illegal means. Cf. http://diabolik.it/index.asp. 
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Fig.24 : The Diabolik sweatshirt 
 
The Diabolik sweatshirt is worn by a ‘true’ UltraS when facing confrontations to avoid being 
identified by the police CCTV; ‘Style’ is thus at times linked to concealment. 
 Via ‘Style’, the UltraS want to give the ‘others’ the impression of toughness, exalting 
the power of their communitas. The concept of habitus here, is useful sociologically for 
examining the UltraS  ‘Style’ ; habitus on an individual level, provides the UltraS with a 
cognitive and motivating structure that helps them to deal with various situations (Bourdieu, 
1984). Crucial to the UltraS habitus are notions of the body, particularly garments, displayed 
symbols, and items that are consumed (Shilling, 1993).  
Music is also part of the Irriducibili and Boys communitas; music helps to mark the 
UltraS distinction from the ‘ordinary’. For some members, their taste in music is varied, such 
as Giovanni (Irriducibili) who explained that his favourite group was the 270 bis 67 and that 
he enjoyed the songs of Massimo Morsello for the beauty of the lyrics and their messages.68 
This music was also popular among the Boys; it was often played in their sede. Another 
music group quite popular among the UltraS were the ZetaZeroAlfa (ZZA). The 
ZetaZeroAlfa songs attack, as the Irriducibili and Boys do in the curve, the omologazione of 
the Italian youth and, with this group, the Italian political and cultural systems.  In 2005, 
during a visit to meet the Boys in their head office, I saw a stereo that was playing the ‘hard 
                                                
67
 Cf. http://.270bis.com 
68Massimo Morsello was the co-founder -with Roberto Fiore- of  Forza Nuova. Morsello at various times has 
described himself as a fascist, a catholic, a fugitive and a politically incorrect song-writer.Certainly he had many 
strands to his bow; Morsello was once a member of the MSI youth organization and a member of the Nuclei 
Armati Rivoluzionari (NAR– Revolutionary Armed Nucleus) a terrorist group that operated in Italy between 
1978 and 1981. He was also a talented and successful song writer within the international world of the radical 
right.  He died of a tumour in 2001. (Cf. http://massimomorsello.it) 
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punk’ ZetaZeroAlfa CD placed among a statue of Benito Mussolini and shelves displaying 
their merchandise. The lead singer of the music group, Gianluca Iannone, as detailed earlier, 
is also the leader of Casa Pound Italia. The ZetaZeroAlfa band began playing concerts in 
Rome in 1997 and has performed 80 concerts, at the time of this writing, both in Italy and 
abroad. Their most recent concert tour, entitled European Revolution, included Eindhoven, 
Marseille, Stuttgart, Paris and Madrid. They have become so popular that the notable music 
magazine Rolling Stone dedicated the March 2008 cover to Iannone. The message of the 
ZetaZeroAlfa encourages followers to intervene in political and cultural domains and to use 
their sense of ‘Style’ to disseminate oppositional messages. Much of their merchandise, 
especially the T-shirts, is popular amongst the neo-fascist movement, including the UltraS, 
and the messages contained in said garments promote their philosophy of action (see fig. 25). 
 
Fig. 25: T-shirt ‘Beauty is in Acting!’ 
 
The ZZA CD entitled Dictatorship of the Smile contains the songs il grande fratello 
(Big Brother) or Indipendenza (Independence), which focus on the negative role played by 
the media in society. According to the lyrics, television rules individuals’ lives, eliminating 
any positive impulse or motivation to improve the human race. The pessimistic message 
states that humans are unable to make decisions when fed fake happiness by the media. In 
living in such a state of lethargy created by this artificial welfare, people are unable to feel 
emotions and to believe in ideals and values. The suggested tool of resistance to this society 
is culture. Such an idea is not new; Italian communist Antonio Gramsci similarly argued for 
the power of culture in his theory of Hegemony (Cf. Ricchini et al.  1987). The novelty of 
these songs is in the use of hegemony by a neo-fascist group, a concept that had long been 
ascribed to the extreme left.  
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Culture does not only encompass what the UltraS wear or the music they listen to, but 
is crucial to how they express their ideas. The fanzines l’Onore di Roma (the Honour of 
Rome-Boys) and la Voce della Nord (the Voice of the North-Irriducibili) are important 
pamphlets that intrigue the curious and offer a means by which the ‘sympathisers’ may 
understand their visions of life. Such publications portray the marginalisation discourses that 
the UltraS live by, yet, at the same time,  promote positive social identifications and seek new 
recruits that mark their ‘distance’ from society. 
 
Fig. 26: ‘Never defeated’ (La Voce della Nord) 
 
Figure 26 presents the ‘true’ UltraS who never concede defeat against the Italian State 
(symbolised by the handcuffs). The casual style of clothing is emphasised. The title of the 
cartoon is ‘Never Defeated’. The unknown Irriducibile writer explains: ‘It is not true that a 
lion in a cage does not change! He has only two paths, either he breaks the cage and resists 
till he dies or he becomes old, lives and dies in ways the others have decided for him!!!’ This 
depiction, like so many others in the Irriducibili and Boys fanzines, also serves another 
essential function:  the document emphasises the epic vision of the life of the Irriducibili. It 
aims to establish the norms that the ‘true’ UltraS should follow by creating images that 
highlight the communitas struggles and, at the same time, express a sense of pride and the 
magnificence of their resistance. Distant heroes are celebrated in the fanzines. Such 
characters are represented in metaphoric tales and exist in mottos and, most importantly, 
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representations of epic actions. The following document of the Irriducibili illustrates this 
depiction (fig. 27).  
 
 
Fig. 27:  ’The Last samurai ’(La Voce della Nord ) 
 
In this document, the Irriducibili exalt the Bushido (the way of the Japanese samurai; 
Yamamoto et al. 2001). The samurai, in the eye of the Irriducibili, represents admirable self-
confidence in making life’s decisions and in their concomitant rejection of superficial values. 
For the Samurai, the path that leads to honour is the most important one to travel. The article 
underlines the heroic vision sought by the Irriducibili, arguing: ‘if something is missing from 
a samurai, it is fear.’ The implication is that fear (not the police) is the number one enemy of 
the ‘true’ UltraS. The same concept can be found in the Boys’ fanzine, as is shown in figure 
28. 
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Fig. 28: ‘Let’s finish them’( L’ Onore di Roma) 
 
The axe is swung by the muscular hero astride his horse as he fights against the universal 
symbol of evil, the serpent. The lack of fear, evidenced in the hero’s ability to commit 
himself to fighting for the common good, underscores the will of those gathered in the UltraS 
name not to bow before authority in their fight for survival. The serpent can represent many 
things: the State, the police or Italian society. Figure 29 shows how the Boys fanzine can 
utilise the myth and symbols of the Roman Empire. It  criticises the AS Roma football 
players who are considered to be mercenaries, who are interested only in money and not in 
making the Roma club great and worthy of representing the greatness of their Roman 
ancestors. 
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Fig. 29: ‘Fatherland, Honour and Fidelity: 
 The 11 mercenaries in the pitch do not deserve us’  
( L’ Onore di Roma) 
Both fanzines have similar internal layouts; both contain columns that are dedicated to 
comments on the teams’ results and vicissitudes. In addition, anti-Italian State ‘editorials’ are 
evident as well as articles on issues that are not pertinent to football. The Irriducibili call such 
editorial selections Non Solo UltraS (Not Only UltraS), as is illustrated in figure 30. 
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Fig. 30: ’I consider you the last of the Idiot’ (La Voce della Nord).  
Article about the hegemony of the USA over the world. 
 
The Non Solo Ultras editorials demonstrate their commitment to what the Irriducibili term 
‘social campaigns’, somewhat of an euphemism, for topics that, as shown earlier in the study, 
range from international politics (the Iraq war, the Middle East conflict) to domestic 
problems, such as housing shortages, illegal immigration and political malpractice.   
Regardless of stylistic and symbolic differences (e.g., the Roman Empire myth is 
recurrent in the Boys than the Irriducibili fanzines), the fanzines promote their commitment 
to the sense of communitas (Fangen, 1998).  Both fanzines present the social and the logical 
world of the UltraS; a world which is based on a sense of hostility toward those who do not 
share their logic. The contest becomes one of celebrating the past against a decadent present. 
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Fig. 31: The Head-office of the  
Boys Roma 69 
 
7.2 Tradition versus Modernity 
Being part of the Boys or Irriducibili clearly goes beyond football. The curva stands 
as the locale where being part of the communitas is appreciated without social class 
stratification, and where the myth of Rome as the glorious capital of the Roman Empire is 
celebrated. As Marco details: 
‘I do not believe in ‘Roma’ as a football team, it would be limiting and superficial; I 
believe in what it represents, the AS Roma represents the capital city with its glorious 
traditions. It is sufficient to walk around Rome to breath this ideal - not Rome today 
with Veltroni [the former centre left Mayor] with the smog and the traffic - walk 
along the Fori Imperiali [Imperial Forum] and feel the power of ancient times. We 
need to be proud of living in this city.’ 
 
 
The Rome of the Empire and the fascist Italy are seen as ideal models of society. The 
articulation (and myths) of the ‘ideal’ society are common themes in the UltraS, as they are 
amongst other neo-fascist groups. Such narratives and images are based on legendary tales 
about ‘origins’ and ‘roots’ (Cf. Dechezelles, 2008). Consequently, an understanding of 
traditionalism70 is central for a proper understanding of the Boys and the Irriducibili’s way of 
life. 
                                                
69
 Cf. http://soccercasuals.splinder.com 
70
 The most compelling definition of Traditionalism is given by Allison: ‘the word came primarily to refer to the 
oral handing down of lore and legend’.Cf. L.Allison "traditionalism" : 
http://oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t86.e1399> 
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When asked who he believed to be the most important Italian historical figure, 
Giovanni (Irriducibili) replied: 
 
‘Benito Mussolini!… in the first 13-14 years of his [Mussolini’s] regime, he built a 
national identity and gave pride to the country, especially at the international level, 
for the only time in Italian history.  The ‘professional’ politicians of today are petty 
bureaucrats who think only about a good salary. Who is the most negative politician 
at the world level? That is easy!  The President of the USA; the Irriducibili believe 
that if many nations today have to live with the fear of terrorism, this is due to 
America.’ 
 
 
The traditional and symbolic universe of the UltraS world revolved - as did Giovanni’s 
statement and others collected from both groups– around the myth of Benito Mussolini. The 
glorification of the figure of the Duce was, as evidenced throughout the study, a dominant 
aspect of the culture of the Irriducibili and Boys.  Il Duce was represented as the greatest of 
men in Italian history. Mussolini was seen as the only Italian politician who had been able to 
represent the interests of his people and, most importantly, to restore Italy to prestige due to 
its glorious past. This legendary status of Mussolini was fostered (it was not spontaneous) by 
the ‘elite’via narratives and symbols.  In Giovanni’s statement, the strong nostalgia for 
fascism is crucially conveyed in opposition to the politics of contemporary Italy, where 
political principles, according to the UltraS, are used to assert individual ego more than to 
help people. This populist inclination is fundamental to the UltraS; it should not be 
considered peculiar because apparently in contradiction with their elitist nature; the UltraS 
originated in a setting- the football stadium- that exalted rhetorical narratives around abstract 
ideals (i.e. the football club) to appeal to the crowd.  The yearning for a return to the 
celebrated past requires that a ‘true’ UltraS know and honour the glorious history of their 
communitas. Being part of such UltraS communitas means that they have not only a 
willingness to celebrate past actions against the ‘system’ or, for instance against le zecche 
(‘ticks’- communists- in neo-fascist slang) of the FC Livorno BAL, but also a willingness to 
commemorate and respect the traditions and roots of their neo-fascist ideology. 
Behind the rhetoric of the UltraS, there is a common theme represented by the 
concept of cultural memory (Assmann, 1997). Memory is a phenomenon that is related to the 
present; our perception of the past is influenced by the present. Memory is also forever 
changing. The past is reinterpreted or reinvented to give new meaning to the present. For 
those who embrace fascism (and its modern ideological manifestations), there is the myth of 
the ‘golden age’, a glorious past that is constantly compared to an uncertain and worrying 
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present. The myth expressed by fascism, and adapted by the UltraS to their everyday 
experience in and outside the football stadium, is transformed into accomplishment. Myth is a 
projection that is different from a utopian vision. It is a logical representation that could be 
rationally examined. It is not important that the myth is realisable; its purpose is to be the 
engine of human action in its appeal to those seeking radical change and to stress the moral 
legitimacy of the communitas of the neo-fascist collective. The importance of symbols and, 
most importantly, their connection to the glorious past was stated by Marco ( Boys):  
 
Symbols are very important!! Not just how they are used, but most of all in what they 
represent. Sometimes we see le rune [the runes] in neo-fascist groups; however, they 
do not belong to our tradition or culture, but more to a northern European one. We 
use the fascio littorio, which was a symbol of authority during the Roman Empire. 
During the Regime of Mussolini, it signified both a will to regain the territories that 
once belonged to the Roman Empire and the pursuit of national unity overcoming the 
North-South tensions ever evident in Italy. The Celtic cross linked to the Roman 
Emperor Constantinus is part of our heritage, but, in Italy, it is forbidden by law to 
display because it is considered neo-fascist!! [He then revealed tattoos depicting the 
Celtic cross].  The sun is the most important theme for us; if you listen to the old song 
of the youth movement of the MSI (Tomorrow Belongs to Us!), the sun is always 
present; we use it because strangely enough it is not infamous as an extreme right 
anthem.’  
For the UltraS, symbols constitute repertoires of action that signpost the importance 
of past events – whether real or imagined – thereby providing popularly accessible 
‘points of entry’ for individuals to locate and contextualise their own personal 
experiences within the broader collective (Gamson, in Mazer, 2008). Antonio (Boys) 
elaborates upon this theme: ‘The Celtic cross, one of our symbols, is forbidden in the 
stadium, so we substitute this with the arrow, another type of Runa that symbolises a 
certain political [but also religious] identity.’  
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Fig. 32:  
The Celtic cross and one of the Boys credo: 
‘Dismay is not escape; Dismay is to wait for the  
nothing that promotes a burning death. 
God, how sad is the behaviour of those 
 whom do not act’ 
 
The Celtic cross was one of the most widely used symbols connected with tradition among 
the Irriducibili and Boys. When asked about this relationship, both groups based their 
explanations on the link of the symbol to traditional Roman Catholicism and to the history of 
the Celts. The link between this symbol and the political extreme right originated in the 
organisation Jeune Europe (1960). The Jeune Europe was founded by Jean Thiriart (1922-
1992) and manifested anti-American and anti-Semitic sentiments. The Belgian politician tried 
to create a European Revolutionary Party - an anti-imperialist party based in the ideology of 
the extreme right (Macklin 2005, pp. 320-321). The Jeune Europe exported the Celtic cross 
to Italy, where it became the symbol of the Fronte della Gioventu’ under the influence of 
Pino Rauti in the 1970s (Cf. Ferrari, 2009). In Italy, the Celtic cross was banned by Law No. 
205 (approved in June, 1993) because it was associated with neo-fascists and those who 
supported racial, national, ethnic and religious discrimination. The relationships between 
symbols, meanings and tradition, in the case of the UltraS, are not casual. Symbols 
(connected to the past), legendary tales and myths not only serve to unite the UltraS but also 
to drive their action via inspiration (Mazer, 2008). The symbols-tradition correlate is also 
very evident in the Irriducibili. Their most important motto ‘Dare, Believe, be Reckless’ is 
illustrated by the Imperial Eagle. The Eagle symbol possesses dual meaning. First, it represents 
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the SS Lazio; however, the SS Lazio Eagle is quite different in shape from the Irriducibili Eagle, 
which is very similar to the fascist Imperial Eagle. Figure 33 shows the latter in Bergamo 
standing outside of the post and telecommunications office. It is one of the ‘artistic’ legacies of 
the fascist period displayed by the city council.  
 
 
Fig 33: Left, the Irriducibili’s Eagle and their motto 
 ‘Dare, Believe, be Reckless.  Right, the Imperial Eagle in Bergamo 
 
The Imperial Eagle represents many aspects of tradition for the Italian neo-fascists. Julius 
Evola (1993) explains that the eagle has both Olympic and heroic meanings. The former 
because the eagle was sacred to Zeus, a divinity who was represented in the Aryan-Roman 
tradition by Jupiter. Zeus/Jupiter was the god of light and power. For the Ancient Romans, 
the appearance of an eagle was a good omen, a divine sign of impending victory against the 
barbars (Cf. Evola, 1993). Symbols serve as a sword to the UltraS that may be used in 
‘battles’, primarily against the modern world, which neglects traditions. Confined by ideas of 
modernity, rationality and technology and a world in which cultural practices are increasingly 
commodified, the absence of a sense of ‘soul’ results in disenchantment (cf. Weber 1963; 
1968). ‘Traditional values’ in the UltraS eyes, celebrate a sense of pride in the Roman, fascist 
and national historical roots. Such values are, together with myth, articulated to oppose the 
dominant and ‘politically correct’ societal values. They are consciously used by the UltraS to 
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reinforce members’ motivation to shape their logic, knowledge, and behaviour (Rafaeli and 
Kluger 1998; Rafaeli and Worline 2000).71  
 
7.2.1 Tradition and Modernity: Football Opposed 
 
The concept of tradition has also a decisive influence on how the UltraS conceive ‘modern’ 
football. In the name of tradition, the UltraS are ‘against a football system that, in the name 
of modernity, promotes impunity from its own mistakes of debts of millions of Euros’ (Boys’ 
slogan). To its critics, ‘modern’ football manifests a total lack of values and is synonymous 
with corrupt politics, governance mismanagement and hypercommercialisation, which treat 
fans as consumers and not as one of the most important elements of calcio- the spectacle. 
‘In this calcio bought by money - where Buffon is worth more than all the Chievo 
football team-  there is no space anymore for values:72 the tifoso has been replaced by 
the spectator, the manager-fan by professionals; the football fan-players have 
disappeared, replaced by mercenaries ready to change their teams every year. The 
UltraS mentality is fighting this to ensure that football passion can defeat money; to 
give the stadium back to their legitimate owners (the supporters). To fight such 
repression is not violence; it is the will to conquer what has been sacrificed in the 
name of business. UltraS follow the team anywhere. The television is for spectators 
[not UltraS]; the UltraS refuse compromises with anyone. UltraS honour the team 
shirt regardless of who wears it. UltraS fight ‘il calcio moderno.’ Boys Direttivo 
The lamented changes of Italian football mostly occurred during the 1980s and 1990s, 
most notably with marketing of the game broadcasting rights and the rise of Pay TV. 
Concomitantly, the game became increasingly spectacularised and dramatised via the 
introduction of the three points for a win and the modification of the offside rule to encourage 
more goals. Changes in the matches’ scheduling - to suit satellite TV programming - 
promoted the transformation of the supporter to a consumer who was exploited for maximum 
financial profits (Malagutti, 2002). Whilst in previous decades, football was always in pursuit 
of the Lira, the interest of the club Presidents and club owners was not linked merely to the 
immediate pursuit of profit, but more to a sense of personal prestige and fame. However, the 
new media influences of the last 20 years gave the teams large amounts of money in 
                                                
71
 The impact of symbols on human behaviour has been documented by several studies. The most complete is 
the work of Carver and Scheier (in Schlenker, 1985). The researchers placed a mirror or a camera in a lab and 
hypothesised that such symbols would either make subjects focus on their publicly-perceived traits  (such as if 
they look good to other people) or the private elements of self (such as if they feel good themselves). The results 
were remarkable. The mirror made the participants  focus on their own values, while the camera made them 
focus on the participants’ values and views. The authors concluded that symbols elicit a specific behaviour and 
work as a bridge from thought to action (Rafaeli and Worline 2000). 
72
 A reference to Gianluigi Buffon, the then Italian national goalkeeper currently a World  Cup winner and one 
of the best players in world football. 
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exchange for broadcasting rights and, via these opportunities, exploited a vast global player 
market. In this ‘capitalistic’ (and potentially highly profitable) football milieu, many 
thousands of paying supporters were destined to lose their sense of importance that they 
presumed their role had granted them in the past. Their financial investment could not 
compare with that provided by the paying TV viewer. Nevertheless, who can resist the forces 
of global capitalism and broadcast gigantism? The Boxer argued that the UltraS are the only 
opposition against those who would like to hegemonise the stadium and to remove who does 
not fit its profit-making logic. In this ‘new worst’ calcio, according to the Boxer, football 
traditions and the values, which have sustained the game, do not count anymore. Similarly, 
Giorgio condemns both modern football and modern politics. To him, the two issues are 
congruent: 
‘The football system and the political one are the same - both are corrupt; look at 
where we watch football. In the Olympic Stadium, the fire brigade can only enter to a 
certain point because of the wrong design for the 1990 Italian World Cup. On that 
occasion, everyone 'ate' a slice from the mondiali cake!! It is a stadium that is the 
safest in Italy [stated ironically], so safe that, every Sunday, they need to ask the 
provincial authority [the Prefect] for permission to use it. They use us as a smoke 
screen to distract the media instead of focusing on problems that are more serious. 
They accuse us of being the cause of families moving away from the stadium, but, in 
reality, the situation is the ridiculous cost of the tickets. The day before yesterday, at 
Treviso [in Serie B], because they were playing Milan, tickets were selling at 130 
Euros!! We are considered trouble, but we annoy the 'palace of power….’  
 
On April 2003 at the Olympic Stadium, the UltraS publicly demonstrated against the 
current way of contemporary Italian football. On this occasion, the UltraS attempted to unify 
the Italian hardcore football supporters of different loyalties to proclaim and resist the 
contemporary culture of football and to publicise and oppose the tactics of police and the 
criminalisation of the whole hardcore football supporters movement. The gathering of the 
various groups’ leaders (the Irriducibili and Boys were the main organisers) was not very 
united due to the ever-evident political division within the hardcore football supporters 
movement. Attending from Rome were the neo-fascists groups, such as Boys Roma, UltraS 
Romani and the Irriducibili. Further camerati came from Inter Milan, represented by the Boys 
San and Fighters of Juventus, and UltraS of Verona, Brescia and Milan. Supporters who 
were more ideologically oriented to the extreme left from Livorno, Ternana, Perugia and 
Cosenza decided not to participate. The demonstration saw 6,000 UltraS shout slogans such 
‘UltraS-free’; ‘We hate pay TV and SKY’; ‘No to police repression, No to your calcio’. The 
Irriducibili stated in their slogans:  
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‘Per una legge più equa e contro la criminalizzazione indiscriminata degli UltraS’ 
(In favour of a more fair law and against the indiscriminate criminalization of the 
UltraS); Per un calcio più a misura di tifoso e contro il calcio moderno (In favour of 
a football more focused on the supporter and against modern football).’ Boys 
 
In another instance in 2005, the Irriducibili decided to oppose the way in which their team 
was managed. After the replacement in July of 2004 of the food tycoon Sergio Cragnotti’s as 
President, the new president, the Roman real estate tycoon Claudio Lotito (according to the 
Irriducibili, linked politically to FI and AN) sought to repay the debt of 107 million Euros 
that the club owed to the Italian tax system by asking the government for permission to delay 
the payment and permit the club to pay in 20 yearly instalments, thereby avoiding 
bankruptcy. The fans had their own way of dealing with the issue. In March 2005, The 
Irriducibili organized a sit-in outside of the Rome based Italian Ministry of the Economy. 
Violence erupted and ten Lazio supporters and four police officers were injured.73 
Fortunately for SS Lazio, and thanks to public activism, after 10 months of negotiations with 
the leaders of the UltraS group, the club reached an agreement with the government and 
committed to pay 140 million Euros over a period of 23 years.  
Today football produces more wealth for its employees (the football players) than its 
employers. To better understand this situation, it is necessary to go back to the 1990s. The 
first important transformation of this era in Italian football occurred at the legislative level 
with Law No. 586 (1996), which confirmed the transformation of professional football to a 
business-oriented system (cf. Braghero et al. 1999). The new law allowed for the distribution 
of profits among football clubs shareholders and opened a new phase in as much as football 
became an ever-greater spectacle. It became part of Italian show business, which was owned 
and controlled by those in search of profits (cf. Papa and Panico, 2002). Further legislation 
affected football clubs’ budgets, most notably the revolutionary Bosman ruling of December 
1995, which gave football players in the EU broad freedom (and power). At the end of their 
contracts, players could ask their clubs for money to stay. In order to avoid losing the players, 
the clubs were forced to renew the contract, paying huge amounts of money in some cases 
(Buzzanca and Di Loreto, 2003). Italian clubs risked financial disaster. For decades, they had 
included in their projected budgets future profits based on the presumed income from the 
transfer of players at the end of their contracts. In these circumstances, the link between il 
calcio and politics was evident. To minimise the effects of Bosman’s ruling on the financial 
status of Italian football, Romano Prodi’s centre-left government (from 1996 to 1998) 
                                                
73
 Cf. http://italy.indymedia.org/news/2005/03/749755_comment.php 
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introduced law No. 586. This law allowed football clubs to itemise in their budgets the credit 
(i.e. losses) accrued by the players and, crucially, allowed the clubs to pay off the losses over 
a 3-year period. It was an ad hoc law aimed solely at helping to resolve the debts of the elite 
clubs (Falsanisi and Giangreco, 2001). However, this law did not stop the crisis. In July 2002, 
eight clubs failed the financial scrutiny of the COVISOC.74 Amongst these were SS Lazio 
and AS Roma. Faced with this economic crisis, the Italian football authorities, in the shape of 
Lega Calcio who controlled Serie A and B, asked the new Italian Premiere Berlusconi for 
assistance (Liguori and Vincenzi, 2002). The centre-right government responded in February 
2003. The Parliament modified law No. 91, thereby allowing the clubs of Serie A and B to 
devalue 50% of their assets, as represented by footballers, and to pay the debts accrued in the 
purchase of players in 10 yearly instalments.The situation has not changed and may worsen 
because of today’s world-wide economic crisis. Many italian football club presidents need to 
cover with their own money the yearly debt of the club; an example is the oil tycoon 
Massimo Moratti – president of Inter-Milan. Even the ‘wealthy’ AC Milan has debts of 30 
million of Euros, while the Juventus’ debts are 20 million. The Italian Football Union has 
forecast a 20% cut of the players’ salaries and complains about this ‘injustice’. On the other 
side of the ‘barricade’, the president of Fiorentina and fashion tycoon Diego Della Valle 
argues: ‘I and my brother feel uneasy paying all that money to players, knowing that there 
are people who come to the stadium earning a thousand Euros a month struggling to make 
ends meet’ (La Repubblica –online- 05 December, 2008). 
The negative perception of ‘modern’ Italian football influences the relationship 
between football and the UltraS, especially if we consider their ideological aversion to 
capitalism. Marco articulates this belief: 
 
‘The UltraS logic no longer acclaims the football player. They are not like a Giannini 
or Conti75  of long ago; they do not care about the supporters anymore, so we do not 
support them as individuals. Before, when a player was injured, he was frequently 
with us watching the match from the terrace, not anymore. They do not give 
emotional contact to us, so they do not merit anything in return. They are mercenaries 
out for the money; we leave this silliness to the normal ultrá supporters who think 
                                                
74
 The COVISO - Commissione di vigilanza sulle società calcistiche – [Committee for the Control of the 
Football Clubs] is tasked with controlling the financial propriety of Italian football clubs and to guarantee the 
regular procedures of the Italian Football Championships. 
75
 Giuseppe Giannini (nicknamed ‘The Prince’ on account of his good looks) was a former captain of the Roma 
team. He so loved Roma that he never left the club during his playing peak from 1983-1996. He finished his 
career in Austria at Sturm Graz. Conti is another example of a player attached to the Roma colours, playing 
from 1973 until 1991 and winning a Serie A scudetto in 1982-1983 and the 1982 World Cup with the Azzurri in 
Spain.  
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Totti is the king of Rome [laughs]. Our banners are more about Roma the club for its 
tradition or about the social issues that affect Rome and Italy.’   
 
The statement of Marco is significant since for the ‘ordinary’ football fans Totti is considered 
emblematic of AS Roma. The detachment of the Boys from the players as expressed by 
Marco finds support on one of the covers of their fanzine, as is illustrated in figure 34. 
 
Fig. 34: What champions… 
What Mercenaries..for you only indifference! 
. 
                                                                     ***  
 
The UltraS were (and are) prepared to fight against what they dismissively call calcio 
moderno (modern football) and its highly commercialised – but ultimately disastrous – 
economic performance and scandalous mismanagement. If they had not, who would have? 
For them the mass of fellow supporters are too compromised to care or protest. For the 
UltraS to oppose, promote and resist is their duty. Nevertheless, whilst dismissive of the 
game’s materialistic pursuits of efficiency, profit and productivity, the UltraS searched for 
and appreciated at the same time the abstract qualities of the game, especially when it found 
proponents who embodied the ‘Warrior Spirit’.  
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Chapter 8 
 
The ‘Warrior Spirit’ 
 
‘‘Nessuna notte è così lunga da impedire al sole di risorgere’ 
[No night is ever so long as to stop the sun rising] Slogan of the Boys Roma. 
 
The key to analyse the UltraS ‘Warrior Spirit’ is bound up in notions of identification, 
best defined as: ‘the choice of another, from whose perspective we view our own behaviour’ 
(Glaser, 1956, p. 440). An UltraS identifies oneself as having ‘Warrior Spirit’, hence, will 
ideally manifests all the values represented by this attitude. The best description of the 
‘Warrior Spirit’ was given by Giovanni (Irriducibili) when he argued that:  ‘Fighting is the 
essence of being UltraS; many joined the group for the desire to confront the opponent’. 
Giovanni’s statement clearly illustrates the warrior-violence correlate; however, such a 
statement does not tell the whole story of the UltraS-warrior couplet. How a warrior should 
behave is perhaps best explained by the following excerpt, which was published in the Boys’ 
fanzine in 2005 and signed by the direttivo: 
 
‘The expert warrior resists insults: he knows the strength of his punch, the ability of 
his hits. Facing an unprepared opponent, he stares him in the eyes and achieves the 
victory without bringing the confrontation to a physical level. As soon as the warrior 
learns from his spiritual master, the light of the faith begins to shine in his eyes and he 
does not need to demonstrate anything to anyone….The warrior of the light knows his 
immense strength: he does not fight with those who do not deserve the honour of the 
combat.’  
 
The concept of honour is an integral attribute of the UltraS ‘Warrior Spirit’. New recruits to 
the Irriducibili and Boys must abide by unwritten codes of honour. The sanctions resulting 
from breaking this code can range from exclusion –or loss of authority and prestige- to 
physical challenge. When the issue of honour is analysed in a sociological speculation, the 
following questions are raised:  Does the ideology of honour allow for discretion? In addition, 
who, or what, writes the scripts in which honour is enacted? Honour is both an individual and 
group attribute that must be claimed and maintained, it is therefore a mechanism of power that is 
used to initiate and resolve conflicts (cf. Campbell 1964; Blok 1981). A notable aspect of 
honour -bound contest and response is that a man ought to respond only to the challenge of an 
equal (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 105). The UltraS individually or collectively lose honour if found 
incapable of responding to a confrontation. Such outlook is expressed by the Boys previous 
statement.  
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For the UltraS, honour provides a code for both interpretation and actions on two levels.  
One is as a ‘system of symbols, values, and definitions’ to think about and interpret as a 
phenomenon.  On a second level, honour embodies the UltraS acts, which are organised into 
‘categories, rules, and processes...which may be specific to the given culture.’(Friedrichs, 1977, 
p. 284). Being an UltraS warrior does not only mean being able to fight, it also requires the 
individual to be able to pay the price for his/her convictions, which, in the Boys and 
Irriducibili’s case, is inseparable from their fight against the ‘system’. For instance, amongst 
the Boys, everyone who was diffidato (banned from the football stadium) displayed a gold 
double- blade axe pendant given by the direttivo and symbolising, not only political identity, 
but also the respect  of  the ‘elite’ for the way the member  behaved in challenging the 
authorities. The member received the pendant as recognition of his/her warrior status. 
The ‘Warrior Spirit’ directs not only the UltraS actions and the value of honour but 
also encapsulates faith. Values need to be fulfilled to become part of the moral duty of an 
UltraS.  For the Boys, faith is disjoined from the AS Roma team (contrary to 
‘ordinary’hardcore football fans) because it has ideological connotations. Faith means 
stressing the glorious traditions of Rome that, as mentioned earlier, from a neo-fascist point 
of view underlines the glorious Roman Empire. Faith for Giorgio (Irriducibili) has the same 
purpose; it means being consistent in what one believes and not renouncing the way of life 
chosen, even if violence needs to be used. Football support and neo-fascist ideology evidence 
similar senses of piety and excessiveness; they are belief systems that result in the traits 
stressed and admired by the UltraS. Honour and faith, in the case of the UltraS, are inseparable 
from the sense of duty –the UltraS must do what they consider to be ‘right’. This attitude 
emerged from Giorgio’s explanation of why the Irriducibili were so respected by other 
UltraS: 
‘After the death of ‘Paparelli’76 we decided to make the Laziali become more 
respected. Over the years, the Irriducibili have faced all UltraS groups in all possible 
ways, even the less orthodox ones. We are the elite of the UltraS, check the papers 
since 1987. Those were different years; there was less police repression. We used to 
leave Rome to see Lazio play away sometimes the day before to be in front of the 
rivals end in the morning. We challenged them in their homes! Nevertheless, at the 
same time, we have never done malicious and infamous actions and perhaps this is 
the reason why we are respected. We are always fair.’  
 
Doing what was ideologically right was an issue stressed by Marco (Boys). In the following 
statement, he explained why there was so much hostility toward the fans of Livorno FC:  
                                                
76
 On the 28th of October 1979 a petard fired from the curva sud by Roma supporters during the Rome derby 
killed a Lazio supporter by the name of Vincenzo Paparelli. 
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‘The Livorno supporters, when relegated to Serie B, produced a banner upon which 
was written: ‘Tito ce lo ha insegnato le foibe non sono un reato’ [Tito has taught us: 
the Foiba is not a crime]77. No police seized this banner; this is something very 
shameful. We will never tell the police to go and seize this banner because we are 
against the ‘infami’ [informers]; we deliver our own justice instead.’   
 
Doing ‘the right thing’ justified fighting rival fans per se and made the assault more 
enjoyable when such fans manifested politics that are diametrically opposed to those of the 
UltraS. At times –in a conventional fashion– the opponents were denigrated and denied the 
status of ‘true’ UltraS and were called communists. These slights justified violence following 
the ‘right thing’ framework. Another example of doing ‘the right thing’ is given by Todde 
who represent the ‘communists’ of Siena and Bologna as both cowards and police delators: 
 
‘Historically, we never found difficulties in small cities like Siena.  They know we- 
Romans - travel in big numbers; hence a city, such as Milan - with Inter and Milan - 
can have a fight with 5,000-6,000 Romans. However, places like Empoli and Perugia 
have in total 1,000 supporters and do not have the numbers to give us trouble. They 
know that if they ‘break our balls’ [annoy us], the Boys will destroy their stadium, so 
they are not hostile.   
 
At Siena, however, once there were 30-40 fans who were desperately looking to fight 
Roma fans; they did not cowardly want to face us but they were looking for families 
and ‘ordinary’fans.  In Siena, 5-6 Roma UltraS saw this aggression against these 
families and tried to defend them. They received lots of ‘botte’ [Roman slang for 
beatings]; however, two Sienesi was stabbed during these fights. These Sienesi went 
to the police. This is very bad because the UltraS code is to clean dirty clothes within 
the family and not be an ‘infame’ (informer). They have not followed the rules; they 
used the police to defend themselves. They have behaved like the Bolognesi [fans of 
Bologna FC] that are deemed throughout the UltraS movement as cowards and spies 
because they report their fights to the police.’ 
 
Informed by the context of Italian masculinity and the added complexities of a 
political ideology, the UltraS carry a heavy burden due to their ‘sense of right’. Following 
this framework, the confrontations that the Boys and the Irriducibili entered into might best 
be considered as ‘competitions’, which they have to win as part of their obligation to both 
protect and save their world. This concept of competition is explained by social 
                                                
77
 ‘Foiba’ is a term that describes a natural deep cavity (one might use it to describe a quarry). Beyond this 
technical description the term equates for many Italians with the nation’s tragic era between 1943 to 1946. In the 
region of Istria, Trieste and most of Venezia the Yugoslavian militia of General Tito used the foiba to eliminate 
Italian fascists as well as civilians of all political creeds, guilty in the eye of Tito of being Italians (cf. 
http://tgcom.mediaset.it/cronaca/articoli/articolo169293.shtm). Thrown into the foiba men and women were 
beforehand robbed of  their houses and possessions. Women were raped and men tortured. The number of 
Italians killed has never been formally established. On February 10, 2007, the President of the Italian Republic 
Giorgio Napolitano (a former leader of the Italian Communist Party and later the Democratic Party) gave  
medals to the relatives of 30 Italians massacred by Tito’s militia. (Cf. 
http://rainews24.rai.it/it/news.php?newsid=67396). 
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anthropologist Bailey (1969), who applied the analogy of a ‘game’ when studying the 
behaviour of politicians. Bailey argued that much adversarial behaviour in politics was based 
on a minimal consensus around what extremes (or boundaries) of behaviour could be 
tolerated. Even when political behaviour might sink to violence, there were rules, tacitly or 
explicitly accepted, that could be divided into those that were proclaimed (normative) and the 
tacit (pragmatic).  
The former set broad limits for possible action and allowed the players a choice. They 
were general guides for conduct, allowing for articulations of ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ judgements 
that could justify behaviour. The latter – tacit (pragmatic rules) – dealt with the effectiveness 
of action.  These rules were wide-ranging, from accepted ways of winning without actually 
cheating, to cheating without being found out. Consequently, what Bailey (1969) termed 
‘pragmatic exceptions’ (p. 113) could build against the normative rules and result in either a new 
set of rules or end with ‘stock-taking’ to restore the desired norms.  As Bailey (1969) argued for 
political contests, confrontation was the product of a sense of competition as well as being a 
message of strength; confrontation could also be considered a challenge, ‘which the receiver has 
an option to receive and act upon’ (p. 100).  In the course of such scenarios, decisions are 
usually made under ‘conditions of uncertainty’ (p. 70), particularly when there is no apparent 
rule to guide action or, somewhat conversely, when there are several possibilities. In the 
oppositional culture of the UltraS, strategies of competition and challenge are ever evolving.  
Such innovation sees in part a deliberate deviation from normative rules (that are considered 
‘fair play’), a circumstance that is facilitated by the ‘rules’ of engagement never anticipating all 
possible stratagems. Competing teams in these social dramas can function without formal 
leaders or normative rules. This caveat facilitated the adoption of pragmatic rules that enable 
some to ‘coerce or influence others’ (p. 35) when a decision has to be made or action has to 
replace thought. Such innovation need not offend existing norms; not least because competing 
personnel could be wide and loose enough in acceptance of what was ‘correct’ and permissible 
to permit individuals who made seemingly outlawed moves to both partake and remain – 
ostracism was difficult to execute. If victory was the outcome, then that which was considered 
cheating was now considered effective; other groups would be within their rights to follow suit.   
Violence does not explain in toto the ‘Warrior Spirit’. In 2009, I asked if the Boys 
considered themselves ‘active’ outside of the stadium. Todde answered, ‘Yes; however, the Boys 
are more than this, our most important commitment is about the social campaigns and not 
forgetting the guys hit by the Daspo or who are not with us anymore, such as Gabriele [Sandri].’ 
A warrior like Todde does not forget his camerati. For the UltraS warriors in death, the 
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camerati are remembered. This duty of memory not only occurs within football, as with 
Sandri.  
 
Fig. 35: Lele’s Acca Larentia article 
Lele of the Boys (age 23), in the above document, remembers the 7th of January 1978, when 
in Via Acca Larentia in Rome (a well known local section of the MSI), after a meeting of the 
MSI Youth Front, two members  Franco Bigonzetti and Francesco Ciavatta were killed by a 
six-strong commando unit of the terrorist group Nuclei Armati. Another militant, Stefano 
Recchioni, died during the subsequent clashes with the police. Lele explains the clashes with 
the police that day:  
 
‘After a few hours, the news of the event became known by many camerati who 
arrived in front of Acca Larentia. The tension was strong; a journalist of the RAI 
(equivalent of the BBC) and a camera operator filmed the street where the shooting 
occurred and stopped in front of Francesco’s bloodstain on the street…. One of them 
threw down a cigarette butt; the crowd reacted immediately. The police charged; 
Captain Sivori took his gun and shot in the middle of the crowd, but the weapon 
locked; so he asked for another and targeted Stefano Recchioni, who died the 9th of 
January at the San Giovanni’s hospital. After many years, their memory makes them 
immortal and frees our eyes from squalid boundaries! Honour to the fallen of Acca 
Larentia.’ 
 
It is not the intention of this study to evaluate whether the episode of Acca Larentia occurred 
as Lele wrote it; the journalist Luca Telese does this in detail in his  book Cuori neri (‘Black 
Hearts’; Telese, 2006). What is important here is the aptitude of the UltraS warriors to 
commemorate the dead heroes, as this trait is integral to their logic. In Lele’s’ passage, it 
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seems that all of the dislikes and contempt focus on the police, who are considered as much 
assassins as the terrorists who killed the camerati. In the UltraS, commemoration - together 
with symbols, myths, and heroes- defines their ideological boundaries with society and, at the 
same time, incites the group members to hate the ‘enemy’.   
The Boxer was the living embodiment of the ‘Warrior Spirit’, which in the end can be 
described as a combination of thought and action. Meeting the Boxer was always a difficult 
task; he was busy leading the group and with his own job. At the time (2006), he had a 
clothes shop in Rome. I eventually interviewed him at the sede of the Irriducibili. Located in 
a pleasant Rome district, the first thing that a visitor notices is the security gates that surround 
the premises. Inside the house, the foyer reveals an aqua scooter (one of the members 
practised this sport). A corridor reveals a series of furnished offices with adjacent waiting 
rooms. Beyond the offices, stands a large warehouse with shelves that are full of merchandise 
- hats, sweatshirts, T-shirts, jackets etc., pictures of the Lazio team and a large imperial Eagle 
emblazoned with the words ‘Dare, Believe, Be Reckless.’The radio broadcast spreading 
through the building reminds listeners that they are tuned into La Voce della Nord (the Voice 
of the Curva Nord). Our conversation was preceded by exchanges around a mutual 
enthusiasm for boxing and martial arts. The Boxer’s’ friend, Alessio Sakara, known as Il 
Legionario (the Roman Legionnaire), is a successful professional fighter in the Ultimate 
Fighting Championship (UFC).78 
Physicality is important to the Boxer. Upon meeting, he remarked, as others before 
him, that I looked like ‘piú na guardia che un professore ‘(more of a police officer than an 
academic). Such a comment was attributed to our mutual interest in combat sports. A well-
known regional boxing coach and a former semi-professional boxer, his pugilistic skills are 
renowned amongst the UltraS – if the Boxer fights, he rarely loses. He is a complex figure; 
his comportment suggested a very tough character which tends to scare people. Upon talking 
with him and gaining mutual trust, his various qualities emerged. Like the members of the 
UltraS ‘elite’, the Boxer had a strict code of honour that is also typical of those who practice 
combat sports at a higher level. The first few questions asked of him were about politics and 
his thoughts about the current state of Italian society. He answered that the First and Second 
Republic were the same; the cards of politics have been just shuffled, but the people in power 
remained the same. He felt great pride as an Italian, despite what he considered the major 
problem of Rome, namely the illegal immigration from the Eastern European countries:  
                                                
78
 The UFC is a full contact no holds barred tournament where fighters compete against each other regardless of 
their fighting style. Cf.  http://ufc.com/ 
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‘At times I do not like to be Italian; too many things are wrong, especially in Rome. 
The situation with immigration is crazy. I am proud to be Italian when I am abroad. 
We need to wash our dirty clothes in private. I hate it when Italians go abroad to 
speak bad about our country. Every country has its own defects, but few people 
‘sputtanano’ (slander) their own country like the Italians. It is impossible to walk in 
Rome during the night without seeing young prostitutes, most from Eastern Europe. 
The ‘Albanian and Romanian plague’ is responsible for this unacceptable condition.79 
It is not politics that exploits the UltraS, but the UltraS that use politics to resist the 
State.’ 
 
Change of various nature justified his politics. For the Boxer, the practise of football 
spectatorship had changed for the worst. He considered that fandom has always been overtly 
political, but that the ideological and political statements now needed to be disguised because 
the police and the State did not like to hear the ‘truth’ from the curva. Beneath his calm and 
muscular exterior, the Boxer manifested an anger and incredulity towards the Italian State. 
Regardless of what the Italian authorities and its representatives brought to his door, he 
remained undeterred. He carried the strength of political conviction and was willing to pay 
the price for what he deemed to be the ‘right’ way.  
 
8.1 Footballers: Once were ‘Warriors’? 
 
‘Warriors’ wearing team colours in the football pitch are more evident among Lazio 
teams than Roma ones. This distinction is because quite a few Lazio footballers have openly 
declared their sympathy for the fascist ideology. Consequently, the UltraS of SS Lazio have 
more role models to identify with than their AS Roma counterparts. One player who is 
currently ‘exiled’ in the USA is sought by the Italian authorities for his part in the proposed 
takeover of the SS Lazio in 2005: Giorgio Chinaglia. Born in Carrara, Chinaglia moved with 
his family to Cardiff, Wales at the age of nine. His football career began with Swansea City. 
Two years later, he moved to Italy and joined Massese, in Serie C. He was to later move to 
Internapoli, also in Serie C, and then to Lazio, in Serie A in 1969. In the 1971-1972 football 
season (when Lazio were in Serie B), Giorgione Chinaglia (Big Giorgio) topped the leading 
goal scorers table of the Serie B with 21 goals. He was the force behind Lazio’s return to 
Serie A. During that season, Lazio played great football and were contenders for the scudetto. 
Included in the Italian national team in 1972, Chinaglia scored his first goal with the Azzurri 
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 The Albanian link with European prostitution is well known; and has appeared in the Soho district in London. 
To evaluate this issue a reader is directed to a 2001 research project of the ECPAT (End Child Prostitution, 
Pornography and Trafficking) which at page 29 dedicated a chapter on the London red light district. 
http://antislavery.org/homepage/resources/Children.PDF 
 116
against Bulgaria (cf. Pennacchia, 2001). The fans remember the great team of this era 
managed by Tommaso Maestrelli, including players such as Giuseppe Wilson, Luciano Re 
Cecconi, Felice Pulici, Renzo Garlaschelli, Vincenzo D'Amico, Luigi ‘Gigi’ Martini, Mario 
Frustalupi and Giancarlo Oddi. In this team, Chinaglia was the undisputed and charismatic 
leader. In the 1973-1974 season, this team won the scudetto; Chinaglia scored 24 goals. The 
following season, he scored 14 goals, but realised his adventure with Lazio was about to end, 
particularly when his friend Maestrelli became terminally ill (Recanatesi, 2006).  
At the end of the 1975-1976 season, Chinaglia accepted an offer from the New York 
Cosmos, where he joined Pele, Franz Beckenbauer, Carlos Alberto and Johan Cruyff. He also 
established residency in the USA. During his USA soccer adventure, Chinaglia proved to be 
the best striker in the history of the North American Soccer League (NASL). In seven 
seasons, he scored 193 goals in 213 matches. He won the prize for best striker for the NASL 
in 1976, 1978, 1980, 1981 and 1982. He was considered the best player of the tournament in 
1981, and was the protagonist of the four Soccer Bowls won by the Cosmos in 1977, 1978, 
1980 and 1982. Whilst living in the USA, Lazio supporters pushed him to become Chairman 
of Lazio, a position he held from 1983 to 1986 (cf. Risoli 2000). Always controversial, 
Chinaglia was issued with an arrest warrant in 2006 by the Guardia di Finanza for alleged 
extortion and insider trading due to irregularities concerning ownership of the SS Lazio club. 
Chinaglia once again resides in the USA, now as a fugitive from Italian justice. In his 
absence, in November 2007, Chinaglia was fined 4.2 million Euros for financial irregularities 
concerning ownership of SS Lazio. The former champion was found guilty of financial 
manipulation and obstructing the Consob (The National Commission for Societies and Stock 
Market) inquiries in connection with an alleged attempt of a foreign-registered chemical-
pharmaceutical group to acquire control of SS Lazio.80 
Regardless of such dealings, the SS Lazio team, which won the 1974 scudetto, was 
seen (and still is) by the Lazio UltraS as a team of warriors led by Chinaglia. The team of 
Chinaglia and Maestrelli was the answer to the prayers of SS Lazio fans, who hitherto had 
known only the disappointment the game offers. At the same time, the SS Lazio team created 
great controversy in a period characterised by the politicisation of all realms of Italian 
society. The fans not only watched a strong football team, but a team made by men with 
whom they could identify politically. The men led by Chinaglia did not fit the cliché of the 
‘modern footballer’ and were inclined to controversial gestures. They trained with passion for 
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 Cf. La  Repubblica. (online edition, 28th  November 2007) :  
www.repubblica.it/2007/11/sezioni/sport/calcio/multa-chinaglia/multa-chinaglia/multa-chinaglia.html 
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the real match; at times, they brawled with their opponents.81 This macho (warrior?) passion 
was reinforced by a passion for parachuting, which at the time was considered synonymous 
with militaristic sympathies and thus an inclination to be ideologically on the right. Chinaglia 
and three of his teammates regularly went shooting in their leisure time. The squad terrified 
the newly-signed via initiation ceremonies that included blank cartridges fired from pistols. 
Public statements made by the players told of their intentions to vote for the MSI. This voiced 
intention was enough to identify the players as fascists in the eyes of political opponents; 
despite this, the Lazio team did not endeavour to influence Roman voters. Years later, 
however, Luigi Martini became an MP of Alleanza Nazionale; Franco Nanni stood for 
election in support of the Mayoral candidates of Gianni Alemanno. Felice Pulici was a 
candidate with Francesco Storace (a former senator of Alleanza Nazionale and now leader of 
the party La Destra – the Right). Giorgio Chinaglia was a fan of Giorgio Almirante, the one-
time leader of the MSI. Many Lazio players wore the Celtic cross and the Lazio team of the 
scudetto year were greeted with the Roman salute. The team and its leader represented the 
rebel spirit in combination with an ideology that was – and remains – promoted by the 
concept of ‘going beyond’ and being aligned with the system and its values. For the 
Irriducibili, Chinaglia and his men are heroes and warriors. 
In the curva nord, one does not need to be Italian to be a warrior. In 2000 during the 
SS Lazio versus Arsenal Champions League fixture, the Lazio player, Serbian-born Sinisa 
Mihajlovic, called Arsenal’s Patrick Viera scimmia di merda (shit monkey). No action was 
taken by the referee and, despite obvious verbal altercations between the two at regular 
intervals, both played the duration of the game. The Lazio player later confirmed that he had 
indeed called Viera a ‘shit monkey’, but only in response to Viera calling him a ‘gypsy 
shit’.82 The following Champions League match saw Lazio play the Ukrainian team of 
Shakhtar Donetsk; Mihajlovic made a pre-match on-pitch announcement stating his sorrow 
for expressing such an insult to Viera and inviting the Lazio supporters to cease their grunting 
toward black opposition players. I asked the Boxer to comment about the matter and he 
dismissed Mihajlovic’s initiative, which they thought was not spontaneous but rather was 
imposed by the Lazio management in the face of threats from the UEFA. They argued that 
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 The ‘rebel’ trait of the Lazio team was evident in the 1970-1971 season. After a 2-2 draw in an Inter-City 
Fairs Cup tie between Arsenal and Lazio in Rome, (Chinaglia scored both goals) the players, whilst eating in the 
same restaurant but at different tables, exchanged pleasantries. A gift of leather bags from Lazio to the visiting 
players was little appreciated by the British, who considered the item effeminate. A brawl between the two 
tables was won by Lazio players who were very experienced in such matters.  For the biography of Giorgio 
Chinaglia , see Pennacchia (2001).  
82
 Cf. http://news.lazio.net/2005/12/16/lazio-juve-diventa-partita-a-rischio-cor-sera/ 
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Viera should have also apologised to Mihajlovic. The Lazio fans liked this import. The 
Serbian arrived at Lazio from Red Star Belgrade. Whilst at the latter, he had begun a 
friendship with the hard-core supporters and was a personal friend of the ‘Tigers’ hooligan 
group and its leader Zelijko Raznatovic, better known as Arkan. When the civil war began in 
Yugoslavia in 1991 – catalysed by a football match between Dinamo Zagreb and Red Star – 
the first militias were drawn from the football terraces. Arkan’s Tigers militia was notorious 
for its brutality and mass murders. In 2000, during a home game, the Irriducibili produced a 
banner depicting the Serbian paramilitary leader, which caused a huge controversy amongst 
the media and Italian politicians who interpreted it as a tribute to the notorious paramilitary 
commander (Corriere della Sera -online- 01 February, 2000).  Motions at the Chamber of the 
Deputies were written in condemnation; politicians sought to stop the UltraS. 
The outcome was an Olympic stadium full of police for the next month. Federico 
(Irriducibili), when questioned in the course of this research, strongly denied any political 
links or sympathies attached to the banner. The banner was, according to him, constructed for 
and displayed out of admiration for their tough player Sinisa Mihajlovic, who was Arkan’s 
friend. This episode might be interpreted as admiration for Arkan, who was never shy about 
having his image circulated, particularly the one of him in military fatigues holding a tiger 
cub. Uncompromising in his pursuits, he was considered a hero by many Serbians and a 
symbol of Serbian Nationalism.83 This type of personality would fit the warrior-like typology 
that was so admired by the UltraS. Following the Arkan episode, the tension between police 
and UltraS worsened. At a Lazio-Udinese game, plastic bottles were thrown at nearby 
carabinieri in protest against their repression. The police responded by charging at the UltraS 
at the exit of the stadium injuring, according to the Irriducibili, the elderly and children alike. 
The Irriducibili declared that some innocents left the stadium in ambulances. They claimed 
that they stood by the bloodstains in the streets caused by the police who supposedly beat 
Lazio supporters for hours. Moreover, the Irriducibili asserted that they had been interviewed 
by journalists who, after the interviews, defended ‘wrongly’ the actions of the police. 
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 Cf. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/612295.stm 
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8.1.2 Paolo Di Canio: Un Irriducibile 
 
 
Fig. 36: The ‘official’ kit of the ‘ Irriducibile Warrior’ modelled by  
Paolo Di Canio (retrieved from the Irriducibili’s website). 
 
One footballer who refused to apologise for his ideology was considered by the group 
to be a ‘true’ UltraS. He was, by anybody’s calculation, a brilliant footballer. The symbol of 
the Irriducibili values par excellence was and remains Paolo di Canio, who was a member of 
the group in his youth. Tattooed on his arm are the Roman numerals of DVX – a Latin 
appellation for Il Duce. Throughout his playing career, Di Canio personified the Irriducibili 
motto of Dare, Believe, Be Temerarious. In doing so, he created a global controversy in 1998.  
After having played and won many trophies – notably the Serie A scudetto in 1995 with AC 
Milan and the UEFA Cup with Juventus – Di Canio moved to Scotland in 1996 to play for 
Glasgow Celtic and then moved to Sheffield Wednesday for a fee of £4.2m to play in the 
English Premier League, where he became the club’s top scorer in the 1997-98 season. 
Whilst recognised for his sublime football skill, Di Canio was also recognised as a player 
whose passion for the game occasionally spilled over into violent conduct. Such conduct 
reached a nadir in 1998 when, in a Sheffield Wednesday vs. Arsenal fixture, Di Canio, 
furious at a refereeing decision, pushed the referee over. The official left the pitch on a 
stretcher; Di Canio was sent off. He was fined £10,000 by the Football Association and 
banned for 11 matches. Leaving for Italy, he refused to return to his club. To solve the 
situation, Wednesday sold him for a bargain of £1.7m to West Ham United in January 1999. 
During his four-year stay in East London, he scored 48 goals and became the hero of the 
Hammers fans. He won the Premier League Player of the Year award as West Ham finished 
fifth. In 2000, he won the BBC Goal of the Season Award (cf. Di Canio and Marcotti, 2001). 
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The tough but ‘honourable’ code of the Irriducibili is well represented by two 
important gestures manifested by Di Canio. One occurred in 2000, during an Everton-West 
Ham match, the Everton goalkeeper, Paul Gerrard, was prostrate as a consequence of an 
injury sustained seconds earlier. With the match poised at 1-1, the ball was passed to Di 
Canio in a goal-scoring position. Instead of exploiting the situation and scoring what would 
have been an easy goal, Di Canio caught the ball and stopped the match, pointing to the 
prostrate keeper84. The home fans understood the chivalrous gesture and gave him a standing 
ovation. Di Canio received an official letter of commendation from FIFA President Sepp 
Blatter and was later awarded the FIFA Fair Play award. Upon leaving West Ham following a 
public row with the manager, Di Canio played for nearly two seasons (but only 31 games) 
with the South London club, Charlton Athletic. He had the possibility to play another season 
with Charlton Athletic, but chose to accept a massive salary reduction in order to play for his 
beloved Lazio.  
The other took place in 2005 when I met di Canio at the invitation of the Boxer, who 
asked if I was interested in meeting a ‘true’ Irriducibile.  I met the player after an SS Lazio 
training session at Formello (the sports centre located just outside of Rome, where the team 
trained). I was in the company of the Boxer and Daniele (a geeky looking Irriducibile in his 
twenties who worked on their website and drew many of their materials). At the entrance of 
Formello, because of bad weather, were a few ‘tifosi’ watching the biancocelesti. The 
security on duty recognised the Boxer and let us enter without question. Inside, there were 
regional and local journalists. One of them immediately spoke to the Boxer and sought to 
understand the current mood of the group regarding President Lotito. Left alone with Daniele, 
I asked him about the relationship between Di Canio and the Irriducibili. He replied that Di 
Canio was a good friend of Giorgio and that the Irriducibili loved Di Canio because, despite 
his fame, he did not forget his roots or the ‘guys’.  
While waiting for the Boxer to return, we entered the room where the SS Lazio 
players came to sign autographs or speak to the tifosi after having finished their training. The 
Boxer asked the representative of the club, who was dressed very formally with the official 
tie and jacket of the team, to call the player. After a while, Di Canio entered. He immediately 
recognised the Boxer, who gave him the new T-shirt of the Irriducibili, which he wore while 
the Boxer took pictures for the Irriducibili website. Di Canio, thus, helped the UltraS promote 
their merchandise without asking for any fee. Once finished, the Boxer asked Di Canio to 
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 Cf. http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/football/teams/w/west_ham_utd/1076058.stm 
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‘have a word’ and introduced me. He smiled and told the Boxer to give me his mobile 
number and we started to speak.  
The connection between Di Canio and the leaders of the Irriducibili was so strong that 
when, as mentioned earlier, the four leaders were arrested in 2007 and were waiting for the 
judicial process but facing home detention for the Lotito-Lazio affaire, Di Canio met Giorgio 
for dinner.85 He supported them even in such difficult moments. Di Canio always defended 
the UltraS against allegations that they knew Chinaglia’s attempt to facilitate the purchase of 
the SS Lazio by a group of foreign investors to be a fraud.  
The year 2005 saw the non omologato Di Canio involved in another controversy – the 
Roman Salute affair. During the Lazio-Roma derby of 2005 (won by Lazio 3-1), Di Canio 
performed the Roman salute towards the joyful throngs of the Irriducibili in an expression of 
joy at the result. The photograph of this gesture created worldwide controversy.86Di Canio 
repeated this gesture during a Lazio-Livorno fixture (a highly political match due to the 
Livorno supporters extreme left sympathies) and received a fine of 10,000 Euros and a one-
match suspension by the Italian Football Association. Later, during a Lazio-Juventus fixture, 
he performed the salute yet again, signifying to the Irriducibili the indomitable ‘Warrior 
Spirit’ to never bow in the face of authority. He was again fined 10,000 Euros and suspended 
for one game. When questioned, Di Canio explained that his salutes arose out of a sense of 
belonging to ‘my people’, adding ‘when you have values, you’re always in the right’ (Agnew, 
2007, p. 273). One of Di Canio’s defenders was Italian Premier Silvio Berlusconi, who 
explained that the salute ‘did not have any meaning, (Di Canio) is an exhibitionist, but a good 
lad’.87 Di Canio’s Lazio contract was not renewed in the summer of 2006 following his 
disagreements and dislike of the club President and majority shareholder, Claudio Lotito. He 
left Lazio in July 2006 to finish his career in 2008 at the Cisco Roma club, playing in Serie 
C2. 
8.2 Boys and Girls: Gender issues and the UltraS  
I held the preconception in the beginning of the research that neo-fascist gatherings 
would not involve female participation. This assumption was wrong; whilst evidencing 
extreme masculinity, the UltraS communitas contained women. In 2005, I was invited by the 
Boxer to accompany him to the Lazio-Milan match. I entered the Olympic Stadium and went 
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 Cf. http://news.lazio.net/2007/02/20/di-canio-chinaglia-e-stato-un-buffone-la-repubblica/ 
86
 Cf. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4158591.stm 
87
 Cf. http://.news.lazio.net/2005/12/20/berlusconi-di-canio-un-bravo-ragazzo-ma-esibizionista-ansa/ 
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to the curva nord to meet him, as instructed. The group was located near the pitch in an area 
that had been delimited to prevent entry by non-members. I explained to the inquisitive 
UltraS that I was expected by the Boxer and, on hearing this, they let me in. While waiting 
for him to arrive, I saw the Boxer on the pitch walking towards the curva nord in the 
company of Paolo Di Canio. Both stood at the side of the perimeter fence and said hello to 
the thousands of Irriducibili. During the match, I started speaking to Giuseppe (a law 
university student aged in his late 20s) who was curious about my presence. The Irriducibili 
knew each other and I was definitively an unknown face. Rumours about my UK provenance 
and link to the Boxer were spreading. I spoke to Giuseppe about my research. I told him that I 
was also in contact with the Boys; he knew a few of their names. He asked me if I had done 
research on English hooligans, as he was fascinated by the topic. At a certain point, he 
stopped and introduced me to his ex- girlfriend Monica (of similar age and a university 
student in communication science). Monica explained her status as one of the group’s 
veterans, having been present amongst them for more than five years. She spoke of her 
admiration for the Boxer, who in the meantime was busy holding the megaphone and leading 
the curva’s chants. She elaborated on her perception of the Irriducibili, indicating that the 
group was based on friendship. She complained that such elementary values were not 
publicised in the media coverage that they received, which was overconcerned with violence: 
‘We have been persecuted by journalists and police who take any excuses to call us thugs.’ I 
asked Monica about the nature of her relationship with others in the group. She responded 
that, while respect was given by the direttivo to every member in the past, the situation had 
gradually changed. Despite this change, the four leaders were able to keep order. There were 
‘kids’ emerging – what she called the ‘new generation’ – who were difficult to handle. She 
indicated that the Boxer had to ‘deal’ with them quite a few times. They were around 16-18 
years of age and did not have respect for seniority. She implied that they likewise did not give 
her the respect due to her as a female. They were trouble for the Irriducibili. She did not want 
to speak about them any further because they were standing near her. In the tumult of a goal 
celebration, she looked scared and uneasy until the veterans moved down the stand to the 
proximity and hugged each other. 
After a while, the Boxer called me. I left Monica after exchanging email addresses. 
Once at home, trying to make sense of the day, I realised the importance of investigating the 
‘female’ dimension of the UltraS. Put simply, their role was not that of a warrior. In general, 
the female element of the group was more task-oriented, but definitely not ornamental. They 
had roles to play (in organising the match day event and banners) and, whilst not counted on 
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to partake in any brawls, could be relied upon to watch the back of a camerata and not reveal 
information to the police. They were similarly expected to show duty and honour to those 
they lived amongst. This presence may shock observers who study hardcore football fandom. 
Anyone who knows the British hooligans realises that the female component is non-existent. 
The presence of women in the UltraS challenges international and Italian academic 
orthodoxy. A case in point is Cere (2002), who states:  
‘The most important thing to note about female football support is its ‘invisibility’ in 
Italian society at large, and that of ultrá’ supporters in particular, in all areas of social 
communication….’ (p. 168).  
 
This was not the case for the Irriducibili and the Boys.  
The Boys also had female camerati, but provided roles for them different from those 
in the Irriducibili. The difference in roles was perhaps due to the different ideologisation of 
the Boys compared to the Irriducibili. The Boys were more profoundly influenced by the 
Adinolfi-Casa Pound Italia strand of fascism, in which women played an active role in the 
collective life of the ideological communitas. One of the Boys was 20 years old Sara, in her 
first year of a political science degree at the University of Rome, La Sapienza. In 2005, I 
asked Sara to explain her involvement with the Boys: 
Q: ‘Sara’, how many times do you visit the head office?   
S: Now, every day. But soon, I will start my university lectures, so I will come 
depending on the lecture schedule. 
 
Q: What do you do in your free time? 
S: Most of my free time I spend with my friends here. 
 
Q: Do they (Boys) pay you to attend here? 
S: At the end of the month, they give me money for expenses because I am a student 
and students, as you know, are not known to be rich. 
 
Q: How long have been in the Boys?  
S: Five years. One year ago I started working in the head office. I have been an active 
member for two years now. This means that I follow the group to all away matches. 
 
Q: In a group such as the Boys, with a neo-fascist ideology, the common 
consensus is that women do not count. What do you think? How many women 
are members of the Boys?  
S: The Boys has two women who take part in any decision concerning the group and 
then we have many women members who come to the stadium to follow the team and 
sympathise without holding a membership card.  
 
Q: Is your relationship with the guys ‘equal’? 
S: The decision part is determined by six people; they are the ‘vets’ [the status of 
veteran is established through loyalty to the groups and courage in ‘action’.]. They 
make decisions and I am not part of it because I am young, but there is a girl who is 
one of the vets. I show my attachment to the group and to the team. I am part of them 
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with the same rights and duties. I belong to the direttivo. We have 30 members of the 
direttivo that do security at the stadium. We share resources for the good of the group. 
For instance, tomorrow we have to go to Florence to get some materials, so someone 
has made their car available to me.  
 
Women such as Sara and Francesca (see chapter 2) were neither invisible nor kept from 
arenas of the above-cited ‘social communication’ in the Boys. Francesca was the ‘filter’ to 
research access to the higher (male) echelons. The Italian context would appreciate the 
female for aesthetic purposes, this is a society and political system that forever praised style 
over substance and which is rather conservative and unequal in terms of gender relations. 
Nevertheless, I argue that women were both present among the UltraS. In the case of the 
Boys, female members were publicly involved in spreading the communitas’ values in the 
curva sud. What follows is an attempt to ascertain Sara’s experience amongst the Boys 
communitas: 
 
Q: So what does it mean for you to be one of the Boys? 
S: It is an elite group of UltraS. The group has, since 1972, shown great attachment to 
the team of Roma and its tradition. I am with them first because of a love of football. 
I want to share this with guys and girls that have the same passion and life vision as 
me. With them, I also travel a lot, so it is good fun! When you travel by train around 
Italy and abroad, emotional attachment to the group is built up. I do not find this at 
university. I have many more friends here in the Boys and this friendship is real; it 
lasts. 
 
Q: What are the main values of the Boys?   
S: A Boys is not only a Boys at the stadium, but also outside of it. A Boys leads by 
example in their lifestyle. They are faithful to the team. We always say friendship is 
one of the most important values. If something happens to one of us, it is as if it 
happens to all of us. A good example is given by the members of the groups that are 
‘diffidati’, you know, the object of a stadium banning order. They are remembered at 
the stadium during matches with banners or, if our members have been arrested, the 
Boys share the cost of their legal representation. 
 
Here Sara highlights one of the main differences between the UltraS and ‘ordinary’ hardcore 
football supporters. It was also significant that a woman manifests no differences in the way 
of thinking or commitment to the UltraS lifeworld. In contrast to the ‘ordinary’ supporters, 
the Boys and Irriducibili are UltraS in and outside of the stadium. Their use of ideological 
symbols, banners and chants is not just part of the stadium ritual, but is intimately intertwined 
with their values, which are informed by their ideology. Their values function to inform their 
actions (Schwartz 1990; Klandermans and Mayer 2006). 
The interview continued: 
Q: What would you say to the people that negatively judge the Boys and the 
UltraS? 
 S: The UltraS is a movement; we are united against the common enemy, which is the 
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State repression and the police.  
 
Q: Why is the bust of Benito Mussolini in the head office of a football fan group?  
A: It is an important symbol to show our political ideology.  
 
Q: What does Mussolini mean for you?  
S: I see Mussolini as an influential man; he had charisma and the first thing that 
comes to my mind is ‘order’. Italy needs order even if I would not like to see a 
dictatorship of the right.  
 
The cult of Mussolini’s persona (also articulated earlier by Giovanni of the Irriducibili) was 
expressed by both the ‘old’ members (in their late thirties/early forties) and youths, such as 
Sara. The figure of Mussolini evokes imagery of a quasi- religious figure. There are a 
multitude of parallels evident here with established religions. A walk around ancient Rome 
reminds the flaneur of the Divine every few metres. Themes of violence are inherent to 
fascism and neo-fascist ideology and reveal a strong link with religion. Such a symbiosis 
justifies the myth of Il Duce. As Falasca-Zamponi (2000) details: 
‘If blood and regeneration had been characteristic features of World War I, they also 
became the identifying traits of the Fascist movement. Within this highly spiritualized 
vision of violence, the fascists who died during violent actions were turned into 
"martyrs" for the fatherland. The dead from violent causes became one more reason 
to affirm the sacred values of fascism....’ (pp. 45-46) 
 
I then made the following observation: 
 
Q: Sara, I heard that some of the Boys have friendships with people of Forza 
Nuova, especially the Latina section. 
S: These are personal friendships. We are completely autonomous of the parties and 
they never influence us. We have similar ideals with Forza Nuova, but we are 
completely independent. No political groups or party would dare to say they represent 
Boys. If there are official political manifestations of parties, we do not attend them; 
members can, if they wish, go for personal reason to attend rallies, but never as Boys.  
 
Q: What about the symbols that the group uses on merchandise?  
S: We do not put unmarketable symbols in our materials; how can a person wear a 
swastika? We use marketable symbols that are ‘cool’ such as the double axe of 
Ordine Nuovo.  
 
 
Ultimately, Sara belongs to a group that supports a football club. Not being an amateur player 
– or a former one – Sara enjoyed the game, but had reservations, as the next statement shows, 
about the way in which it is organised.  
 
Q: What is your assessment of Italian football?  
S: Too many people ‘eat’ on Italian football. Exceptions exist, but many players are 
not attached to the colour of the team as in the past. Loyalty does not exist anymore. 
The Boys have zero contact with the team management. We are very independent, so 
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when we think that they are doing something wrong, we have the freedom to voice 
our dissatisfaction. 
 
Sara had a career aspiration typical of many undergraduate students and had worries about 
her future and the difficulty of finding a job without having connections.  
 
Q: What do you want to do when you finish university?  
S: I will get my first degree in political science, then either I continue studying for 
another two years with a specialisation in the same area or I will do a conversion 
course to gain a degree in law. Then I will see my options. I applied to work at the 
Senate, but it is a place where, if you do not know a politician, you will not work. 
 
Sara’s last phrase deserves careful reflection. She accentuated the nepotism that remains a 
strong cultural practice in Italy. In 2008, the Italian Supreme court declared that providing a 
recommendation on behalf of someone seeking a job or wanting to resolve a personal matter 
is an offence. In Italy, there is the belief –confirmed by reality – that it is impossible to obtain 
a job without resorting to nepotism. This situation is especially difficult for youth such as 
Sara who feel disheartened and insecure about their future  (Telegraph –online- 25 March, 
2008). 
Females often write in Boys’ fanzine. The duty to defend the Boys for their actions 
during the notorious Roma-Lazio derby that was interrupted by the UltraS in 2004 was given 
to Katia.88 
 
                                                
88
 Chapter 11  will focus on the relationship Media-UltraS and on the incident mentioned by Katia. 
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Fig. 37: Katia’s writing in the Honour  
of Rome (2004) 
 
In the above document, Katia accused the police of using hardcore repressive tactics; she 
affirmed that her son of nine years of age was, like others, made ill because of the tear gas 
fired by the police in the stadium. Katia also invited the media to use more objectivity in their 
reports of the UltraS and, most of all, to first ascertain the facts before reporting.  
The fanzine of the Boys contains articles dedicated to women. The article copied 
below articulates the International Woman's Day (IWD), highlighting the importance of the 
day (a celebration of women supported in Italy by Leftist groups and feminists). The writer 
describes the mimosa flower (customarily given to women on that day), describing it as a 
perfumed, delicate -but at the same time, resilient- symbol of strength and femininity; this 
analogy exactly represents the ideal of the females of the group. The words are offered as a 
metaphor for those women who follow the path of the UltraS. 
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Fig. 38: ‘Making sense of the 8th March’ (L’ Onore di Roma) 
 
                                                                   *** 
 
Although, this study does not pretend to be a definitive voice on the link between 
gender and UltraS or between gender and Italian neo-fascism; what was presented here aims 
to serve as a spring board for future research. Willing to accommodate women, open to men 
of a wide range of ages and not concerned about occupational status or social origins, the 
Boys and the Irriducibili might be considered all-inclusive gatherings with few parallels in 
Italian society. However, inclusion in these groups is restricted by shared orthodoxy in 
political opinion. To join the UltraS means to adhere to certain ideological concepts, of which 
Patria (fatherland) and ‘Race’ are essential. 
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Chapter 9 
 
Conceptualisations of Nation and Race  
 
 
‘The motto of the Boys is ‘Patria, Onore e Fedeltá’ (Fatherland, Honour,  
and Fidelity). Marco 
 
 
The ideologies of nationalism and racism are related to and contrast each other 
because of their shared historical origin and traits (Miles, 1993). The overlapping of these 
concepts is certainly present in the UltraS discourses as Giovanni (Irriducibili) demonstrated 
in the following statement:  
 
‘The Italian radical right still represents the fundamental values of Italian society – 
the family and the concept of Patria [fatherland]. When the family is substituted by 
single parents or ‘natural unions’ or when people will not be proud to be part of the 
Italian nation, and when those who arrive from abroad have more rights than Italians; 
then our society will dissolve.’ 
 
Giovanni stressed two important foundations of the desired neo-fascist society: Patria 
(fatherland)  and family. These beliefs have a long neo-fascist pedigree. The Decalogo del 
Balilla 89 (The Commandaments of the Balilla, 1929; cited in Galeotti, 2000) at point one 
argued: ‘Ama la Patria come i genitori; ama i genitori come la Patria [Love your fatherland 
as you love your parents, love your parents as you love your fatherland]’. But such love 
comes at a price - some had to be excluded. Exclusion was mainly based on a sense of 
common self. Giovanni explained: 
 
‘It is useless to speak about ‘multi-ethnic’ models of co-existence or even ‘European’ 
models. To have social peace, every nation has its own identity that needs to be 
respected.  We can see the English situation where social peace is forever disturbed 
by the multi-ethnic society imposed by the UK government and championed by Tony 
Blair. We are not ‘racists’; we support the concept of tolerance, but this exists only 
when there is reciprocity, otherwise it is all bollocks. For example, when a Muslim 
wants to build 10 mosques here in Italy, he has to allow us Christians to build 10 
churches in his country. It would be more equal if they allow us to put a crucifix in 
Muslim schools just for the principle of reciprocity.’  
 
 
Hence, in the UltraS reasoning, the exaltation of the Patria does not necessarily translate to 
the exaltation of a ‘race’ over and above all others. The exaltation of Patria is underlined by 
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 In April 1926, the PNF, via law n2247, constituted a youth organization the Opera Nazionale Balilla (ONB)  
comprising children aged from 6 to 18 years (Cf. Tognarini, 2002). 
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differences founded mainly in cultural and religious identity, which constitute the UltraS 
barriers to immigration and are the crucial factors to the immigrants exclusion. In this 
context, racism and nationalism intertwine. This discourse is the expression of what can be 
termed as ‘neo-racism’, which is increasingly emerging in Europe (Spaaij and Vinas 2005; 
Balibar and Wallerstein 1991; Martín-Cabrera 2002). In simple terms, prejudice is 
normalised mainly via cultural and religious differences and not notions of racial superiority 
(Gullestad 2002; Wieviorka 1995).  
The significance of symbolism, once again, helps the UltraS to communicate and 
promote their beliefs around nation, as is stated by Marco (Boys): ‘Our symbols are the sole 
nascente [Rising Sun] and l’ascia bipenne [double blade axe]. The sole nascente has a 
political value; the sunrise represents a new era for our nation – a rebirth - the symbol of the 
sun is also found in the Celtic cross’. The ‘elite’ of the Boys demonstrated their collective 
heroic identity by being the only ones to wear the hat displaying the sole nascente insignia, 
which is a lesser-known symbol of nationalistic neo-fascism. It symbolises the re-birth of 
fascist ideology.  
 
 
Fig. 39: The Boys with their Rising Sun symbol 
 
However, where and when will this re-birth of the nation, in the words of Marco appear? In 
addition, from where does such a belief originate? The answer sees the roots of UltraS 
expressions of nationalism in Mussolini’s fascism. Griffin (1991) defines fascism as being 
populist and ultra-nationalist. Among the most important elements of Ultra-nationalism are 
the uniqueness of national culture and an ever-growing awareness of shared history, ethnicity 
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and language (p. 201). Italian neo-fascism draws on such elements, but adds new dimensions, 
most notably the concept of Revolutionary Nationalism, which, in 21st century Italy, is 
represented by Casa Pound Italia.  Revolutionary nationalism should be interpreted as a 
‘Third Way’ between those who champion (at any cost) the processes of globalisation, which 
the neo-fascists believe homogenise and erase national identities- and ‘fake patriots’. 
According to the Italian neo-fascists, the Italia of ‘fake patriots’ is an entity based on 
capitalism and selfishness, which neglects regional identities and expression of glorious local 
traditions. The current political class deny Italy a significant political and moral role at the 
international level by accepting a servile position in relation to the political hegemony of 
Britain and America. Contempt is concomitantly manifest towards those servile to Anglo-
American ideas and ways of life that champion consumerism. This Anglo-American 
opposition shares common traits with the French Nouvelle Droite (New Right) and its guru 
Alain de Benoist. Anti-Americanism and the fight against globalisation, which is considered a 
domain of international finance controlled by Jews and Freemasons, are the main themes of 
De Benoist (Cf. De Benoist and Champetier, 1999) and can be found in the UltraS sentiments 
evidenced in and around the Olympic Stadium. The anti-American stance of the Boys is 
displayed in the following account, published in the group’s fanzine and addressing the 
intervention in Iraq by the USA, titled The Anglo-American Arrogance in Iraq:90 
 
The reasons [for this war] as advertised by Bush are about international justice and 
terrorism, but do not have any real basis. Iraq has not respected the UN resolution, but 
what about Israel that has not respected 200 UN resolutions, or the U.S.A. which 
often bypasses the UN resolutions ?.....No proof exists or episode confirms the 
involvement of Saddam Hussein in terrorist actions. Furthermore the States that have 
weapons of mass destruction are numerous and either pro-American or are visited by 
VIP tourism or have less petrol than Iraq [irony]…..We need also to consider that in 
moments such as this when the economic system, hegemonised by the west, is in a 
crisis, American economists are pushed to use new imperialist ideologies to renew the 
economic-industrial process via a war economy to conquer a monopolistic position in 
the world energy-petrol industry. Everyone knows this, even our politicians -always 
servants of the American power- influenced by the restrictive and tedious presence in 
ITALIAN land of American military bases ready always to forget with great infamy 
our history.’ Boys  
 
Anti-USA sentiment has drawn sympathy of sorts for the most unlikely of captives. The 
Irriducibili’s 2006 statement on their website about Saddam Hussein proclaimed the 
following: 
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‘While I am writing, many images of Saddam Hussein, the former president of the 
Iraq, are flooding the websites of major online newspapers. As a group, we cannot 
comment on the judicial part of the matter because we did not read any judicial 
document but, as people with brains, we can express an opinion on what such a 
process in Iraq means today. 
 
As Irriducibili we well understand unfortunately on our skin the inefficiencies and 
injustices of our judicial system. Many times because of this, we were convinced that 
perhaps in no other country in the world existed a judicial system worse than the 
Italian one. Actually we have found one in Iraq; we laugh at a tribunal that by its 
nature should be impartial… is a tribunal impartial composed of judges appointed by 
a ‘joke’ government in a ‘joke’ state that does not have any  national sovereignty? 
Can it be considered impartial when the judges are appointed by those who have 
arrested him? What will be the likely outcome of the process?  
 
….Saddam Hussein will be condemned to death (a vice that the Americans imported 
into Iraq in 2006 from their ‘civilised’ land and continue to assassinate people using 
the electric chair as  did the French with the guillotine two  hundred year ago) with all 
his advisers who like him would prefer to die in prison instead than collaborate with 
the Americans.  We hope that the same justice that will kill Saddam Hussein one day 
(hopefully soon) will punish those who committed crimes such as the slaughters of 
Sabra & Sahila, the massacres in Iraq by the Anglo-American troops using white 
phosphorus; the civilians killed during the invasion of the country, the Palestinian 
population who no longer have houses destroyed by bulldozers, the torture in the 
concentration camps of Abu Graib and Guanatanamo Bay. For the past crimes 
(Vietnam, Dresden, Roma, Berlin, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Baghdad, Kabul, and 
Belgrade) and so on…. We are full of hope, but we also know that it will be difficult 
because the tribunals that will judge these signori are designated by those 
themselves!’91 
 
The UltraS nationalism is, consequently, conceived around the idea of a patria sharing a 
sense of common participation with a collective destiny. Such a society had to be fought for; 
battles had to be won; warriors were needed. It is this representation of ‘remote traditions’ 
that gives the UltraS a sense of moral and cultural authority and, most importantly, 
authenticity that produce a direct link to the past.  
However, pride in the patria and a sense of ‘people’ expressed by the two UltraS 
communitas provoke prejudice amidst admiration. The most unlikely of groups can be 
offered the plaudits. Realism and contradiction are evident. The UltraS celebrate the symbols 
of defiance manifest by both Palestinians and Irish Republicans, which assist their anti-Israeli 
and anti-British articulations. The anti-Israeli stance was evident in the frequent display by 
the Irriducibili in the curva nord of the Palestinian flag and their chants in praise of the 
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 The prophecy of the Irriducibili was fulfilled on December 30, 2006, when the former Iraq president was 
executed by hanging, having been judged –and found guilty- by a special tribunal on charges of crimes against 
humanity. 
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repressed: ‘Palestine: Never Give Up’ (see figures 40-41). Some of these sentiments are 
genuine, many are pragmatic.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                       
 
Fig. 40: The Irriducibile banner: ‘Palestina Never Give Up’  
(2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              Fig. 41: The Palestinian flag and the Irriducibili 
 
 
Using the Palestinian issue, the Boys concomitantly express their opinions against what they 
negatively define ‘Zionism’. The following document titled Libertá per La Palestina 
(Freedom for Palestine) was published in the Boys fanzine:92  
 
‘It is right to dedicate a space [in our fanzine]on what is happening in the Middle 
East93, about the aggression of Israel against the Palestinian people, about the 
invasion of a land that rightly belongs to another population [the Palestinians], also a 
land that for the Christians represent an Holy ground. 10 days ago, the Cis-Jordan 
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 This article was written in April 2002 at the time the Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat was 
confined to his office compound in the West Bank city of Ramallah by Israeli troops during an escalation of the 
Israel-Palestinians conflict. Arafat died in 2004. 
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invasion began by the Israel army deployed by Sharon using as an excuse Palestinian 
terrorism. The reality is different. The war has always been an option since the 
Palestine Liberation Organization leader Arafat was confined to his office and kept 
under surveillance 24 hours a day. They forbade him to see people from the 
international community. This is already a despicable act in itself because Arafat was 
elected democratically by the Palestinian people and the Israelis have no right to 
deprive him of power by the use of force. In the meantime, in the rest of Palestine the 
war ‘against terrorism’ runs wild. Entire cities are bombed ‘to drive out terrorists’, 
curfews are imposed; houses are either destroyed or occupied. The world seems 
initially surprised; no one [however] condemns the Israeli aggression… 
 
 In Europe, we have news about ambulances used as targets by Israeli soldiers 
because they carry injured Palestinians. This is documented by reporters always 
looking for sensational news even risking their lives; in fact, the soldiers, to 
demonstrate once more that the witnesses of wars are always tedious observers, 
decide to shoot the press. Among them, an Italian journalist died hit by a tank while 
documenting the assaults of Israelis troops upon Palestinians.’  
 
Here, the Boys demonstrated once more that they are articulate individuals in tune with 
current international and national political affairs. They refer to Raffaele Ciriello, an Italian 
photographer killed by Israeli defence force gunfire in the West Bank city of Ramallah in 
March 2002. Ciriello was working for the well-known Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera. 
According to press reports and eyewitness testimony, he died during an Israeli offensive94. 
The Boys finished their document by writing: 
‘All the world continues to show its disapproval against Sharon, who disregards 
international protests and continues his path enforcing the siege of the Palestine 
continuing to keep Arafat in  forced exile and threatening to kick him out of his own 
country. During these last days, even Bush has demonstrated in a timid way his 
disapproval. Because the Americans are always ready to run and help every nation 
and then deceitfully colonise them, in this case they just intervene lightly [irony].’ 
 
At other times, contempt for Israel was combined with similar hatred for the global 
capitalism of the USA. The only bulwark, for the Ultras, seemed to be Roman Catholicism:  
 
‘Firstly: the Israeli army has been armed- and probably still is - by American firms. 
All their weapons are made in U.S.A. Secondly: The Israeli are one of the strongest 
minorities in the world, their power comes from an almost total control of the 
economy especially in industrialized countries. Aggression against Israel could cause 
a reaction of the world‘s dominant class [linked to the world economy] and bring 
economic reprisals. Only the Pope has tried to oppose this slaughter because this war 
is fought on the Holy Land and in these times the fighting involved the church of the 
Nativity Bethlehem; the church dedicated to the nativity of Jesus!! Israeli soldiers 
have surrounded it, bombed, occupied it and they are continuing to shoot inside the 
walls. This demonstrates that the Israeli intend to respect the friendship that our Pope 
has so strongly wished [irony]. It is useless to continue justifying this war as a 
reaction against  terrorism because, as  senator Andreotti said, who would not in the 
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 Cf. 
http://archiviostorico.corriere.it/2002/marzo/17/addio_Milano_Raffaele_Ciriello_nessuna_co_0_0203179202.sh
tml 
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current conditions fearing to be confined in an Israeli concentration camp; who would 
not considered  [pushed] to stuff themselves with TNT to promote his/her cause.? 
SOLIDARITY FOR THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.’  
 
As is very evident by now, the football stadium in Rome (and throughout Italy) is a 
place to articulate the legacy of a nation. The Olympic stadium symbolises in posse this 
function. The main street via which spectators access the stadium is dominated by the Obelix, 
bearing the dedication to Mussolini Dux Dux  and is adorned by a sequence of symbols, 
mottos and the most important stages of the fascist regime (Caporilli and Simeone, 1990). 
This connection to the past is so strong that, around the stadium on match day it is possible to 
find stands selling not only merchandise of the teams of AS Roma and SS Lazio, but also 
busts of Mussolini and other fascist regalia. The authorities appear to ignore such enterprise; 
the merchandise is sold in defiance of the Mancino Law passed in 1993, which prohibited the 
use of political symbols linked to fascism. Such artefacts are also to be found on sale on stalls 
in the city of Predappio (the burial place of Mussolini). In Rome, the same artefacts are on 
sale in the popular Via Sannio Market and in Via Conca d’Oro. Badges in praise of Mussolini 
can also be found sold by entrepreneurs outside of the Colosseum. Certainly, there is no 
shortage of buyers. 
 
9.1 The Racist-UltraS Couplet 
 
The Italian football stadium is not dissimilar to those in other countries; it is a site of 
racism and xenophobic intolerance.95A recent study (2007) conducted by the Italian 
Observatory on Racism and Anti-racism in Football96 underlined a phenomenon of 
‘normalisation’ manifest in the Italian media and football organisations around the issue of 
racism; although the media discourses strongly focus on the UltraS societal ‘threats’. In 
analysing the 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 football seasons, the study identified 134 episodes of 
racism around the game, which were categorised in two typologies: ‘indirect’ racism  (or 
propaganda), which manifested regardless of what was occurring in the pitch, and ‘direct’ 
racism, which was defined as targeting players of different skin colour, religion or origin.  
Regardless of its numerous manifestations, racism has a unified theoretical basis. It is 
composed of two elements: ‘inferiorisation’ and ‘differentiation’. ‘Inferiorisation’ leads to the 
isolation of individuals in social and economic domains of a society (Spaaij and Vinas, 2005).  
‘Differentiation’ (creation of the ‘others’) is not necessarily based on biological explanations, 
                                                
95
 Cf. http://edition.cnn.com/2008/SPORT/football/06/18/racism.europe/index.html 
96
 Cf. http://no-racism-news.noblogs.org/post/2007/11/08/attacco-antirazzista-2007 
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but on cultural rejection and nationalistic distinctiveness (Spaaij and Vinas 2005; Wieviorka, 
1995). Differentiation discourses are evident among UltraS as this poem written by the Boys 
direttivo (and given to me) shows: 
 
‘I walk along the streets bold and proud.  
I am the son of an ancient EMPIRE 
I serve my fatherland, I am Italian 
I am proud to make the Roman SALUTE 
Attached to affections and to religion {catholic] 
Never will I bend my will in front of the ‘master’  
[Italian authorities] 
The motto that I follow is  
Will, Power and Freedom 
I do not love the weak and promiscuous 
I am not violent 
I do not wish to repress 
Nevertheless, I wish that everyone remains in his or her nations 
People respect me 
Because they know, I am a perfect citizen 
I wait for the Celtic Sun to rise 
In the hope that everything will improve’  
Boys  
 
For the Boys, the ethical bond is the differentiation variable, based on a generalised sense of 
shared kinship and expressed in their proclamation of fatherland united by a common 
religion, Christianity.  
The racist manifestations of the UltraS can be quite intricate. Behaviours in the curve 
that fit the description of being ‘racist’ can be ambiguous and contradictory.  The first type of 
insult originates from Italy’s north and south divide; such chants and insults are mainly 
spontaneous and ritualised. In 2006, at the Olympic stadium during the Rome derby, the Boys 
started chanting, ‘Paolo di Canio- Napoletano, Paolo Di Canio- Napoletano! (Paolo di 
Canio- Neapolitan)’ in response to Paolo di Canio playing the ball (even though Di Canio 
was not born in Southern Italy). Opposition players and rival fans face the accusation of 
being a southerner, considered prejudiciously to be a person who does not wash, nor work, 
but lives to exploit State welfare. The term ‘southerner’ can be synonymous with napoletano 
[Neapolitan, from the southern city of Naples]. One could argue that such slurs directed at 
southern Italians are a form of racial insult based, not on skin colour or other genetic traits, 
but integral to the concept of difference. Alternatively, one might consider the insult as a 
symbolic reference to cultural norms and traditions. Such remarks would not seek any 
ideological justification amongst the Boys and the Irriducibili because their fascism considers 
territorial unity and a national sense of identity crucial to all Italians. In this case, it does not 
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appear to be a conscious intent to racially abuse other Italians, but these deplorable episodes 
might be determined by the spontaneous emotional engagement of the match and a fierce 
rivalry with, in the case of the Boys, the Neapolitan fans. Knowing that Di Canio was quite 
respected by the Boys, I asked one of the Boys why the group abused Di Canio, who was also 
a camerata. He said that, at that moment, he was a Laziale - and the accusation and type of 
chant were meant to be funny.  
The second and more insidious type of insult is ethnic, which comprises different 
dimensions that focus on skin colour, religious difference and the perceived danger of 
irregular immigration, mostly from Eastern Europe. In 2007, at the Lazio versus Dynamo 
Bucharest match, monkey grunting erupted from the curva nord against the Ghanaian-born 
Dynamo Bucharest player George Blay. Following my request to explain the motivation of 
the monkey grunts, Federico (Irriducibili) unconvincingly justified the noise. According to 
his reasoning, it was manifest as a means to distract opposition players and should not 
necessarily be regarded as an expression of racial contempt. To complicate the issue further 
such types of insult, as a reader who knows about Italian football is well aware, can both 
originate and finish in a very spontaneous fashion, involving the whole stadium, not only the 
curve . These dynamics are also present in other football stadiums in Europe.97 Ignorance 
concerning race and ethnicity can be manifest in the stadium, not only among the UltraS, but 
also among the ‘ordinary’ and respectable fans.  This behaviour illustrates that racial bigotry 
is present not only in the football stadium, but also outside of the stadium, in the wider 
society and going beyond ideological explanations. Moreover, behaviours that fit the 
description ‘racist’ manifest ambiguous and contradictory forms in the Roman curve. It was 
not uncommon in the Lazio curva nord to hear racist insults directed towards black 
opposition players, whilst black Lazio players were lauded by the same supporters. 
Sometimes in the pursuit of offending an opponent, pragmatism and self-censorship were 
evident. At times, supporters who might use racially inspired insults realised that they would 
not be able to offend the black players of other teams without offending their own team. 
The connection between ideology and racism produced one of the most compelling 
UltraS statements about race displayed on the Lazio UltraS website. This internet group is 
neo-fascist and has strong links to the Irriducibili: 
                                                
97
 Spaaij and Vinas (2005) argues:  
‘Few commentators acknowledged the fact that the racial abuse during Spain’s friendly against England was 
not simply provoked by a right-wing ultra group, but involved a large section of the home crowd(-reportedly up 
to 80 per cent’. (p.149). 
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‘The concept of race is influenced by the vision that one has of the human being…I 
have a traditional conception as a strong base of my ideas; this recognises in the 
human being three elements: the body, the soul and the spirit. A complete theory of 
the race needs to consider all these three elements.’ (Julius Evola mentioned in 
http://ultraslazio.it/evola.htm) 
 
The articulations of Julius Evola are crucial for defining the UltraS thoughts concerning race 
and ethnicity. For Evola, the term ‘race’ is synonymous with quality; a person having values 
is a person of race.98 Evola rejected Hitler’s biological ideas of racism, and this distance from 
Hitler’s racism was also stressed by the UltraS; Todde for instance, when asked about the 
issue of race in 2008, replied: ‘we are against immigration, but not against the immigrants; 
the biological racism of the Nazis is not part of our tradition and beliefs.’ Evola introduced 
instead the notion that human existence is represented by three elements: the body, the soul 
and the spirit. The spirit is crucial in this analysis, as it manifests the metaphysical element 
that is worn down by centuries of secularisation and modernisation. The element of body in 
Evola’s rationale is based on a specific appearance. Evola believed there are two types of 
Aryans: Ario-Germans and Ario-Romans. The latter group was considered superior in soul 
and spirit to the former and provided the raw material required for a national cultural rebirth 
(Griffin, 1998). For Evola, ‘mixed races’ and racial degeneration were the negative 
consequences of modernity (Germinario, 2001). Consequently, Evola’s philosophy argues 
that, in the fight against modernity, society must return to the traditional differences of the 
races; resistance against modernity is resistance against racial mixing. The struggle against 
modernity implies a process of renewed differentiation and hierarchy of races. However ,even 
if Evola’s racism is quite distant from the biological racism of the Nazi – it contains instead 
cultural and esoteric elements (Cf. Rossi, 2007) - the potential consequences of this 
conception are tragically the same.  
Accusations of racist (and especially Anti-Semitic) attitudes were strongly challenged 
by both groups in the media. One notable instance concerned footballer Fabio Liverani, who 
was of Italian-African heritage, and part of the 2004 Italian World Cup winning team. In 
2001, the Irriducibili were accused by the Italian media of being responsible for spreading 
racist slogans around the city of Rome against Liverani, who was newly arrived from 
Perugia.  According to the racists, the player was guilty of having a black Somalian mother. 
                                                
98Evola’s ideas around race are mainly detailed in J. Evola, (1937). Il mito del sangue, Milano: Hoepli; J. Evola, 
(1941a). Sintesi di dottrina della razza, Milano: Hoepli;  J. Evola, (1941b). Indirizzi per una educazione 
razziale.Napoli: Conte. 
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The Irriducibili were immediately presumed blameworthy even if Giorgio, declared in a 
statement to the newpaper La Repubblica:  
‘The Irriducibili disagree and dissociate from the writings and symbols used against 
Liverani. We invite Lazio fans to show solidarity with the player and the team today 
during training.’ (Cardone, 2001)   
 
At times, the UltraS went beyond individual to challenge belief systems; some actions 
and words of the UltraS were aimed at faiths at odds with Christianity. Giorgio (Irriducibili) 
deliberated upon such ‘others’: 
‘The organisation of today’s society causes crimes because, in some cases, stealing is 
the only way of surviving. It also favours intolerance towards others. Let’s take an 
example, in Rome’s Parioli district (a very affluent area), instead of building and 
funding a park (perhaps it would have been even better to spend this money in the 
peripheral districts), they have allowed the building of a mosque. They allowed 
people that are against our way of life and our religion to build their sanctuary; their 
symbols, which stated for centuries their tradition against ours. I cannot accept this!! 
We Italians are not owners of our land any more. I cannot accept that, in our schools, 
for instance, someone spoke about taking away the crucifix to avoid offending people 
belonging to other religions! I have never been interested in religion, but I am ready 
to participate in a religious war against this idea. That crucifix symbolises not only 
Catholicism, but also Italy and its history. To the ‘beggar’ [Muslim] with the daughter 
with the veils who does not like it, I would say ‘go away to your country with your 
daughter and make her wear however many veils you want.’ If you want to stay in 
Italy, accept our way of life or leave.’ 
 
Whilst the ideology of the neo-fascists can celebrate the struggle of Muslim groups 
(such as the Palestinians or Iraqis) against what they consider to be Anglo-American and 
Zionist imperialism, this celebration should not be seen as support for their religion, 
especially if such a religion tries to establish itself in Italian cities. The majority of Italian 
neo-fascist sentiment is linked to Catholicism with a minority related to paganism. The 
UltraS supports this claim; they see themselves as champions of Catholicism. One such 
example is provided by an editorial written in the Boys fanzine in 2003, which invites fellow 
believers to act against the ‘sinister’ forces of globalisation, modernity and liberalism and 
reminds readers of the pride that they should manifest in Italian Catholic identity against 
Islam: 
‘I would have preferred to speak about other things but my conscience leads my hand. 
Adel Smith - President of the Italian Muslim Union - has appealed to the Tribunal of 
Aquila [an Italian City] to eliminate the cross from all the Italian schools, which your 
sons attend99. The deputy Prime Minister Fini needs to think well before the law to 
give the immigrants the votes is proposed. Many other threats of this kind [referring 
to Smith’s initiative] are around the corner and can get out of our control. Guys, we 
                                                
99
 Adel Smith was the leader of the Unione dei Musulmani d'Italia located in Ofena (L'Aquila) which seeks 
political representation for Muslims in the Italian Parliament. 
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live in a world where the sacred is not important anymore; where all is sacrificed to 
the rhythms of production and mass consumerism disregarding sentiments and values. 
These people act out of revenge and not feeling. Instead of fighting with honour, they 
fight with infamy. Their eternal dissatisfaction is about to bring horrifying 
imbalances…. Should we not act and see the decadence that surrounds us? I ask you 
UltraS, you warriors of the new millennium, defenders of the ancient values; they are 
attacking our identity and we will not allow it! Those who do not respect our culture 
do not deserve our respect. First in the list [to hit]: Adel Smith!’ 
 
The same sentiment was evidenced weeks later by the Irriducibili within the Olympic 
Stadium. A banner that they produced stated: ‘Adel Smith buffone - fuori dalla nostra 
nazione’ [Adel Smith Clown - Out of our Nation].  
 
9.1.1 The UltraS and the Eastern European Immigration 
 
The minority ethnic group that provoked particular resentment among the UltraS 
were, though, white Eastern Europeans. The problems thrown up by irregular immigration to 
Italy, particularly from Romania and Albania, were strongly felt by the UltraS due to the 
perceived correlation between this ethnic group and crime in Rome along with the seeming 
inability of the authorities to tackle such crime. Given this context, one of the typical Boxer’s 
statements is understood: ‘you can look at the curva and understand your city.’ These words 
are (potentially) profound. People in the Roman curve have, for many years, articulated what 
the Roman population, as a whole, perceived as a problem. The anti-illegal immigrant 
sentiment appears to be linked to an objectively perceived public emergency that involves a 
lack of control by the local authorities and police over individuals involved in crimes. The 
fear of crime provokes prejudicial attitudes and seeks simplistic solutions.  
 It should be noted, though, that the perception of an ever-increasing influx of 
Romanians (and specifically Romanian gypsies) into Italy is supported by objective data. 
Romanian immigrants doubled in number in three years based on data compiled by the 
ISTAT annual survey on the presence of foreigners in Italy (La Repubblica –online- 31 
October, 2007). Residents in Italy classified as ‘immigrants’ on January 1, 2007 numbered 
just short of three million (2.938922), which is an increase of 10.1% over the previous year. 
Since the balance of the Italian population is negative (-6912 units in 2006), the increase in 
foreigners growth is quite significant. The Boxer was dismissive of the newly arrived 
citizens, considering Albanians and Romanians as the people responsible for the unacceptable 
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level of street prostitution in Rome.100 Although generalisations are unfruitful and censurable, 
it is important to remember that the stereotype of the crimogenic Romanians is supported by 
official crime data. In 2007, Romanian citizens were involved in 14 episodes of serious 
violence in Italy, which resulted in deaths of 13 individuals (La Repubblica –online- 01 
November, 2007a).The 2008 report on crime published by the Ministry of the Interior argued 
that Romanian organised crime was gaining strength and visibility in Italy (Il Tempo –online- 
22 February, 2009). Moreover, the same newspaper article reported that an astonishing 90% 
of committed crimes in Milan involved Romanians, which placed them at the top of the 
‘crime ranking’ of foreigners residing in Italy. In Rome, Romanian-related offences 
accounted for 31% of recorded crimes.  
One event that caused a national outcry- and an UltraS reaction- occurred in October 
2007 when Giovanna Reggiani, who was 47 years old and the wife of a high ranking Naval 
officer, was murdered at Tor di Quinto (an area in the north of Rome) whilst returning home 
from shopping. She was attacked by a 24-year old Romanian, dragged into a shed, raped and 
thrown into a nearby street. She died shortly afterwards. Following this tragic episode, the 
former Mayor of Rome, Walter Veltroni, rounded on the Romanian government, telling them 
‘You cannot open the hatch before the entry of Romania into the EU’. He stressed that, before 
the arrival of these co-patriots, Rome was one of the safest cities in the world. The former 
Italian centre-left Prime Minister, Romano Prodi, called his Romanian equivalent to express 
the anger of the Italian government. Giorgio Napolitano, President of the Italian Republic, 
spoke of the act as one of ‘barbaric aggression’. In the Serie A matches the following Sunday, 
the players of AS Roma and SS Lazio wore black armbands in respect for the deceased. 
Gianni Gumiero, the victim’s husband, declared: ‘I am desperate. If I was not a devoted 
citizen, I would do justice by myself’ (La Repubblica –online- 01 November, 2007b). 
Some vigilantes sought justice beyond the courts of law. A punitive blitz in the 
Roman working-class area of Tor Bella Monaca against Romanians followed. This high-
density immigrant area was subjected to attacks by groups of young men clad in motorcycle 
helmets or balaclavas. They attacked four Romanians in a parking lot. Such men were not 
‘unknown’ to the Lazio UltraS. The four Romanians were hospitalised. Journalists of La 
Repubblica interviewed the local Italian population and asked their opinion about the attacks. 
Some answered that Romanians were lazy, indolent and regularly and publicly drunk. They 
                                                
100
 To evaluate the issue the reader is directed to the ECPAT 2001 (End Child Prostitution, Pornography and 
trafficking) which at pag 29 dedicated a chapter on the London red light district of Soho; cf. 
http://antislavery.org/homepage/resources/Children.PDF 
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made the public arenas, be it a park bench or public transport, potentially dangerous places 
for decent citizens to pass (La Repubblica –online- 02 November, 2007). 
Not all attacks on Romanians should be considered as provoked by vengeance. In 
August 2007, just two months before the death of Giovanna Reggiani, during the Lazio-
Dynamo Bucharest Champions League fixture in the Olympic stadium, the Bucharest team 
and their fans were the subject of hostile chants. Amongst other insults, the Lazio UltraS 
chanted "Gypsies: Go Away". Outside the stadium, five Romanian fans were stabbed; none 
sustained life-threatening injuries (La Repubblica –online- 14 August, 2007). Football plays 
many roles both obvious and subtle, recognised and unrecognised, in such debates and 
highlights historical reasons for such discourses. 
Lacking a significant colonial history, Italy was not prepared for the massive 
immigration from Albania and the former Eastern Europe from 1990 onwards. The Italian 
election of April 2008 recently changed the policies concerning illegal immigration. Silvio 
Berlusconi and Walter Veltroni created two large parties, one of the centre-right and one of 
the centre-left, to ostensibly simplify and give stability to the Italian government. A dominant 
cause – for those seeking political office – was the worry over irregular immigrants and 
associated crime. The centre-left mayors, in many cities from Parma to Bologna, initiated 
voluntary groups promoted as ‘city angels’ to provide security and public reassurance in parts 
of the city that were notorious for drug use and violence. Such citizens did not have the 
power to arrest or seek to engage directly with suspects, but their presence was considered an 
attempt to discourage criminality. The electoral campaign saw Berlusconi and his Partito 
Delle Libertá victorious with an electoral promise based on two criteria. One criterion was 
the necessity to make electoral procedures simpler in order to improve the political stability 
of Italy (hitherto never accomplished), which, in doing, so favoured the constitution of the 
two big parties and concomitantly eliminated the smaller ones. The political campaign also 
centred on the worries of Italians concerning public safety and unregulated immigration from 
Eastern Europe. Berlusconi committed himself to a ‘zero tolerance’ policy against crime, 
especially that committed by non-nationals. He promised greater severity in custodial 
sentences as punishment from crimes. In 2008, the Italian Police Chief Antonio Manganelli, 
in a speech to the Chamber of Deputies, (3 July) stressed, in an alarmist fashion, the illegal 
immigration-crime link: 
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‘Those responsible for widespread crime offences in Italy in the report were 30% 
illegal immigrants, while the percentage increases to 50-60% in the North of the 
country (Il Giornale –online- 22 April, 2008). 
 
The politics of fear played a part in the outcome of the election. The role-call of those allied 
with Berlusconi reminded observers of the recent past of the Far Right. His campaign team 
included il Duce’s granddaughter, Alessandra Mussolini, and Roberto Calderoli, a senior 
member of the Northern League, who was once tipped to become Deputy Prime Minister. 
Formerly Minister of Reforms in Berlusconi’s last government of 2006, Calderoli, at the 
height of controversy over the publication in a Danish newspaper of a cartoon considered 
blasphemous by Islam, had taken his shirt off to reveal the same cartoon penned onto his vest 
on live television . The same man, in articulating his opposition to the building of a mosque 
in Italy, organised a ‘Pig Day’in 2007 in an attempt to offend Muslim sentiments (Il Resto del 
Carlino-online- 13 September, 2007). The election of 2008 saw small parties, which were 
characteristic of Italian politics since 1948, erased. The Communists, the Greens, and the 
Socialists are no longer represented in Parliament, as they did not acquire the 4% quorum to 
obtain representation. The anti-immigrant rhetoric of the Northern League allowed its 
representatives to gain 60 MP’s and 25 Senators a significant result101. 
Today, the neo-fascists, which since 1948 were represented in parliament by the MSI, 
have no elected representatives. La Destra (the Right), a small party originating from the 
radical faction of AN in 2007, the Movimento Sociale Fiamma Tricolore and Forza Nuova 
collectively gathered a mere 2.7% of the total vote for the Chamber of Deputies and 2.3% for 
the Senate. In the Lazio electoral region, the Right almost reached the Senate with 3.8% of 
the vote. In the Lazio 1 electoral district, the percentage vote for the Chamber of Deputies 
was the highest in the region. Such data support two arguments. First, the Lazio region is 
once again confirmed as the historical bulwark of neo-fascism, which was evident in the 
subsequent Mayoral election (see below). Second, even if the majority of neo-fascist parties 
did not gain representatives, the ideas of neo-fascism are alive in this region (as in all Italy).  
Nevertheless, the lack of parliamentary representation of the extreme right should not 
deceive a reader. In Berlusconi’s government, the leader of Azione Sociale, Alessandra 
Mussolini, is the elected deputy in the Campania region and a national board member of the 
Popolo delle Libertá (PdL). Another faction  is, as mentioned earlier, led by the former 
Alleanza Nazionale member and new PdL Mayor of Rome, Gianni Alemanno.  
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Fig. 42: Roman salutes for the newly elected Mayor 
Gianni Alemanno102 
 
                                                                     *** 
The ideology of fascism still holds appeal in Italy. The extreme right is now more 
central to the Italian State than at any time since the demise of Mussolini. Italy has shifted to 
the Right since Berlusconi’s first electoral victory in 1994. The Left’s 2006 victory was an 
anomaly. The disillusionment with politics of the Italians has ushered in the new Far Right 
anti-politicians, like Umberto Bossi, Alessandra Mussolini, Roberto Calderoli and Gianni 
Alemanno. The populace seek out variations of Authoritarian Populism. They are enraged as 
the economy declines and find the criminal acts of some immigrants to be a target that 
manifests vague opposition to globalisation. In April 2008, Gianni Alemanno defeated the 
Democratic Party’s candidate Francesco Rutelli and was elected Mayor of Rome. Alemanno 
was also elected for his intransigent approach to the ‘problem’ of illegal immigration. 
Alemanno’s 16-point ‘pact for Rome’ promised to ‘immediately activate procedures for the 
expulsion of 20,000 nomads and immigrants who have broken the law in Rome. He also 
promised to eliminate illegal Romanian gypsy camps.103The mood and protest of the Romans 
against the failing management of illegal immigration in the capital, which had been 
expressed for at least a decade by the UltraS of Roma and Lazio (speaking in their piazza 
freely and without the filters of political correctness), may have found   an institutional and 
political outlet. 
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 Cf. http://repubblica.it/2008/04/sezioni/politica/elezioni-2008-sei/campidoglio-festa/campidoglio-festa.html 
103
 Cf. http://romapunto.it/?costante_pagina=il%20patto%20con%20roma&id_lingua=2 
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Chapter 10 
 
The UltraS: An emerging social movement? 
 
‘Since the beginning of our constitution, we have had clear ideas about politics in the 
stadium. We believe it cannot be avoided, because every man, hence, every UltraS 
has his own ideals and beliefs, and it seems right that, especially in this place of 
aggregation, he can manifest them.’ Juventude Crociata -Crusade Youth104 
 
 
The above statement of the UltraS Juventude Crociata of the city of Padova 
exemplifies the sense of ideologisation of the Italian curve. At the macro-level, this study 
argues that the UltraS ideological, behavioural and cultural elements can be understood- 
similar to the arguments of Gentry (2004) regarding gatherings of extreme right skinheads- as 
manifestations of an emerging social movement.  
Social movements do not originate from a vacuum, but they arise from precedent 
experiences (Taylor, in Klandersmans and Mayer, 2006). The UltraS are a good example of 
this process; they find their roots in both the Italian youth neo-fascist and hardcore football 
supporters movements. In this study the notion of social movement105 is defined as a 
‘collectivity acting with some degree of organisation and continuity outside institutional 
channels for promoting or resisting change in the group, society, or world order of which it is 
a part’ (Simi et al., 2004, p. 3).  
However, before delving into the UltraS as social movement hypothesis, it is fruitful 
to outline their historical appearance. What follows illustrates the UltraS origin from the 
wider Italian hardcore supporters (ultrá), and allows us to see how the UltraS constitute at 
least in part a particular response by one section of Italian youth towards the social, cultural 
and political restrictions that they encounter within the broader social system.106  
 
10.1 From ultrá  to UltraS 
 
The UltraS grew out of ultrá gatherings. The term ultrá was used to generically 
indicate (regardless of political orientation) all hardcore Italian football fans (invariably 
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 The Juventude Crociata are the UltraS of Padova FC. Amongst the Padova Curva  the Juventude is 
notoriously extreme; many of its members belong to extreme right extra-parliamentary groupings. Cf. 
http://tifonet.it/free/juventudepd/ 
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 More specifically I refer in this study to ‘power-oriented’ movements, which contrary to participation-
oriented movements, act in concert to achieve group influence to make or block change  in society (Morrison, 
1971). 
106
 For a more detailed and dedicated analysis,a reader is directed to A. Roversi (1992).Calcio, tifo e violenza. 
Bologna: Il Mulino. 
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males between the ages of 16 and 40) who manifest behaviours that, at times, exceed that 
considered the ‘norm’ in terms of linguistics, bodily comportment and, ultimately, violent 
practices. The etymology of the word ultrá is based in French political discourse. During the 
Restoration period (1815–1830), the word ultrá-royaliste indicated partisan loyalty to the 
Absolute Monarchy. The ultrá-royaliste championed the interests of property owners, the 
nobility and clericalists. They were the supporters of authority and royal tradition in 
contraposition to the philosophies of human rights and individual freedoms proselytised by 
followers of the Enlightenment (Regoli, 2006).  
During the 1950s, Italian football was characterised by a generally relaxed and 
informal football fan culture. Fan club offices were places to buy match tickets and gather 
with the like-minded to listen to the State radio commentary when the team played outside of 
town. The football match was a parochial town event and a social gathering; whilst episodes 
of violence were present, they did not become tragic or out of hand. There were, on occasion, 
scuffles between opposing fans, usually concerning long-standing district and regional 
rivalries and fights were sometimes evidenced amongst groups that supported the same team 
over on-the-pitch incidents (Roversi, 1992).  
The chronology of the appearance of such hardcore football fans groupings is hotly 
debated. While Roversi (1992) argued that the first violent clashes between Italian rival fans 
occurred during the 1970s, the English sociologists from the Leicester University Centre for 
Football Research criticise this native-born assertion. They assert that such episodes have 
occurred since the origin of modern Italian football and cite an event in 1959 during a Napoli 
versus Bologna match, when 65 people were injured following a pitch invasion. This study 
favours the interpretation of Roversi whilst accepting that the debate arises out of a 
misunderstanding of that considered fan intemperance to that which defines the presence and 
practices of those considered ultrá. The period of the late 1960s is the fulcrum between these 
two paradigms.  
The first half of the 1970s witnessed large sectors of Italian youth from diverse social 
classes practicing a form of socio-political insubordination. When combined with an 
exaggerated hostility against any form of authority and the elaboration of subcultural 
peculiarities, a general juvenile tumultuousness was manifested. In this temporal framework, 
appear to emerge the ultrá. The appeal of such gatherings to Italian youth at the end of the 
1970s was a sign that Italian politics (and trade unions) had lost any monopoly that they may 
once have had on mobilising both youthful and general public opinion and indeed their 
behaviours (Triani, 1994).  
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Ideological divisions of Italian society, reflected in cities and regions, were usually 
mirrored by the political sympathies manifest at the local football stadiums. In this era, one 
could find Left-wing hardcore football fan groups, including the AC Milan Brigate 
Rossonere (Red-Blacks Brigades), and the Brigate gialloblue (Yellow-Blue Brigades) of 
Modena. On the opposite side were Verona’s Brigate Gialloblú (Yellow-Blue Brigades), and 
the Boys SAN of Inter–Milan (constituted by members of the Fronte della Gioventú –the 
Youth Front Organisation of the Italian neo-fascist party Movimento Sociale Italiano). These 
groups, together with the Boys, can be considered the first manifestation of what this research 
identifies as the UltraS. However, apart from the few exceptions mentioned, the hardcore 
football fandom of the 1970s cannot be considered strictly political and was not so directly 
oppositional to the Italian ‘system’ as the UltraS. Grispigni (1993) argues that the ‘death’ of 
politics and the associated disillusionment was a characteristic of Italian youth of the time, 
that -  returning from the disappointment of the movement of protest of 1968 and 1977 -
transferred the generational conflict from the political to the sports arena’ (in Triani, 1994, p. 
75). The youthful pursuit of excitement and conflict was to be satisfied henceforth in the 
football context via identification with colours, symbols and territories of football-related 
belonging. This pursuit could be very consequential. 
10.1.1 The Rise of the UltraS 
In October 1979, the Lazio fan Vincenzo Paparelli was killed by a Roma fan who 
fired a petard from the curva sud (Mariottini, 2004). The same day, football-related violence 
occurred in the cities of Ascoli, Milan and Brescia, causing many injuries and widespread 
criminal damage. These data were important for Italian football; football spectators’ violence 
from this time forward became a key issue in media discourse, state institutions and public 
opinion. The latter called for repressive measures from the State to eradicate the teppisti 
(thugs). Many house searches of suspects were subsequently made by the police, who began 
targeting the most notorious individuals. The headquarters of hardcore football fan groups 
were raided and banners, drums and choreographic materials were seized (Borghini, 1987).   
The escalation of the hardcore football fans' violence between the 1970s and early 
1980s indicates the transformation of the phenomenon. It was in the 1980s that the Italian 
hardcore football fan movement reached its apex in terms of the number of participants and 
episodes of violence. The development of a complex of friendships and rivalries regulated at 
first glance by the logic of the ‘Bedouin Syndrome’ ostensibly ensured that the friends of an 
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ally became friends, and the enemies of an ally were enemies (Bruno, in Marchi, 1994). This 
simplistic formula was, though; open to challenge by historical antecedents and personal and 
political negotiations. Moreover, in the 1980s, it was possible to witness the exacerbation of 
security measures, most notably CCTV surveillance and the use of hand-held metal detectors 
at stadium entrances. Football Stadiums took on the appearance of fortresses with riot police 
surrounding the vicinities and parading in large numbers at the stadium clad in riot gear. This 
change engendered a polarisation of hardcore football fan groups that had hitherto co-existed. 
While the policing impositions reduced episodes of violence in the stadium, a ‘dislocation 
effect’ resulted in a concomitant rise in violence outside of the stadium, in town centres, 
railway stations and tube stations (Roversi, 1992). In addition, the Italian political crisis 
provoked contempt for traditional forms of political aggregation. The increasing alienation of 
youth from mainstream politics correlated with such football fan associationism. Individual 
and collective political hopes, joys and frustrations surfaced like never before in the stadium.  
The 1980s ended with serious incidents of fan violence (Marinelli and Pili, 2000). In 
1988, during an Ascoli versus Inter-Milan match, Nazareno Filippini was killed by a group of 
Inter Milan hardcore fans, having been repeatedly struck by kicks and punches. On June 4, 
1989, during a Milan versus Roma game, a Roma supporter, Antonio De Falchi, died of a 
heart attack following an assault carried out by rivals from Milan. Amongst the traditional 
factions, younger formations appeared who celebrated their ability to break boundaries. By 
the mid-1980s, new gatherings had joined the curve. These were the cani sciolti (Hot Heads) 
those considered by all in the stadium difficult to control. This term was applied to 
youngsters by the established organised ultrá groups (Vincenti, 2000). These youngsters did 
not recognise themselves as a pre-existing fan group – nor did they seek such an association - 
and did not collaborate with pre-existing supporter formations. They did not originate out of 
schisms within the established groups; they were autonomous from all pre-existing fan 
constitutions. The majority of this new demographic, invariably aged between 14-16 years, 
was lacking in political consciousness and had little historical knowledge of the ultrá 
movement (Roversi, 1992).  
The new curve formations represented an Italian society that, during the 1980s, 
celebrated individualism, self-indulgence and ostentation.  As a consequence, the era saw a 
refusal among much of its young generation to engage or participate in matters that were 
political or required a sense of dedication. The nomenclature of the curva groups reflected 
this ethos; names with political connotations were substituted by those linked to 
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psychological conditions and drug and alcohol consumption. Examples of these gatherings 
were the Sconvolti (Deranged), Kolletivo Alcoolico (Alcoholic Group), Wild Kaos and 
Arancia Meccanica (Clockwork Orange- from the controversial 1971 Stanley Kubrick film 
that presented a dystopian vision of violent nihilism).107 The dislike and opposition to such 
metamorphosis was evident in the constitution of groups in the more notorious curve, such as 
Roma, Milan, Bergamo, Naples and Genova, who took on the title Vecchia Guardia (Old 
Guards). Such gatherings emphasised the principles of collective unity and group 
collaboration that had inspired the origins of the hardcore football supporters' movement. It 
is, perhaps, in this period that the ideology of the hardcore football fans became more 
meaningful in content.  
From the early 1990s onwards, there has been a systematic ideologisation of the 
Italian curve. Hardcore supporters groups throughout Italy started to more frequently display 
common emblems or mottos related to neo-fascism on their banners (Marchi, 1994). The 
stadium became a setting in which it was permissible to express both concepts of selfhood 
and collective political will. The observation that ideological displays are evident in and 
around football should not surprise a reader. The 1990s were a decade of profound political 
and economic crisis for Italy. An entire political system was falling apart under the acts of 
tangentopoli; public opinion was tiring of corrupt politicians. The electorate punished the 
distrusted political parties, which were decimated in the corruption inquiries of the Italian 
magistrates. Sentiments of political renewal were represented by extreme parties, such as the 
Movimento Sociale Italiano , which subsequently became Alleanza Nazionale or by new 
political parties such as Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia ,founded in 1994, and Umberto 
Bossi’s Lega Nord ,founded in 1996 (Pagani, 2003). The era also saw increased popularity of 
national revolutionary movements on the extreme right spectrum, such as Forza Nuova 
,Movimento Sociale Fiamma Tricolore, Fronte Nazionale and the reaffirmation of extreme 
left ideological parties, such as Rifondazione Communista (New Communist  Party). 
In 2009, I interviewed Dr. Domenico Mazzilli, a high ranking officer of the Italian 
police and President of the National Observatory on Sport Events of the Italian Ministry of 
the Interior (see chapter 12). The Ministry of the Interior confirmed the existence of 58 
UltraS groups with more than 15,000 members throughout Italy. The UltraS are, thus, a 
relatively large nation-wide grouping that interacts across regions. Whilst they are not a threat 
to parliamentary democracy, their very existence is a stain on the Italian body politic. The 
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 For an in depth account on the history of the Italian hardcore football supportrs movement cf. C. Balestri, & 
G. Vigano. Gli Ultra’: Origini, storia e sviluppi recenti di un mondo ribelle. Quaderni di Sociologia, 34. 
 150
political concern that they carry with them is two-fold; they are prepared for violence and 
they are unpredictable having unknown potential. 
 
10.2 The UltraS Collective Identity 
 
Over the past 20 years, it has been possible to witness in the curve not only a rise in 
ideologisation, but also a concomitant increase in UltraS politicisation. Simi et al. (2004) 
stress the main elements of the process of politicisation that can be applied to the UltraS, 
namely the belief in the possibility to resist or change things for a common cause. For the 
UltraS, the shared causes are their very survival; they have common opponents (the police, 
media and football institutions); they resort to tactics, such as a supporters’ strike, in which 
they refuse to sustain the football teams during the match to voice their discontent. Further 
shared elements are a willingness to engage in violence, public protest campaigns and 
maintaining a recognisable organisation, which, in the last two years, has emerged in the 
newly founded UltraS Italia (see later). The politicisation process among the UltraS marks 
the development of their collective identity, which is an important attribute of any social 
movement. Collective identity is a sense of ‘we’ based on cohesion and solidarity around 
which individuals act (Cf. Simi et al. 2004; Klandermans 1997). Traditional rivalries, as this 
study demonstrates, can be forgotten to oppose a perceived persecution of the State against 
their common way of life. The capital of Italy, Rome, can be considered a good example 
about the capability of the UltraS in their struggle against the Italian State. The UltraS of 
Roma and Lazio have gradually preferred resistance against the State, its repressive laws and 
the police to clashes against rival fans. Whilst aware of differences, Marco (Boys) underlines 
the comradeship between the Boys and the Irriducibili: 
‘The leader of our group had a personal friendship, based also on the same 
ideological outlook of life, with one of the Irriducibili leader. When he died in 2005 
all the Direttivo of the Irriducibili attended his funeral and raised their hands doing 
the roman salute in sign of respect. We are more explicit and openly political than the 
Irriducibili. We produced a banner stating ‘No American peace on my land!!’ We are 
anti-NATO [they do not want American military bases in Italy]. We are against 
Italian soldiers in Iraq; we do not want to waste Italian blood for an American war.’ 
 
Similar dynamics are emerging among other UltraS groups throughout Italy. Few in Italy 
would ever imagine the possibility of hardcore tifosi of Juventus and Roma sitting together in 
the stadium and watching a football match. Nevertheless, this is precisely what is happening 
with the UltraS Italia, who gathers to watch and support the national team as a symbol of the 
concept of Patria. 
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Fig. 43: The kit of the UltraS Italia:  
The original polo and buckle. 
 
In 2009, I asked Todde, who had recently been involved with the UltraS Italia, about 
them. Namely, I questioned if there were aspects in this group to consider the UltraS Italia as 
an expression of the ability of the UltraS to organise themselves at a national level. He told 
me that the number of the members was currently approximately 600 and that the camerati of 
Lazio, Roma and Inter had recently joined the ‘project’. Other members were drawn from 
Juventus, Ascoli, Verona, Udine, Trieste, Napoli, Genova and elsewhere. In Todde’s 
analysis, the same logic that explained the actions of the Irriducibili and the Boys was valid 
for the UltraS Italia. Even if many of the members are neo-fascist sympathisers, they 
considered themselves autonomous from any political party. The national mobilisation of the 
UltraS, which is pertinent to their being considered a social movement, is expressed by their 
direct actions. The UltraS direct action takes several forms. At its most primitive, it is 
exhibited by the presentation of common banners containing messages of accusation and 
defiance. At a higher level, as shown previously, it is evidenced by social campaigns that they 
perceive as ‘just’. Direct action is also demonstrated at an organisational level via their radio 
programs, which they use to proselytise and spread their ideas. Whilst these typologies have 
become a constant background noise, when an issue is considered meritous, the UltraS can 
mobilise and attack the State. Although we cannot affirm yet that the UltraS structures and 
connections are formally delineated among the groups, the sense of an emerging movement is 
present and is certainly based on a common foe and a common strategy of opposition. 
In 2007, the death of the Lazio UltraS Gabriele Sandri provoked an unprecedented 
violent reaction manifested by UltraS groups throughout Italy. Groups from Taranto, Milan, 
Rome, Parma and Torino challenged the police in protest against the killing, but also in rage 
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against the militarisation of the football stadiums and the cumulative repressive measures that 
the Italian state had undertaken against them. A common theme of the chants was ‘Polizia 
Assassini’ (Police - Murderers); graffiti against the police were written on walls of cities such 
as Milan, Rome and Padova.108 In Rome, the reaction of the Roma and Lazio UltraS in the 
streets – assisted by the decision of the authorities to cancel the AS Roma-Cagliari match a 
few hours before kick-off – was extremely violent. Some 20 police officers were injured in 
the disturbances. At the time of the violent disturbances, four UltraS were arrested and 
charged with offences pertaining to terrorism.  
In March 2008, a further 16 Lazio UltraS were arrested in police raids in connection 
with the events.109The same year, during the Triestina-Rimini match in curva Furlan, a 
banner was displayed to honour Sandri and the UltraS of Lazio.110 The November funeral of 
Sandri attracted more than 5,000 mourners. Banners displayed by them demanded justice for 
his death and condemned what they perceived as their ‘crazy’ repression by the State. The 
disorders that followed Sandri’s death were, in the words of the Italian Minister of Interior, 
Giuliano Amato, a manifestation of ‘a blind rage, led by madly criminal minds subversive 
against the police, its vehicles and its symbols.’ 111 The same man (without revealing his 
sources) informed the Parliament of planned disorder, subversive articulations, and 
diversionary tactics employed by those seeking ‘to attract the police and Carabinieri around 
CONI (Italian Olympic Committee), to leave unattended the police barracks with the 
intention of making their attack easier.112 In this case, the behaviour of the Italian police 
force was exemplary. The police could have reacted and shot people. In one instance, the 
UltraS attacked the Maurizio Giglio barrack, which was full of weapons, ammunition and 
vehicles. The law allowed the police to shoot in that circumstance to protect the public, but 
due to great skill and professionalism, the police avoided a possible tragedy (Bonini, 2009). 
The images of the riots, which were broadcasted globally, were not good for the reputation of 
Italy.  
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10.3 Deprivation: A reason for the UltraS mobilisation?  
 
The identification of the UltraS as a rising social movement does not end our attempt 
to complete a macro-level investigation of the phenomenon. The task of the researcher 
remains one of trying to understand the emergence of the movement. One answer may lie in 
the Relative Deprivation Theory (RDT), a construct that, according to Walker and Smith 
(2001), is an exciting topic for research and is employed in various ways to make sense of 
the rise of a variety of collective identities and social movements.  RDT argues that, 
‘whenever groups find a benchmark that implies they could or should be better off than they 
are, a condition of relative deprivation exists and a psychological strain (cognitive 
dissonance) triggers participation in collective behaviour.’ (Buechler,  in Snow et al., 2004, 
p.  49). Deprivation, or the sense of deprivation, is a condition that has resonance in both the 
individual and the socio-cultural setting. According to the RDT, when groups develop 
legitimate expectations113 and- at the same time- a conviction that these expectations will 
never be satisfied114, they may develop a cognitive dissonance that focuses on feelings of 
prejudice and discrimination (Morrison, 1971). In a power-oriented movement such as that of 
the UltraS, to reduce this psychological strain, a belief in a structural solution (in the case of 
the UltraS, the solution is comprised of violence, campaigning and lobbying of the Italian 
parliament) is conceived against the larger social structure outside of the group. At this very 
moment, mobilisation and resistance manifest. Morrison (1971) explains:  
 
‘The dissonance is not psychologically disabling for the individual because its effect 
is overridden by the belief that the blockage will be removed by group action 
(structural faith), and by the belief that some feature of the larger social structure 
outside the individual can be blamed for the blockage-structural blame-‘(p. 10). 
 
The RDT highlights the elements that may lead to the emergence of such movements, as well 
as providing reasons for their consolidation. Research should, consequently, be aimed at 
investigating the objective conditions that lead to discontent and, ultimately, action 
(Kornhauser 1959; Davies 1971).  
The UltraS have always considered their cause rightful; furthermore, they consider 
the curve to be their territories upon, and within which, they have the right to voice their 
opinions and ideology. The recent and sudden escalation of tougher laws and the State 
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 154
repression have promoted a perception among them of blocked expectation and a 
concomitant sense of outrage concerning notions of injustice and inequity.  Such a sense of 
grievance increasingly leads the UltraS to see themselves as societal outcasts and fosters 
conflict with the State and the media. The latter, according to the groups, have sided with the 
State oppressor. Consequently, the group’s rhetoric of discrimination has increased. Previous 
research focusing on Italian youth neo-fascist gatherings supports this contention 
(Klandermans and Mayer, 2006). At the same time, such feeling is not necessarily negative in 
the immediate sense of the gatherings and in the wider sense of the movement. Klandermans 
and Mayer (2006) highlight different ways of coping with discrimination, all of which are 
applicable, to a different degree, to the UltraS. Among the most relevant is ‘social creativity’, 
whereby the groups respond to discrimination by defining themselves as superior to others 
(Tajfel and Turner, 1986). The UltraS belief in their superiority to other hardcore supporters 
is evidenced by their consideration of themselves as ‘pure’, not polluted like the ‘others’ by 
the commercialised logic of modern calcio, in which mercenaries (i.e. the football players) 
are  idolised. In comparison to the ‘ordinary’ youth, the UltraS stress their ‘superior’ values. 
They feel that their ethical stance justifies their violence and way of life and makes bearable 
the perceived social stigma.  They believe that it is ‘morally’ worth it.  The key strategy for 
coping with discrimination lies in what Klandersmans and Mayer (2006) define as social 
support and a sense of bonding. The ideological and cultural traits that make the UltraS feel 
strong are also those that create a feeling of belonging and strength throughout the 
movement. As Todde argues, ‘Although there was an attempt to organise ourselves at the 
national level before Sandri’s death [He refers to the first emergence of a national group 
called the Vikings Italia], after Sandri’s death and the injustice carried out against one of us, 
there are more interactions among all of the groups and one of the result is the UltraS Italia.’ 
On the occasion of Sandri’s death, for the first time, many UltraS throughout Italy 
displayed banners in their stadium and wrote about the death on their websites in honour of 
Sandri and in solidarity with the UltraS of SS Lazio. They were also supported by the popular 
music group ZetaZeroAlfa that currently display on their website the picture of Sandri 
demanding: ‘Justice for Gabriele’.115 
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Fig. 44: UltraS Identity website in honour of Sandri.  
One of the web meeting points of the UltraS (2009) 
 
 
There may be, however, another facet of the UltraS grievance that merits evaluation; 
this relates to their nature of an ‘extreme’ youth movement. The pervasive sense of 
dissatisfaction by the Italian youth is mostly related to the legitimate expectations by youth of 
an efficient political class that works in their interest. Traditionally, Italian politics has been 
unsympathetic and blind to youth. The UltraS do not trust Italian politics and, of course, 
oppose it. Such anti-political discourses were a common theme and persisted in many 
interactions that I had with the UltraS. These feelings are widely present throughout the 
whole UltraS movement. As youth, the UltraS do not miss any chance to declare their dislike 
for Italian politics and their incompetent youth policies; this hostility is well represented in 
the following Marco’s statement (Boys):  
‘I do not like politics and do not follow it!!  I am an extraparliamentary; I follow the 
Third Position - the ‘revolutionary’ position. The Italian system is putrid; if the tree is 
sick to the root, it cannot give good fruits. The problems are not the fruits that need to 
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be changed, but the tree that needs to be eradicated or at least cured. Sometimes I 
agree with Bertinotti [the leader of Rifondazione Communista, and former president 
of the Chamber of Deputies].  The extreme left and right converge on some issues....’ 
 
The term ‘putrid’ used by Marco can be considered a fair representation of the mood of the 
youth of the curve, an important part of the Italian youth. In 2009, the international 
organisation Transparency International polled Italians to determine what they believed to be 
the most corrupt organisation in the country. Astonishingly, 44% of the participants indicated 
the Italian political parties (La Repubblica –online- 03 June, 2009). 116 The Italian journalist 
Bosetti, in his article, ‘Why is the political power in the hands of the old?’ (2008) identified 
as one of the main causes of the malfunction of the Italian political system  its gerontocrazia 
(gerontocracy); young politicians are underrepresented and not in key places to exercise 
power. Furthermore, Italy is far from achieving the requisite of a just society -namely having 
a system based on meritocracy. In Italy, a career, especially in the State-controlled domains, 
is accomplished by personal recommendations and seniority that greatly de-motivates its 
youth (Abravanel, 2008).  
In addition, Italian Sociologist Carboni (2008), in his most recent study of the Italian 
political class, affirms that, in the Italian parliament, individuals of poor political skills, but 
loyal to the party, function merely to reinforce the leadership that has chosen them. Too many 
MPs are elderly professional politicians. According to Della Loggia (2008), Italy is a country 
that exists on political immobility, a society that is fragmented and lacks a strong political 
and institutional framework. It is a country that has a significant public debt and that, instead 
of introducing much needed reforms related to education, health and justice - to name but a 
few - is instead blocked by litigious local and national leaders who promote a system based 
on political parties and not on people  (Corriere della Sera –online- 25 October, 2008). 
Furthermore, Italy is a nation wherein governments, regardless of political line, are unable to 
erase organised crime in the regions of the South; not by chance, these regions experience 
higher youth unemployment rates.117  
Della Loggia believes that the Italian social and political status quo is because society 
is a prisoner of its past and focuses on the same political discourses, contrapositions, and old 
‘low politics’ (Corriere della Sera –online- 25 October, 2008). As Clark (1996) 
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acknowledges, such a milieu can be defined as a systematic way of doing politics, where 
concessions and favouritism are institutionalised and where conceding favours to obtain votes 
develops into a consistent and non-written rule. The majority of Italian politicians have never 
been employed outside of the political arena. Politics is their only means of revenue, which 
makes them inclined to adhere to a systematic and methodological administration of power to 
survive and obtain an income. This situation creates conflict, protest and resistance, 
especially amongst the youth, who are the most penalised.  
The inefficiency of the Italian politics, political parties and protagonists has provoked 
opposition diffused among the whole electorate. The well-known Italian journalist Eugenio 
Scalfari (2007) explains this situation in the following statement:  
‘… Grows the numbers of Italian citizens who totally refuse this political class…. 
There is a growing refusal of ‘these’ political parties, of ‘these’ politicians…. It is a 
total refusal on all levels: taxes, public order, legality, inequalities, freedom. Thumbs 
down on everything. They [the political class] need to go.’ (La Repubblica –online- 
16 September, 2007) 
 
The statement by Scalfari is reinforced by the recent emergence of a popular movement 
organised by the renowned Genovese comedian Beppe Grillo who, during his stage and 
broadcasting career, was a vociferous critic against the malpractice of Italian politics and its 
politicians.  
 
‘We are against right and left; we do not have hope anymore... this should have been 
the government who would have changed everything. We need young people and 
new ideas not policies originating from ‘pensioners’ of 70 years [referring ironically 
to the existing politicians] they are all old!! The aim [of this manifestation and 
movement] is to ‘kick them out from the palace’ and most of all to express our dislike 
and weariness of a politics which is more and more millions of miles away from the 
citizens and their needs.’ (La Repubblica –online- 09 September, 2007) 
  
The protest gradually took shape via the comedian’s Internet blog and, during his Italian tour, 
found its first public manifestation with a protest meeting held in Bologna’s Piazza Maggiore 
in September 2007. The main objective of the movement was to ‘clean’ Italian politics from 
its so-called rationalisation, wipe out its professionalisation and expose its lack of ideals. The 
Bologna meeting, called ‘V-Day’ (i.e. Vaffanculo Day, or Fuck Off Day), aimed to collect 
signatures for a petition urging the creation of a new law to prescribe the ineligibility of 
politicians in the future with criminal records (25 MPs in Parliament in 2007 held such a 
status). The movement also sought to disallow Italian citizens from being elected as an MP if 
they held a criminal conviction or were in the legal system awaiting a verdict. Another 
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purpose of this movement was to get rid of the ‘professional politician’. To this end, the 
protesters proposed that no Italian citizens could be elected as an MP more than twice and 
that anyone elected had to come from a grass-roots selection procedure and not be parachuted 
in by a party system. Some 50,000 signatures were collected, as the Piazza was linked via the 
Internet to 179 cities (30 of them foreign-based). In March 2009, Grillo launched an electoral 
list closed to his movement throughout Italy for the forthcoming administrative elections. 
Commenting the event Grillo said: ‘The parties are dead. We are the only virus that crosses 
our disappeared ‘little’ Italy: perhaps we lose today, but our ideas are the ones that will win 
in the future’ (La Repubblica –online- 08 March, 2009). 
The inability of the Italian State to respond to the concrete needs of people, especially 
its youth, who see their existence as increasingly uncertain in this political framework, can be 
said to contribute to the creation of an ideological vacuum. The search for security and 
certainty can then promote the diffusion of any extreme ideologies founded on ‘action’. The 
attraction of a political formula like neo-fascism professed by the UltraS is, thus, not hard to 
understand. The esteemed sociologist (and novelist) Umberto Eco (1995) lists various 
characteristics of what he terms ‘Ur Fascism’; the most relevant for this study is 
irrationalism.  ‘Ur Fascism’ is based on the cult of action for the sake of action; there is no 
struggle for life, but rather a ‘fight for life’. According to this formula, pacifism is collusion 
with the enemy; action is good in and of itself, and must be implemented without reflection. 
As Giorgio reflects: 
‘I am waiting for that day when I will be in Piazza a Roma to ‘take’ Rome with the 
others. I could be 50 years old or older - it does not matter- but the rage that we have 
with this political system is huge. This society -and I refer to modern society not only 
Italy- creates privileges; many people have jobs so low paid that they cannot afford to 
marry or have children, they can be tempted to ‘deviate.’   
 
Giorgio expressed once again the populist nature of the Irriducibili and the desire of the 
UltraS to be protagonists, to act. It is a populism shared by the Boys and that has spread 
throughout the Italian curve. The UltraS do not believe in the Italian State and, while 
supporting their teams, they use the stadium for their own pronouncements. Such a statement 
implies an apocalyptic vision of Italian society; they suggest that Italians must be awoken in 
order to eliminate the inefficient politicians. This discourse is clearly subversive in nature. 
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10.4 The football stadium as the 21st century Italian Agorà 
 
The UltraS movement is the opposite of the immobility that is dominant in Italian 
society. The groups will fight for their ideas no matter the outcome and no matter the medium 
that is used. As Eco recognised in his reflection on fascism, in any mythology, the hero is an 
exceptional being that is closely linked to the cult of death. Heroism is the norm. The fascist 
hero aspires to death as the ultimate reward for a heroic existence. As Antonio (Boys) argues: 
‘Who dies or is a victim of this State in our groups is not forgotten and will be always 
remembered.’ The heroes celebrated by Italian UltraS are people who fight for their ideals. 
Their heroes are the deceased – their ‘fallen’ are those such as Paolo di Nella;118 others are 
the ‘victims’ of the DASPO or those imprisoned for being UltraS. As Eco (1995) notes for 
those devoid of alternative social identities, Ur-Fascism, presents a privilege of being born 
with a sense of nation going back to the Roman Empire, of being Italian, the inheritor of 
these ancient and venerable values, cults and histories. Significantly, the Boys and Irriducibili 
sport the colours of the Italian flag in their merchandise.  
The UltraS have parallels elsewhere. For many, modern society lacks meaningful 
relationships, beliefs, strong values and a sense of place (Klapp 1969, p. 318). In modern 
cities, there is an absence of strong identifications for a strong point of reference. In this 
context, many correlate themselves with the most unlikely of individuals and movements. 
The Boxer recognises this fact. He describes his reason for the response that it provokes:  
 ‘When we speak about issues such as the Palestine Intifada and Saddam Hussein’s 
Iraq they do not like it; they do not like political topics at the stadium because they 
could create a consensus; this scares politicians who cannot control votes. This is the 
reason for the strong police repression….’  
 
In distant places, obscure texts, and myths of origin are found amongst narratives and 
practices. The UltraS aspire to such texts and myths, even if their origin has no relevance to a 
Roman or Italian context. Their sympathy for the Irish Republic cause arises out of their 
seeing Ireland as a nation that forever resists an imposed discourse via myth, legend and song 
- and ultimately violence.  The Irish nationalist populations celebrate the warrior; the 
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 Paolo Di Nella is considered by Italian neo-fascists as one of their martyrs against the communists. He was 
honoured in 2005 by the former centre-left Mayor of Rome, Walter Veltroni, with a street dedication in a 
historical Roman park. In February 1983, Di Nella was acting as a member of the Youth Front (the youth 
movement of the fascist political party, the MSI) placing posters at Piazza Vescovio, aiming to raise 
environmentalist issues concerning the preservation of the historical park of Villa Chigi. He was attacked by a 
group of the extreme left who struck him on the head. He died after seven days in a coma. Cf. 
http://archiviostorico.corriere.it/2005/maggio/15/Rinasce_Villa_Chigi_con_viale_co_10_050515103.shtml 
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nationalist murals are admired, stressing, as they do, a sense of identity through symbols, 
non-conformist heroes, and national (and submerged) identities. The Palestinian cause offers 
the same admiration-logic. Such support is not required, it is what such people symbolise that 
matters. The wish of the UltraS to be heard and counted is evidenced by Giovanni‘s 
articulations (Irriducibili): 
I can tell you even more; for a while, a well-known and popular extreme left-leaning 
newspaper [Il Manifesto] dedicated articles about us and praised us for our social 
battles against drugs and paedophilia; ironically they said we were fascist that did not 
know how to be communist. How ignorant! Many do not know the social doctrine of 
fascism has many things in common with the revolutionary left.  Unfortunately in 
Italy fascism has been always depicted as reactionary whilst in origin it was nothing 
like that; unfortunately these things are taught in history books that our children study 
where many things are represented following dominant ideology, … for us, 
communism has been reactionary while real fascism was revolutionary.’ 
 
The ideology of the Italian neo-fascists, as expressed by the UltraS, has potential in the 
Roman (and in the Italian) curve. It has revolutionary power and has found in the stadium an 
outlet. As Giovanni elaborates: 
‘Until the emergence of our group, everyone thought that the typical UltraS was an 
imbecile who goes to the stadium to watch the match, perhaps drunk and seeking 
violence. We want to send a message to the public; the Irriducibili showed the public 
that UltraS can think beyond football. We did this firstly with our fanzine and then 
with our radio programme. Via these tools, we can express our opinions and defend 
ourselves from media attacks; this was the main reason why we started radio 
programmes.  The fanzine pushed the Irriducibili thought at the games, our radio 
show keeps it alive all week.  We wanted to underline that the Irriducibili are Lazio 
UltraS but they are also citizens wishing to have their opinions heard.  We have been 
pioneers; we tried to make other UltraS realize that we are a potent lobby and we can 
make a difference at the elections.’   
 
 
Giovanni’s’ statement stresses the status of the Agorà of the Olympic stadium. Agorà is an 
ancient Greek term meaning public meeting place (Camp, 1992). It is a location in Ancient 
Greece that is intended primarily for public assembly. Only later was it also used as a market 
place. Agorà is the location where the oikos (private dimension) and ecclesia (public 
dimension) meet.  It is the location where private problems are dealt with in a meaningful 
way.  This locale is used to articulate, not just to draw narcissistic pleasures or to search for 
some relief through public display, but to collectively seek the tools that are powerful enough 
to lift individuals from their privately suffered misery. It is the space where ideas may be 
born, take shape and be considered the ‘public good’. It pursues the ‘just society’ or at least 
provides comfort in a sense of ‘shared values’ (Bauman, 1999). The Italian football stadium 
is one of the few remaining Italian modern social Agorà. It is a site where not only football, 
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but also ideological opinions – often the antithesis of notions of political correctness – and 
direct actions are freely expressed in the pursuit of a wider consensus and resistance. Todde 
affirms this: 
‘The football stadium allows us to bring our battles -via the media- to 40 million 
Italians. Before in the stadium you would rarely find socio-political issues raised by 
UltraS. It is the only place that we can speak freely about our ideas without being 
charged with subversive association. In other places, we would be repressed. We are 
people that do not want to be made stupid by consumerist repression; we want to 
discuss and to confront. The stadium ends are ours and here we can express who we 
are and impose our rules. We go to the stadium and articulate our ideas because the 
State does not allow the individual to freely speak out because of rampant political 
correctness. We fight this lack of freedom mainly with negative campaigns, but when 
the State allows us to express our values, we also send constructive and positive 
messages.’ 
 
In their Agorà -stadium, the UltraS have a liminal arena for the public performance of 
stigmatised behaviour. In ritual and display, they have words and symbols and, similar to 
Rappaport’s (1979) debate on religious protagonists and performance, the believer ‘gives 
substance to the symbol, as the symbol gives him form’ (p. 200). The Agorà -stadium 
becomes for the UltraS another means of identification; it can be considered at the same time 
a place for the outlaw and socially excluded and a locale where the UltraS can resist 
repression. Football support coupled with a strong ideology induces notions of the 
‘Fundamental’, but as Vrcan and Lalic (1999) have argued in the context of post-1991 
Croatian football and football-related political ideology, the escalation of conflict makes it 
possible to die because of symbolism. 
 
*** 
 
This section aimed to make sense of the complex social forces that motivate the 
Irriducibili and Boys. The roots of the political ideology which inspires the UltraS lifeworld 
is oppositional, as in all Italian neo-fascist youth groups. The main patterns of the UltraS 
reasoning namely the non omologazione, authenticity, Tradition and adversion to Modernity, 
and the ‘Warrior Spirit’- together with the UltraS way of conceiving issues related to national 
identity and race- unveil the ideological but also cultural traits of what can be conceived as 
the UltraS communitas. To completely make sense of any UltraS group, though, it is 
important to locate them in a wider context considering the increasing diffusion throughout 
Italy of similar gatherings and their common strategy of opposition to the police and the 
State.  
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The notion that can be used to summarise this section is that of ‘Framing’. The UltraS 
are constantly ‘Framing’ their messages. ‘Framing’ and ideology are two sides of the same 
coin to interpret the UltraS way of life. They are different but connected (Corte and Edwards 
2008). While ideology – supported by culture – represents stability and provides certainty and 
values to social groups, ‘Framing’ is flexible, unpredictable and is responsible for the 
construction of their meanings (Corte and Edwards 2008; Snow et al., 2004). When opposing 
the ‘others’ or fighting their battles, the UltraS make choices and erase some information; 
this process is what Goffman (in Corte and Edwards, 2008) identified as ‘impression 
management.’ Put simply, the UltraS package the reality, leaving out what does not fit and 
keep that which can create a consensus. ‘Framing’ is the key, for example, to understanding 
the UltraS recruitment dynamics among the curve.The framing of social stigma and the sense 
of persecution create a consensus in the group and serves to proselytise their cause to the 
Italian neo-fascist world. Todde explained that many youth with neo-fascist ideological 
sympathies approach groups such as the Boys identifying with their plight, enraged by what 
they perceive as a police persecution against fascists. 
‘Framing’ processes have implications not only at micro but also at macro level. In 
the current Italian social and political context, the curva and, more generally, the football 
stadium, re-affirms its social status and function as an Agorà , a site of communication, one 
of the few surviving places in which a group may jointly express sentiments of rebellion and 
collective identity. The UltraS ideology is meaningful; they are organised and interact both 
locally and nationally, they are present throughout the country and are able to mobilise 
themselves to fight common ‘enemies’. A climate of hate and vendetta ensues, diffusing 
progressively among the whole Italian curve led by the UltraS, which has repercussions for 
the Italian public order. 
To understand these extreme youth gatherings, we need also to consider that the 
members of the Irriducibili and Boys shape their own world that is constantly delimited. This 
domain includes two major actors: ‘we’ (the UltraS) and ‘the others’ who are deemed 
outsiders to their way of life. This attitude is particularly important in the evaluation of the 
UltraS racist dimensions.  As found in studies conducted on the Italian extreme right youth 
movement (Klandermans and Mayer, 2006), the UltraS never admitted with me to being 
racist. They were offended by comparisons to Nazis. Federico (Irriducibili) rejected 
accusations of racism and provided the following story in response: 
 ‘I am against anyone who calls me a Nazi! What I do not like are people who come 
to my country and commit crimes; Albanians and Romanians are destroying Rome 
 163
with their camps. I am not racist. One day, I was waiting in my car at the traffic light 
for the green and, as usual, there was a young female gypsy who was trying to clean 
the car window screen and was asking for money.  Suddenly, a municipal police 
officer (traffic police hired by the Mayor with less power than ordinary police and 
who are usually not armed) started to mistreat the girl. I jumped out of my car and 
almost kicked his arse.  I hate injustice! ‘ 
 
In this account, the anti-system stance of the UltraS was stressed over and above racial 
prejudice. Such an account shows the complexity of the racist dimension. Their racism exists; 
it is expressed in the stadium and it has different dimensions. It is ritualised, it is ideological 
(specifically prejudice towards the ‘Jews’ always identified as ‘Zionists’) and reflects the 
broader worries of many Roman-Italian citizens regarding the State’s mismanagement of 
illegal immigration (especially from Eastern Europe), which is widely perceived as a threat to 
the security of the city. However, the root of their racism is ‘oppositional’. The Boys and the 
Irriducibili are hostile to anyone outside of their world, regardless of race and credo and this 
is one of the most important traits they have in common with other Italian UltraS. As they are 
popular in the curve and connected nationally we can, therefore, hypothesise the emergence 
of both a social movement and a common oppositional strategy against the media and the 
police. It is on these dynamics that the final part of the study focuses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 164
SECTION C 
THE ‘WARRIORS’ AND THEIR FOES 
 
           
 
 
Fig.45: The UltraS and their foes 
 
 
Offering a road map to live by and narratives to act within, the UltraS ideology and 
culture define the boundaries of the possible.  While the Italian neo-fascists try to promote 
their ideology within society, the UltraS consider themselves bearers and promoters of this 
ideological ‘way of life’ within the Italian curve. The football stadium, therefore, remains 
dangerously the most important Italian mediatic piazza, as a result, one of the most efficient 
Agorà of the 21st century Italian youth socialisation.  
By locating themselves against the dominant values of Italian society, the UltraS 
require and acquire a symbolic and ideological system to act as a guide to action. Symbols 
and tales motivate the logic of both the ‘elite’ and ‘sympathisers’ and fuel their hostility to 
the ‘deceiver’ media and the ‘oppressive’ arm of the State namely the police. Chapters 11 and 
12 conclude this thesis by investigating the relationship between the ‘warriors’ and the people 
and institutions that they identify as their enemies.  
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Chapter 11 
 
Contested meanings: the Italian Media and the UltraS  
 
 
Football in Italy is not only a significant cultural practice; it is also an important 
industry. Over the past few seasons, Italians have spent millions of Euros on admission 
tickets for football matches and football magazines and on the football betting game called 
Totocalcio.119 If we compare that amount of money with some of the nation’s biggest 
industries, football finds itself close to the top. His Holiness the Pope, in his Sunday Angelus, 
has repeatedly spoken about the powerful effect that football exerts on any Italian province 
and Italian social life generally. The common saying that football is the foundation of the 
State exceeds the meaning. Nowadays such a relationship is felt more than ever. During the 
Campionato  di Serie A ( the major Italian football Championship) one finds a common 
Sunday scenario: following lunch, families and friends gather in football clubs or bars with 
pre-paid TV channels, or at home to watch TV or listen to the radio. One can witness the 
same story every Sunday, and hear from bars the commentator’s voices particularly via the 
radio programme Calcio Minuto per Minuto. Following the match, the requisite TV broadcast 
of 90th Minuto presents the first interviews of the coaches and players, accompanied by the 
Schedina and the hope for a point’s accumulation numbering 14 in the Totocalcio lottery, for 
a fortune in winnings. The comment Scusa, Scusa Ameri (Excuse, excuse me Ameri) heard 
among friends is frequently said, imitating a phrase often used during the football radio 
programme of RAI120 Tutto il calcio minuto per minuto (All Football Minute by Minute) by 
the now-deceased sport journalist Enrico Ameri to announce that a goal has been scored in a 
Sunday Serie A match.  
The link between football and the media is very strong and this is particularly relevant 
in Italy (Porro 2001, 2008). The Italian media, for instance, have greatly contributed to the 
popularisation of the ‘beautiful game’. Media have a tremendous influence on supplying 
publicity and creating the need for advertisements. Equally, football influences the media: it 
is the reason why many newspapers exist. Not everything in this relationship is constructive; 
the saturation coverage of football by the Italian media has created some dysfunctions; 
among these, we find the triviality of many sport talk shows that in content resemble barroom 
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 The Totocalcio is a prize contest. The punter, using the betting card (schedina), must predict the outcome of 
14 football matches every Sunday. 
120
 Radiotelevisione (RAI) is Italian State  radio and television broadcasting. 
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debates. Heated arguments (and even brawls) among sports journalists frequently occur on 
such shows.  At times, such behaviours are promoted, as they improve the audience ratings. 
One sports talk show, hosted by journalist Aldo Biscardi,121 exemplifies this trend. The tone 
of the commentators and conversations has progressively worsened in recent years. Triani 
(1994) argues that in Italian TV sports, broadcasting there is a constant disappearance of 
intellectuals, meaning that to be heard, the commentators adopt simplifications bordering on 
vulgarity.  
Three Italian newspapers give extensive coverage to sports (especially football): la 
Gazzetta dello Sport, il Corriere dello Sport and Tutto Sport. Moreover, on Monday, all 
Italian newspapers focus on the Sunday football league results. Many national and satellite 
TV channels dedicate entire programs to the games, their tactics, results analyses, and trivia. 
One can find regional and local televisions focusing on their local teams and fans; these 
broadcasts are often led directly by hardcore football supporters. It is in this context that radio 
programs such as the Irriducibili and Boys’s la Voce della Nord   (the Voice of Nord) and 
Giallorossi  si diventa (Yellow-Reds) emerged and became popular in the Lazio region in the 
late 1990s.122   
 
11.1 The voices of the reason? 
 
The media have extraordinary power in today’s society, not only to make ‘things 
visible’ but also to manipulate what people think (Entman, 1989).They provide definitions 
and explanations, and present both problem and solutions (Cavender 2004;Cavender et al. 
1993). The media portray real or ‘supposed’ dangers, giving people the opportunity to react, 
to protest and to be actors in the subsequent outrage. They particularly help in shaping 
opinion and orientation in relation to deviant behaviours and crime. (Cavender, 2004).  With 
this in mind, an analysis of the media-UltraS (and hardcore football supporters) relationship 
needs to be attempted. My starting point focused on a central question: How do the UltraS 
perceive the media? Among the Boys and the Irriducibili, the media provoked strong 
sentiments. These were not without ambiguities. Generally, the UltraS had an avoidance 
relationship with the media: ‘we avoid [overtone of disdain] speaking to the press. The group 
has its hierarchy and needs to have only one public voice. The only one who has media 
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 The television broadcast title il processo di Biscardi (the Trial of Biscardi) is broadcast every Monday after 
the Sunday football matches and since 2006 is hosted by channel 7 Gold.  
122
 The broadcasts were used to advertise the UltraS pensiero (i.e. values, opinions) about football but also about 
political and social issues. Moreover, listeners could hear stories around the groups’ social initiatives. 
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contacts is the ‘big boss’ (Boys). Giorgio (Irriducibili) never failed to stress his and the 
group’s dislike of the Italian media; for him the media discriminated against the UltraS and 
specifically against the Irriducibili. Considering them hypocrites, Giorgio could not 
comprehend why they focused on the Irriducibili’s display of the Celtic crosses (which he 
admitted were not only a Christian symbol but also a neo-fascist one) but at the same time 
failed to stigmatise football players (such the Livorno’s striker Cristiano Lucarelli) for 
displaying tattoos of communist icons like Che Guevara, or groups that openly supported 
communism. Communism for Giorgio committed as many crimes against humanity as 
Fascism. 
The UltraS also considered the media as an ally of the forces of their repression. The 
Media acted as a tool to serve the interests of the ‘system’. They also believed that media 
money was the main reason why Italian football was lacking in values. This was a common 
feeling, not only among the UltraS studied, but also by a large part of the Italian hardcore 
supporters groups regardless of ideology. This attitude, however, contains a strong 
contradiction; while ostensibly fighting the media, the UltraS aim to be in the stadium 
because it is the only place where, because of the media coverage, they can be visible and 
heard in promoting their way of life, their ideology and, in the case of the Boys and the 
Irriducibili, their struggle against societal and football institutions.   
In November 2008, three well-known Italian sport journalists were interviewed with 
the purpose of explaining their viewpoint on the UltraS phenomenon and the relationship 
between their trade and the UltraS: Franco Arturi (deputy director of  la Gazzetta dello Sport, 
an historical and popular Italian sports newspaper); Giuseppe Tassi123 (sports journalist and 
deputy director of Quotidiano.net); and Gabriele Marcotti (journalist of The Times and of the 
Rome based Corriere dello Sport -another major national sport newspaper). The interviews 
allowed them to reply to the UltraS accusations and to explain their points of view about the 
UltraS phenomenon. From these interviews, two patterns of inquiry emerged around the 
media-UltraS dynamics; one we might term ‘alarmist and interventionist’ (Arturi and Tassi), 
the other ‘skeptical’ (Marcotti). 
Asked what he thought about the hardcore football supporters and more specifically 
the UltraS phenomenon, Arturi argued the following: 
 
‘We should not be afraid of words such as ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorists’; for example 
when a person commits a crime, he/she is a criminal. In Italy we tend to be tolerant 
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 Cf. http://club.quotidianonet.ilsole24ore.com/tassi 
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and to use meaningless formulae… we in fact seem not to criminalise… . I argue that 
if anyone imposes fear in a curva and masterminds a strategy of terror then he is a 
terrorist. The curve enjoy territorial immunity; the police do not enter these locations 
because they are strongholds of these groups.’  
 
Tassi took a similar line and called the UltraS group ‘young thugs disguised as football 
supporters’. Arturi, more than Tassi and in accord with most of the national press, identified 
the groups (often without any distinctions between them and ‘ordinary’ supporters) as 
‘outcasts’ from the Italian ‘civil’ society requiring strong State intervention to control them. 
In addition, Arturi, in defending his hypothesis of associating the UltraS with terrorism, 
argued that ordinary people in the curve were expropriated from their seats and the stewards 
or the police could do nothing about it. In his opinion, many Italian stadiums events 
resembled anarchy: there were no rules and the curve were dominated by groups who chanted 
horrible slogans and exposed disgusting symbols. The accusation that the situation is akin to 
anarchy highlights a hasty observation of the journalist with regard to the social world of the 
curve. There are indeed words spoken and chanted that many would not agree with; that said, 
the curve have historical customs and norms justifying specific behaviours that an outsider 
can understandably perceive as illogical. In the curva the principle of seniority, for instance, 
is strictly respected by groups regardless of ideology. Such seniority highlights the supporter-
team connection, and is considered by the fan as a badge of loyalty. If an individual has 
occupied a seat for many years, then that seat, regardless of its number, is considered 
‘reserved’. This process does not follow the dominant reason of the wider society, but it is 
perfectly logical to both the ‘ordinary’ curva supporter and the UltraS.  
Another source of contention between the UltraS and the media was the groups’ 
involvement in social campaigns. During his leadership of the Boys, Paolo Zappavigna was 
the main promoter of these campaigns. The first such project was focused around agitation 
for a national referendum to abrogate law No.40, 2004, which regulated assisted procreation. 
The law banned testing on human embryos and prohibited more than three embryos from 
being implanted in a womb simultaneously. The law also forbade fertilization by the use of 
semen or ova provided by persons other than the couple. Zappavigna collected signatures 
proposing a referendum to abrogate the law. He did this in the curva sud and convinced 
groups therein to create a huge banner urging people to sign the referendum. These actions 
helped the protagonists reaching the necessary target signatures for a 2005 referendum to 
proceed. However, due to pressure from the Catholic Church, technical confusion around the 
issue and the effectiveness of the oppositional campaigners convincing people not to vote 
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(only 25.9% voted), the law remained unchanged (La Repubblica –online- 13 June, 2005). 
The second cause Zappavigna tried to support was that of the Argentinian Desaparecidos.124 
In doing so, he invited into the curva sud Estella Carlotto, a representative of The Abuelas de 
Plaza de Mayo (Grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo) and collected monies for their cause in the 
curva sud.  
The Irriducibili were not only against paedophilia and against drugs, as previously 
documented, but they also aimed to raise public awareness on other issues, as Giorgio 
explains: 
‘We help a dog refuge near Rome for mistreated and abandoned dogs; we got 
involved five years ago because they did not have funds and the refuge was about to 
be closed and the dogs killed. Now the place is a safe haven supported by Laziali. We 
also help an association in the fight against tumours in children; we donated to the 
hospital Bambin Gesu’125a machine called the ‘Retcam Photography System’ to help 
diagnose tumours and complex eye diseases126.  They invited us to a dinner and once 
there received from us this very expensive machine. We also collaborate with the 
Italian Anti-Tumour Association. We are involved in the fight against vivisection; we 
have thought to do as many do in the UK to go to the university/drugs companies labs 
and free the animals. We are against vivisection especially when testing for 
cosmetics; we have also financially supported people who lost their homes when their 
building collapsed in Rome [he did not remember the date during the interview]; in 
that occasion, Lazio supporters lost their lives. We are available to any socially 
worthwhile battle; we have a radio and a television program that is open to any cause 
if we can help. Just to have one of us on the radio speaking about the initiative is 
helpful.’127 
 
The response of the Gazzetta dello Sport’s journalist to such projects was dismissive; Arturi 
compared such gatherings to the Mafia and dismissed the campaigns as ‘ordinary’ good 
actions any citizen would undertake. He rejected the accusation from the groups that the 
media did not advertise their social campaigns but only their violence, and affirmed that 
when such groups were involved in social campaigns his newspaper informed the public. 
Nonetheless, he dismissed the campaigns as a publicity stunt conducted to ‘buy’ a sort of 
immunity for the groups’ violent acts. Arturi maintained that the press had to fight the UltraS 
because in Italy ‘we live in an emergency state.’ Tassi spoke from a more moderate stance 
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 The term literally means ‘disappeared’ in Spanish and is applied to people arrested for ostensibly political 
reasons by the police of the Argentine Junta of the 1970s and early 80s. It is estimated that between 1976 and 
1983, up to 30,000 dissidents went ‘missing’. The Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo (Grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo) 
are mothers and grandmothers of the "disappeared". Since its foundation in 1977, the organization has also been 
searching for over 200 "disappeared" children, some born in clandestine detention centers during the captivity of 
their mothers or "disappeared" with their parents after being taken into custody by members of the police or 
security forces.Cf. http://abuelas.org.ar/italiano/storia.htm 
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 A hospital in Rome internationally renowned in treating children’s diseases. 
126The two initiatives were also acknowledged by the newspaper Il Manifesto (issue 04/06/03) ; a popular 
national newspaper that propounds a communist ideology.  
127
 Giorgio refers to the radio broadcast, La Voce Della Nord . 
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and tried to differentiate supporters. He argued that the press had the right to strongly 
denounce the violence of mindless thugs like the UltraS and the degeneration of the tifo, but 
needed not to dismiss the good side of the hardcore supporters’ movement. Tassi believed 
that their choreographies are an integral part of the footballing show and contributed to the 
‘good’ atmosphere of the stadium.  
It would be incorrect and naive to consider the media as ‘evil,’ as many UltraS and 
hardcore supporters would argue. On the other hand, the same risk of being accused of 
naiveté is evident if we analyse, without a critical eye, the Italian media coverage of events 
connected with these 21st century ‘folk devils’ (Cohen, 1980). As Todde argues with some 
justification: ‘they [the media] seldom write the real fact; they do not understand the UltraS 
phenomenon in its entirety and most of all are superficial and lazy in researching and 
understanding.’  
It is, therefore, important to recognise that the media, in their function to inform, link 
events together; they build or ‘map’ events into larger, wider frameworks of meaning so that 
viewers come to ‘know’ more than just what is happening. From that knowledge viewers and 
listeners also construct ‘pictures of the world, scenarios of action.’ (Hall, 1975 in Doran, 
2008, p.198). Two examples suffice here: one relates to the UltraS studied, the other concerns 
the hardcore football fans of Naples (who are not generally ideologically oriented). These two 
examples underline the risk that the exercise of the mandate to inform can bring.  
The first instance illustrates one of the flaws of certain Italian press and its inclination 
to readily identify conspiracies. The episode in question occurred at the final game of the 
2003-2004 Serie A season between Roma-Lazio. The match saw normal pre-match mingling, 
accusations and boasting between the rival fan groups, augmented by mutual chants of abuse 
and occasional missile throwing in the stadium. What was unprecedented was the mass 
confrontation between the forces of the law, clad in their designer riot gear, and the 
momentarily united ranks of Roma and Lazio supporters some 60 minutes later. This Roman 
fan alliance, which Arturi in our interview defined as ‘unnatural’, was unique in terms of the 
numbers and anger involved but not unusual to the participants. The uniqueness originated 
from the nature of the event. The dynamics around this 2004 fixture were bizarre. In the 
second half, a rumour circulated in both curve that, in the pre-match mêlée between fans and 
police outside the stadium, a police vehicle had struck and killed a young boy. This rumour 
had the effect of transforming the vociferous antagonism between both sets of supporters and 
the police into an open conflict. The police subsequently faced attack from angry UltraS 
throughout the Olympic Stadium. The police responded with baton charges. The two football 
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teams, clearly in shock over the happenings on the terraces, stopped play shortly after the 
beginning of the second half when smoke bombs were let off, making it difficult to watch 
events on the pitch. In the hiatus, three men in their 30s – Roma UltraS – entered the pitch. 
One put his arm on Francesco Totti’s shoulder, the Roma captain and Italian international, 
and spoke with him demanding he lead the players off the pitch (thereby suspending the 
match) both out of respect for the dead and in a show of protest against the supposed police 
brutality.  The next 20 minutes made for global debate. Totti discussed matters with Lazio’s 
Serbian-born enforcer, Sinisa Mihajlovic. The referee, sensing their fear, approached the pair 
and in typically macho language encouraged the pair to continue playing. Meanwhile the 
public address system broadcasted denials that a child had been killed. In the chaos, Totti 
spoke to the AS Roma coach, Fabio Capello. His words were recorded as stating: ‘If we play 
on now… they’ll kill us’ (Panorama –online- 22 March, 2004). Sensibly, the majority of 
players did not want to continue. The Prefetto di Roma, (the highest provincial authority of 
public security) then entered the pitch demanding the referee and players restart the game in 
the interest of public order. The referee then took a call on a mobile phone from Adriano 
Galliani, the President of the Italian League; after a short conversation, the game was 
abandoned. The police were powerless in this football context. By the end of the night, 15 
fans and 60 police were reported to have sustained injuries and some 36 fans were arrested. 
The interruption of the match brought global notoriety to the city of Rome and Italian 
football. Several Italian newspapers ran headlines the day after, which compared the UltraS 
to the Sicilian Mafia. The following ‘discourse’ published by the Italian magazine Panorama 
reported the tifosi invasion in the following impressionistic fashion: 
 
‘They approach Totti threateningly and spoke agitatedly to the captain. Sky’s 
[Murdoch’s television channel] camera operators were sent away as if they were 
spying (which is an unacceptable violation of the right of information). The players’ 
faces are perturbed and frightened; it is not possible to hear it but the scene suggests 
that they have been threatened.’ (Panorama –online- 22 March, 2004) 
 
An important trait of media discourse is their ability not only to reflect reality but also to 
construct it; expressions of reality are often used to construct representations that fit a 
particular ideology (Fairclough, 1989). According to Fowler (1996), ideologies are, amongst 
other discursive structures, articulated in lexical processes. Even if the journalist admits the 
impossibility of listening to the conversation, expressions such as ‘perturbed’ and 
‘frightened’ direct the reader to an assumed scenario.  
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The three main UltraS, Stefano Carriero, Roberto Maria Morelli and Stefano Sordini, 
who had entered the pitch from the terraces, were arrested as they left the pitch. Days later, 
the Roman magistrate Giorgio Maria Rossi released the three from police custody arguing 
that they had not threatened Totti. The supporters had entered the pitch to inform Totti of the 
(false) death of the boy and asked him to abandon the game so that fans could go home and 
therefore the angry reprisals against police would cease. Whilst entering the field of play is 
not permitted under the regulations of the Italian Football Federation, the circumstances at the 
Olympic Stadium did not belong to the realm of normality.  The UltraS had shown the nation 
watching TV on a Sunday evening that in some situations they had enormous power, they 
strongly denied the media’s theory that they had organised the episode to show their power. 
The three UltraS also denied having threatened Totti. Francesca dismissed the plot 
allegations as silly, arguing that if she would have known that the Boys and the other UltraS 
were planning to destroy the stadium and attack the police she would not have gone to the 
Olympic Stadium. The Boxer instead accused the media in this occasion of being infami: 
‘They just wrote what they wanted without even asking us what we thought and our 
version of the story. If the Irriducibili are involved there is surely something ‘dark’ 
behind it. Almost every journalist behaves in the same way ; when we plan a nice 
show in the curva with banners, choreographies either they will not cover it or will 
minimize our work; if instead there are problems at the stadium is our fault we are the 
mindless thugs, the fascists, the delusional; I say instead they are the scum.’ 
 
After a few days of online research seeking to find out more about the epilogue of the 
episode, I discovered an article of La Repubblica- dated 2007 and  titled ‘ The suspended 
derby was not a plot, the magistrates established the facts about the 2004 match’ – that 
informed the reader: 
 
‘The magistrates beliefs after nearly three years of investigations were crucial to the 
fate of the seven Roman fans suspected. All the serious criminal charges (among 
these private violence and incitement to disobey the laws of the State) were dropped 
while they still faced minor charges  of violations of the law on the safety of the 
stadiums and creation of panic which will be prescribed only a pecuniary fine.’ (La 
Repubblica –online- 05 February, 2007) 
 
Oversimplifications about bad practice of the Italian media would be inappropriate here; 
nevertheless, this is an obvious example of the media’s ability to re-present reality creating 
meaning via a careful selection, presentation, organisation and re-construction of the news 
(Hall,1982,  in Juris, 2005, p.422).  
Another episode involving media coverage - this time non-ideologically oriented- 
occurred at the first match of the 2008-2009 season. The respected Italian journalist Oliviero 
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Beha reported the episode in his popular blog.128On the first match of the Serie A season, 
Roma and Napoli drew (1-1). The media informed the public of 1500 hardcore Neapolitan 
fans attacking a train station in Naples, forcing 300 passengers to get off the train. Four 
controllers of Trenitalia (the Italian state railway company) were reported as being wounded 
and the train was apparently damaged and looted. At their arrival at the Roma Termini 
railway station, the aggressors were said to have thrown paper bombs and tear gas. Trenitalia 
estimated the damages at 500,000 Euros. The Italian newspapers carried the headlines, 
‘Naples’ ultra’ owner of the train: Trenitalia: damages for 500,000 Euros’; ‘ultra’ out of 
their minds, trains and train stations destroyed’ (La Repubblica –online- 31 August, 2008). 
Beha was the only journalist to publish the account of the German sport journalist 
Reinhard Krennhuber who was also chief editor of Ballesterer FM Radio. Krennhuber, 
together with his colleague Jacob Rosenberg, had travelled with the Neapolitan hardcore fans 
to Rome for the match. Krennhuber, when asked about what really occurred that day in his 
interview with Thomas Hirner of the DerStandard.at,129  stated: 
‘Firstly, it is incorrect to say that the fans of Naples threatened and pushed 300 
passengers to get off of the train; we also did not see any train controllers attacked. 
The train should have left at 9.24 am but after 11 am trenitalia representatives came 
aboard to advise the passengers to leave the train and take another one. We left at 12, 
30 with a train completely full. When we arrived, the match had already started by 52 
min; it is a shame the fans had paid for their train and stadium tickets. The frustrated 
fans started to demolish the toilets but I am unsure how such damages reached 
500,000 Euros...I cannot imagine why a person should loot a train; what is there so 
important to loot? I also find it strange the news about the tear gases at Termini.’ 
 
 
The journalist of the DerStandard.at130 asked Krennhuber if they were afraid; he 
answered: 
 
’We did not fear the Naples fans, they had not attacked the police in the train station 
nor at the stadium, because they knew what was at stake…  The allegations that the 
incidents were planned and orchestrated by the fans or even by the camorra 
(organized crime organization of Naples) seem totally absurd.’ 
 
Krennhuber concluded:  
 
’In the future, I will believe even less the news of Italian media about clashes 
involving fans. There is an enormous discrepancy between what we experienced that 
day and what the media reported. All day we did not meet a fellow journalist. The 
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 Cf. http://behablog.it/ 
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 Derstandard.at. (2008, September 04). Schikanen bewusst geplant?. Retrieved January 14, 2009, from http:// 
derstandard.at/?url=/?id=1220457342474 
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 Derstandard.at. (2008, September 04). Schikanen bewusst geplant?. Retrieved January 14, 2009, from http:// 
derstandard.at/?url=/?id=1220457342474 
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media had not done any research on the spot; they are collecting information from the 
local authorities. In addition, in their coverage the fans’ version is not taken into 
account or only minimally. Raiuno (the Italian equivalent of the BBC) was the only 
broadcaster to permit the fans and ordinary people to speak, instead of just politicians 
and representatives of various authorities on the facts. The versions of the fact from 
the ordinary people and the fans are similar to ours'.131 
 
In his interview, Krennhuber portrays the Italian media as too lazy to find out what really 
occurred and too reliant on the ‘spin’ of authority. It is difficult not to notice that 
Krennhuber’s argument is similar to many UltraS opinions about the media. 
The example of the Naples fans illustrates the media’s process of ‘encoding’ (Doran, 
2008). According to Hall et al. (1978), journalists have easy access to the versions of events 
given by individuals or institutions in positions of power. These groups become the ‘primary 
definers’ of crucial society issues because they have privileged access to information out of 
the sight of the public (Doran 2008; Hall et.al. 1978). Deviant actions and their coverage are 
often shaped around the perspectives of the ‘primary definers’. The primary definers interpret 
the event creating a dynamic by which, ‘the first interpretation is discursively powerful and 
extremely difficult to alter, once established’ (Hall et al. 1978, in Doran, 2008, p. 201). In our 
analysis of the media, we also need to be cautious in characterising them as passive 
recipients. Once the journalists receive the primary definers’ versions, they act to select and 
shape these viewpoints; as a result, they are not merely passive tools in the hands of the 
powerful. Events are ‘coded’ in each paper’s own mode of address and into its public idiom; 
the media often adapt the tale of the primary definers using versions of reality that fit into the 
common language used by the ‘average joe,’ giving further strength to discourses 
characterised by ‘popular force and resonance’ and ‘naturalising’ these views for the 
audience (Doran, 2008). Moreover, both examples mentioned earlier underline the role of the 
Italian media as agents of moral resentment (Cohen, 1980). The media-UltraS dynamics (and 
more widely the whole of the hardcore football fans), however, cannot be completely 
understood using just Hall’s hypotheses; it is complex and multi-dimensional. An excess of 
media coverage is also another issue in this highly complex media-UltraS relationship; dense 
coverage is a dysfunction that may become dangerous. The excess focuses mainly, but not 
exclusively, on negative actions, real or perceived. This trend appears to be rooted in two 
factors; the first is economic, namely the need to sell news. The other is specific to the UltraS 
identity, notably their logic and characteristic as an oppositional movement. Two different 
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opinions emerged from the interviews with the Italian sports journalists. From one side, 
Arturi did not mention any problems related to an excess of coverage even if he rightly 
underlined the difference in quality of the coverage according to the skills of the journalist: 
 
‘The press - I would add the ‘good’ press, because as always in life there are the 
average journalists, good journalists and bad journalists – is one of the pillars that 
underpin a democratic country, these ‘Mafiosi’ see the police and the media as an 
obstacle to their criminal business. If the press intervene strongly it is due to living in 
a state of emergency.’ 
 
The third journalist Gabriele Marcotti, though, held a different view: 
 
‘Violent acts from hardcore fans receive less coverage in the UK media than in Italy. 
For example, two years ago, Chelsea and Tottenham fans fought and 13 Tottenham 
fans were wounded and ended up in hospital; if you search, you will find only brief 
reports.  I do not remember any Italian match ended with 13 fans wounded but I 
imagine, if this episode had occurred in Italy, the press would have covered the event 
for ages. If we want to be cynical we could say that broadcasting channels such as 
BBC and SKY do not cover the phenomenon so much to avoid damaging football as 
a product and business. We can also say that they do not want to encourage an 
emulation process. When the Italian inspector of  police- Raciti- tragically died , the 
Italian TV channels showed the episode millions of times; I am not sure how 
necessary this obsessive coverage is; can this instead have an opposite effect?’ 
 
While Arturi’s statement argued for the supposed ‘emergency’ situation that justifies an 
excess in media coverage, Marcotti pointed out an ‘obsessive’ coverage of negative episodes 
involving not only UltraS but also any hardcore-football fans. Marcotti’s argument is 
supported by the literature (Marani, 2003).  
The first, apparent, justification of the Italian media coverage of the UltraS 
phenomenon might be best explained by the statement ‘bad news is good news’. Fights 
between rival fans are more likely to be reported than the UltraS campaigns against 
paedophilia. A more articulate explanation might help focus this issue. According to 
Cavender (2004), the pleasure that audiences draw from crime stories comes from the eternal 
battle between good and evil. Such stories ideally contain, as protagonists, heroes (the State, 
the police and the media) and villains (the ‘mindless’ football thugs). This representation is a 
constant feature of news about crime. The media increases the tension/drama between the two 
forces, which is good news albeit hardly ‘fair’ coverage. 
 
‘This similarity of presentation produces a unity of narrative themes about crime. 
Crime, in the real world, but also as depicted in the media, becomes a part of the 
agenda of public discourse.’ (Cavender, 2004, p. 339) 
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In their presentation of crime/deviant news (such as those involved the UltraS) a clichéd 
scenario ensues. The tension has to be built up; the enemy is defined. The drama is then 
played out and the public’s interest is used to justify all subsequent coverage. 
The other possible explanation focuses on the specificity of the UltraS having a dual 
vested interest, not only as hardcore football fans but also, as this study explains, as a 
‘genuine’ neo-fascist extraparliamentary groups motivated by a logic of ‘action’ and 
opposition against the Italian authorities. As stated previously, the UltraS consider 
themselves outside the ‘system’. They, hence, need the Agorà of the stadium and seek, via 
this location, the possibility of mass audience in their struggle for visibility (Juris, 2005). 
Confrontations, together with banners and fanzines based on ideology, are a good means to 
attract media attention, which then decontextualise and  re-shape the events to highlight the 
UltraS criminal or deviant traits (Gitlin, 1980), augmenting in this way the UltraS sense of 
injustice and marginalisation.  The militant nature of the UltraS encourages the media to 
represent any aspect of their protest as dangerous. Their symbolism, ideology, and 
warrior/rebellion spirit does not provoke inquiry but seems only to help the media 
constructing them as a threat to the social order. Arturi, commenting on the UltraS, 
considered them: ‘more than terrorism, this is Mafia! Within the stadium, there are Mafiosi 
attitudes. The contempt shown for journalists can be only understood in this context’. 
Therefore, groups of militants, such as the UltraS, increase the media discourses of fear and 
terror, and serve to justify a strong repression that at times involves not only the UltraS but 
also ‘ordinary’ supporters. This type of coverage, on the other hand, can strengthen the very 
phenomenon, especially considering the nature of communitas of the UltraS where there is a 
strong group identification based on ‘a shared ordeal’. This media strategy can work to 
increase the cultivation of perceived stigma (Corte and Edwards, 2008). Once again the 
stigma – discrimination element plays a central role in understanding the dynamics between 
the UltraS and the ‘others’ including the media. As Marco argues:  
 
‘We tend to defend the young guys of 17/18 from the control and labelling of the 
State; you must understand that being an UltraS and being a neo-fascist can be 
devastating for the future of these guys. In Italy, there is not a democracy; we are 
guarded and filed by the police; we do not expose these youngsters to this danger 
even if we fight; the direttivo is in the first row; the young follow. We do not want to 
expose them when they will have the maturity they will choose; we do not want to let 
them become attached to a label so they will not be discriminated against like many 
of us are.’ 
 
The risk of reinforcing their discourses of persecution and discrimination is real.  
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                                                                     *** 
 
In a study of the Italian neo-fascist militants carried out by social scientists Milesi et 
al. (in Klandermans and Mayer, 2006), the data stressed that the crucial element, which 
motivated the participants to join the ‘action’, was the discrimination suffered by those who 
embraced this ideology.  Similar to the UltraS, the young participants underlined 
discrimination during their adolescence or early adulthood at high school and university.  
Milesi et al. argued that such discrimination did not discourage them from identifying 
themselves in public as fascist. In fact, it had the opposite effect, reinforcing such 
identification.  In the past, these perceptions have brought the UltraS to act together against 
oppressive institutions.132 This type of coverage might, as Corte and Edwards (2008) point 
out, reinforce the claims of marginalisation made by the UltraS, and supports their vision of 
being the righteous victims of persecution perpetrated by a system-wide conspiracy. The 
sense of ‘being against’ creates tension, anger and hate that could develop into new forms of 
attack against the State. Concomitantly, this type of coverage also contributes to promoting 
the underdog discourse that can help recruitment in the curve (Corte and Edwards, 2008).  
While this study does not suggest in any way to restrain the democratic freedom of 
the media to inform the public, it proposes a more balanced use of media coverage as a 
strategy to contain the UltraS violence in light of not only this study but of findings  and 
experiences in other countries. For instance, a negative correlation was found between a 
decrease in media attention and the violent actions of Austrian hardcore football fans 
(Marani, 2003). Perhaps the British attitude towards this phenomenon, which the journalist 
Gabriele Marcotti supports, could be exported to Italy.  
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 For example the derby in 2004,  has no precedent in football history, even during the Italian period of the 
‘bullet years’. 
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Chapter 12  
 
Dura Lex Sed Lex: The Response of the ‘system’ 
 
‘Le squadre ferme nel centrocampo sulle gradinate scoppia l'inferno,le squadre ferme nel 
centrocampo sulle gradinate scoppia l'inferno…. [The teams stop at the centre of the pitch, in 
the terraces there is hell]. 
 
FRANA LA CURVA FRANA SULLA POLIZIA ITALIANA, FRANA LA CURVA FRANA SU 
QUEI FIGLI DI PUTTANA [The terrace collapses on the Italian Police, the terrace collapses 
on those sons of bitches]  
 
Volano calci, pugni e spintoni, macchie di sangue sugli striscioni! [Kicks, punches, shoves 
fly; blood stains on the banners!] Volano calci, pugni e spintoni, macchie di sangue sugli 
striscioni!  
 
FRANA LA CURVA FRANA SULLA POLIZIA ITALIANA, FRANA LA CURVA FRANA SU 
QUEI FIGLI DI PUTTANA  
 
Se deve esserci violenza che violenza sia ma che sia contro la POLIZIA!!! [If there must be 
violence, ok but against the Police]. Se deve esserci violenza che violenza sia ma che sia 
contro la POLIZIA!!!!  
 
FRANA LA CURVA FRANA SULLA POLIZIA ITALIANA, FRANA LA CURVA FRANA SU 
QUEI FIGLI DI PUTTANA.  
 
Digos...........BOIA  [DIGOS……SHIT] 
Digos...........BOIA  
Digos-Digos-Digos............BOIA-BOIA-BOIA 
 
 
The chant above, sung by Gli Hobbit - one of the best known Italian neo-fascist rock 
groups - is a popular song among the UltraS. The song’s words depict the level of anger 
against the Italian police. Giorgio attempts to articulate this rage: 
‘Football is based on business and people like us have become trouble. They have 
tried to sterilise the environment; they try to make the experience of watching a 
football match like going to the cinema. We live with passion, feelings, with ideals – 
this is our way of watching football. We are not against the police who punish those 
who throw bottles on the pitch or who create violence but this has to be proven; 
justice cannot be discretionary. People get banning orders without being proven 
guilty….’ 
 
The Italian police forces have, for decades, found themselves as the bulwark against 
football related disorders. They have endured a high price in terms of both resources and the 
deployment of manpower. In this spiral of violence, involving reactions and counter-
reactions, the police have increasingly become the focus of the anger of the UltraS. In return, 
the police have sought to enact increasingly repressive legislation created to combat their 
attackers. Over a five-year period (2003-2008), 1,114 incidents involving fans and police 
were documented, equating to 222 per year (one per day when one takes public holidays and 
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feast days out of the equation). Resulting from these incidents, 5,388 injuries were recorded; 
6,000 people were arrested and 2,000 were charged; and 20 people have died in 
circumstances related to football disorder since 1963.133 Furthermore, in the same years 
(2003-2008) other alarming data were published by the National Center for Information on 
Sports Events (CNIMS), a body of the Department of Public Security of the Ministry of the 
Interior. They indicate that 574 police officers were injured during this period.134   
Following the Heysel tragedy135 in August of 1985, a permanent multi-disciplinary 
commission was established by the Italian Ministry of Interior. The commission was 
composed of the Chief of Police, the President of the Italian National Olympic Committee-
CONI, the Director-General of National Professional League, the Secretary General of the 
Federation Football -FIGC, and a representative of the Serie C league. This commission was 
truly a crisis unit established to address football fan violence. In 1988 (again at the Ministry 
of the Interior), a joint commission was formed - with the participation of the Ministry of 
Tourism and the FIGC - for the preparation of legislative proposals against violence related to 
sporting events. The Italian Parliament had to take into account the post-Heysel framework of 
pan-European policing cooperation. Consequently, on November 1, 1985, the Convention on 
Violence and Disorders of Spectators at Sporting Events came into force.136 It is in these 
contexts that later laws against the UltraS (and neo-fascist manifestations in the Italian curve) 
should be understood.  
In June of 2006, the Ministry of the Interior 137 presented an intelligence document 
compiled by the Squadre Tifoserie (fan units) of the DIGOS. According to this report, of the 
487 football clubs comprising some 80,300 supporters, nearly half - 245 - expressed a 
political orientation (71 to the extreme right, 61 to the moderate right, 34 to the extreme left, 
and 87 to the moderate left). Some extreme ideological factions were recognised in the 
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document as having been involved in ideological propaganda and proselytism, specifically 
the distribution of fanzines with a political content. The report also recognised the presence 
of the UltraS in political events, as well as their participation in criminal activities with no 
apparent link to sporting manifestations. This should not come as a surprise to the reader. 
Some form of protest was enshrined in the very existence of the Italian State, and some of it 
was criminal. Football was not an exception. What was exceptional was the realisation that 
the UltraS had provoked the Italian State to hire people for the specific purpose of stopping 
them. For example, the Sezione Tifoserie (Fans Unit) -which collected data on the UltraS, 
exchanged such information and coordinated the activities of the Digos - was established by 
the Italian Ministry of the Interior. The personnel in the Fan Unit sought to develop a 
systematic intelligence-gathering activity focusing on links between extreme ideologies and 
football fandom. In pursuit of this, the Fan Unit was in weekly contact with representatives of 
official fan clubs and constantly monitored their supporters. The police were often covert in 
their methods as they collected and collated information and intelligence on the more 
secretive UltraS. At times, they sought both assistance and assistants from inside such 
gatherings. The figure of the informer in police and security services was ostensibly regulated 
by the criminal law, which aimed to balance the needs for discretion (i.e., the judge cannot 
oblige police to reveal the names of their informants) and transparency. In the latter pursuit, 
the legal system could not use the information in a court of law if the informants were not 
available to be examined as witnesses. The ability to pay such informants was not prohibited 
by law, and police could use such monies according to their organizational practices.138 The 
police have never revealed the extent of the use of informers against the UltraS. 
 
12.1 The Italian Anti-UltraS legislation 
 
The first law dedicated to confront football violence was introduced in December of 
1989 and become known as No. 401. The legislation was, in part, a response to an event that 
occurred earlier the same year, when Antonio De Falchi died from cardiac arrest caused in no 
small part by an attack from Milan hardcore football supporters during the Milan-Rome 
fixture (Cf. Mariottini, 2004). The first part of the law, however, focused on tackling illegal 
betting on football matches. The second part aimed to prevent and suppress violence around 
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 The status of and procedure around the role of informer has been recognized in Italian courts. "The police 
and secret services informers are usually paid or obtain other benefits - providing them occasionally, but 
systematically with intelligence.” Cf. Judgement No. 36720 of the Courte di Cassazione (Supreme Court) on 
June 12th,  2001. 
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sporting competitions.139 Over the years the law has been frequently modified in an attempt 
to make it more applicable and rigorous. Unfortunately such changes have complicated 
matters; modifications have invariably been the products of urgent Decrees – Laws issued by 
the government and changed at a later date, usually with modifications by the Parliament.140  
Such ad hoc intervention has created a large body of laws and modifications of pre-existing 
laws that have proved difficult to implement, though this often occurs in Italy. As the 
hardcore football supporter phenomenon changed, so did the law. The UltraS movement 
emerged at the beginning of the 1990s. During this period, racist and anti-Semitic discourse 
became evident in the Italian curve. The government and Parliament, with good reason, 
responded by passing measures attempting to repress such objectionable manifestations. Law 
No. 401, aimed specifically at repressing the neo-fascist UltraS, was modified via decreto 
legge (Decree-law) in June 1993 to contain specific criteria for punishing expressions of 
racial, religious, and ethnic discrimination. 141 This law also permitted the arrest of 
individuals attempting to bring into the sports arenas emblems or symbols of associations, 
organizations, movements, or groups having as their aim the incitement of racial hate and 
discrimination. This crime was punishable by arrest and between three months to one year in 
custody if convicted – a penalty that increases proportionally with the severity of the offense. 
However, the legislation and concomitant stadium surveillance did not deter all of those it 
was designed for.  
A central piece of legislation in the anti-UltraS armory appeared in 1995, when Law 
No. 45 introduced the DASPO. The prohibition of access to places where sports events take 
place was a power given to the Questore (local Police Chief); such a DASPO could be 
imposed on anyone convicted of crimes and, more controversially, on those not arrested or 
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 Decree-Law, No. 122, art. 2, comma 2, 1993; it was  converted with modifications into Law No. , 205, 1993. 
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convicted in a court of law but considered instrumental in episodes of violence.142 In reality, 
the DASPO could be imposed by the Questore irrespective of convictions or complaints 
against the person. The Questore could, therefore, demand that a person provide - in writing - 
the address of the place where they may be found during sports events. The Questore could 
then require the person to appear once or more during a specified period in a police station 
during the day of the sporting event. The DASPO could also be applied to minors aged 
between 14 and 18 years who were considered threats to public order and safety. It might be 
enacted around places where sports events were held or places of transportation of football 
supporters. Violation of the DASPO and non-attendance at designated ‘sign on’ police 
stations might result in a custodial sentence lasting between one to three years, or a fine 
ranging from 10,000 to 40,000 Euros (Law No. 410, art. 6, paragraph 6, 1989). Arrest is also 
permitted in the case of breach of the terms of the DASPO (Law No. 410, art. 8, paragraph 1 
bis, 1989). Pending trial, the courts could ban access to the places where sports events were 
held. The DASPO was strongly opposed by both the entire hardcore football supporters’ 
movement and the UltraS.  
In 2001, Law No. 401 was modified again following the death of a Messina fan who 
was killed when struck by a petard thrown by rival fans during a match with Catania.143 
Amongst the most important elements of this change was an increase in DASPO timescales 
and duties. Those subjected to a DASPO were now to appear at the police stations on one or 
more occasions at pre-established times. The potential length of the DASPO was also 
increased from one to three years. The application of the DASPO and the obligation it 
brought to appear at a police station could be issued by the court for between two to eight 
years’ duration. Guilt was assumed and redress was very difficult. The Constitutional Court 
(Judgment No. 512, 2002) affirmed the constitutionality of the DASPO obligation to appear 
at a police station. Simultaneously, the court remarked that the Questore was required to 
check the need and urgency of the DASPO order, as well as the satisfactoriness of its 
contents in terms of duration. The court also allowed a judge to assess whether the DASPO 
was (and remained) necessary. The judge could simultaneously order the perpetrator to 
undertake socially useful activities for the benefit of the community. When I asked Dr. 
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 According to the interpretation of the law, sporting events were defined as any competition taking place 
promoted by sports federations and the institutions and organizations recognized by the Italian National 
Olympic Committee (CONI). The measure may also be applied for misbehavior around sporting events taking 
place abroad in other EU member states. 
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 Decree-Law No. 336 , 2001; it was converted - with modifications – into  law in 2001. Cf.  Gazzetta 
Ufficiale  No.  245 October 20, 2001 
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Mazzilli (President of the National Observatory on Sport Events of the Italian Ministry of the 
Interior, ONMS) about the legal nature of the DASPO and its efficacy, he replied: 
 
‘The DASPO is an ‘atypical’ prevention measure applicable to a specific type of fans 
judged dangerous for the public security. The DASPO can also be issued for sports 
events taking place abroad and it can also be imposed by authorities of other Member 
States of the European Union for sports events taking place in Italy. The constant 
application of DASPO, in recent years, has allowed to ban from the stadium 
dangerous individuals who had committed violations of the Italian laws that 
safeguard public security at sports events. At the time of this interview, 4185 
DASPOs have been issued and the measure has successfully tackled violence at 
football matches.’ 
 
Law No. 401 was modified yet again in February of 2003144, via the introduction of 
the controversial arresto differito (deferred arrest). The deferred arrest enabled the detention 
of those suspected of involvement in football related violence up to 36 hours after the 
perpetration of the crime (based on video-photographic evidence or other, never defined 
‘objective elements’). The Decree-Law also prohibited fans from bringing smoke bombs and 
petards into the stadiums. Transgression was punishable with arrest, and if found guilty, 
custodial sentences ranging from 3 to 18 months and fines of up to 500 Euros. Some of the 
amendments permitted the police to act as both judge and jury. For example, Article 6 gave 
the police the power to prevent individuals from entering the stadium if the local Questore 
considered them dangerous based on the elusive concept of ‘intelligence.’  
Five days after the February 2007 death of the police inspector Filippo Raciti 
(following the violence instigated by UltraS against police forces at the end of a Catania-
Palermo match); the Italian Government issued the Decree Law No. 8. This law had a 
severity without precedence in Italy145. Decree Law No.  8 increased and strengthened 
previous anti-UltraS measures. Law No. 41, 2007, demanded that football matches scheduled 
for stadiums that had not been structurally updated (following the terms of Decree Law in 
2003) would henceforth take place ‘in the absence of spectators.’ The decision was to be 
made by the Prefetto following the recommendations of the National Observatory on Sport 
Events. The law also became more punitive for fans caught in the stadium or in nearby 
parking or transport areas with petards, batons, and blunt objects. Those arrested and 
convicted faced imprisonment ranging from one to four years, the punishment increased if the 
crime delayed the scheduled start or caused the cancellation of the match. The punishment 
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 Converted into Law No. 88, with modifications in  2003. 
145
 http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2007/04/04/stadi-sicuri-pene-piu-dure-adesso.html 
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would be increased by up to an additional half if any such act caused personal injury. 
Furthermore, the law limited the number of tickets any single fan could purchase to four and 
maintained the prohibition on football clubs selling blocks of tickets to visiting fans. On the 
back of every match-day ticket was now a message stressing the obligation for the buyer ‘to 
respect the rules of the stadium’ as an essential pre-condition for entry. Fans were also 
required to show a valid identity card (checked by stewards at the stadium entrance) as part of 
the admission criteria. Fines ranging from 5,000 to 20,000 Euros could be imposed upon 
stewards who fail to implement the law. The clubs were charged with the responsibility of 
issuing and selling tickets individually numbered and matched to a seat. The sale of tickets on 
the day of the match was prohibited. Breach of this law was punishable with fines ranging 
from 2,500 to 10,000 Euros. The law also forbade clubs to give discounted tickets or any 
other benefits to fans convicted of football-related offences; the penalty was a fine issued by 
the Prefetto ranging from 50,000 to 200,000 Euros.  
In 2007, the Italian government explained that the problem of controlling fans in the 
stadium was linked to the difficulty of managing sports facilities, almost all of which were 
owned by local authorities and entrusted to clubs for football matches. For these reasons, the 
government intended to work towards a system of structures characterized by clearly 
identifiable liability. With the support of the Parliament, the government identified the 
regulatory measures affecting the safety of the stadiums that remained unrealized or 
circumvented since 2003. 146 The negligence of these measures was implicated in the shadow 
of police Inspector Raciti’s tragic death. With a few exceptions (such as the Olympic Stadium 
in Rome), football stadiums are the property of their respective municipalities. They are lands 
and structures given in concession to the custody of the clubs. This situation has made for a 
problematic scenario involving the application of safety procedures, notably due to 
uncertainty about who has to bear the expenses of implementing structural changes and the 
wages of safety personnel. Arising out of the debate over Raciti’s death, the control of 
behavior in the stadiums was effectively privatised with governmental stipulations. The 
management of order and public security inside the stadiums became the obligation of the 
football clubs, under the supervision of the Gruppo Operativo di Sicurezza (GOS - Group 
Operations Security) and police commanders.  The GOS147 are essentially responsible for 
football stadium safety management, which includes all responsibilities demanded by the 
Questore.  As of February 2008, all stadiums with more than 7,500 seats were required to 
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 Decree-law No. 28, 2003; it was converted into Law No. April 24, 2003. 
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. Cf. Allo stadio con gli steward (September 2007). Polizia Moderna .Roma: Ministry of the Interior Press. 
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have at least one steward for every 250 spectators, as well as a coordinator for every 20 
stewards. Failure to comply with these regulations brought the threat of closure. Stewards 
were required to search fans as they entered the stadium.  
The regulation of fan inflow and outflow was also tasked to the stewards. The 
stewards enforced the norms specified for the use of the sport structure and the behavioral 
obligations as prescribed by the law. In execution of such duties, the law confers upon them 
the status of public officer; any assault upon them is treated as an assault on a police officer. 
The stewards’ tasks were a product of collaboration with the police, who were required to be 
promptly informed of any problems that might interfere with public safety. Institutions that 
provided steward training had to be certified by the ONMS. When I spoke to journalist 
Franco Arturi, he indirectly criticised the introduction of the stewards in the stadium. He 
observed that the presence of the police in the stadium was now less visible, especially in the 
curve still under the control of the UltraS whom he memorably identified as ‘terrorists’. I 
asked Dr. Mazzilli his opinion about Arturi’s remark; in answering he focused on the 
introduction of the stewards: 
 
‘Via the introduction of the stewards - they have started to operate since the 1st of 
March 2008 - in the Italian football stadiums, the police forces are displaced outside 
the stadium. It is not the responsibility of the police to be in the curve, the stewards 
have the function of hospitality, management and control of fans, obviously in 
collaboration with the police forces.’  
 
Other procedures were promoted to change the relationships of fans with clubs and players. 
The tessera del tifoso (fan membership card), launched by the ONMS (together with CONI, 
FIGC and the Italian Football League), began in March of 2008. Promoted as providing a 
number of benefits for subscribers, the card gave priority for purchasing tickets, provided for 
dedicated entry gates, and created a category of ‘official’ and ‘loyal’ supporters. Individuals 
subjected to DASPO were excluded from any official relationship with the clubs.  
The anti-UltraS legislation is characterised by an over-production of laws and ad hoc 
passing of special legislation that ,not only have proved difficult to implement, but tends to 
increase the sense of victimisation of the ‘ordinary’ fans and, most importantly, the neo-
fascist groups. This has increased their hostility towards the Italian State. The 
disproportionate number of laws in Italy is a widely known problem; it was a topic during the 
last 2008 electoral campaign, which saw the former Mayor of Rome, Walter Veltroni, 
representing the centre-left Partito Democratico (PD-Democratic party) and Silvio 
Berlusconi, candidate Prime Minister for the centre-right Popolo delle Libertá. In the 
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electoral program, Veltroni underlined his commitment about controlling the production of 
new laws and decrees to avoid what he negatively termed the ‘Italian legislative jungle.’ 
Veltroni stated that there were currently 21,000 laws in Italy - five times more than in 
Germany and double that of France. To reduce the progressive bureaucratization of the 
legislative system and make the application of the laws more efficient, fast, and certain, the 
PD proposed to abrogate 5,000 laws by the end of 2008, to reduce all the laws and State’s 
rules to just 100 testi unici, and to limit specials laws to 1,000 (La Repubblica –online- 31 
March, 2008). 
The overproduction of laws added to the inefficiency of the Italian justice system; 
court processes are also notoriously slow. The recent Eurispes Report148 of 2007 titled 
‘Giustizia al Collasso’ (Collapsed Justice) focuses on this very problem. The average 
duration of the judicial process is some 35 months (i.e., three years) for processing in the first 
instance and 65 months (i.e., five and a half years) if the case went to appeal. During the 
period from 2001 to 2004, civil cases increased by 64%, and those in the Court of Appeal 
increased by 122%. The Corte di Cassazione saw a rise in hearings of 33%. Criminal cases 
increased by 16% in the Istruttoria Fase - 60% in the first instance, and 24% on appeal. A 
rise of 4% was recorded for the Cassazione Court. In 2007, there were no fewer than 10 
million legal cases pending (4 million civil and 6 million criminal); a further 700,000 final 
sentences were still not completed. The Eurispes data further reported that the justice system 
was heavily in debt, and its financial resources were inadequate to meet the needs of state 
prosecutors. The total debt of the Ministry of Justice amounted to 250 million Euros. 
According to the Eurispes, the populace did not trust the justice system, and a sense of 
insecurity came with that absence of trust. The consequence was voters’ cynicism, which, 
regardless of their political sympathies, ranged from 80% of those sympathetic to the center-
right to 60% preferring the political left. 
The inadequacy of the justice system also hit the UltraS of this study, contributing to 
the current amplification of the rage of the movement. The leadership of the Irriducibili – all 
interviewed in this study – was arrested in 2006 and detained in prison for more than eight 
months. In the eyes of the Italian UltraS, four Italian citizens had been subjected to the abuse 
of the Custodia Cautelare (Preventive Custody) legislation. This case was highlighted in the 
Italian parliament in December of 2006 by Paolo Cento (an MP for Verdi - Green Party), the 
Vice Minister for the Economy; Antonio Buonfiglio (MP Alleanza Nazionale); and Sergio 
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D’Elia (Secretary of the MP’s Chamber (MP for the Radical Party with an extreme left past), 
in a petition to the Minister of the Sport, Giovanna Melandri. The document was also signed 
by two other MPs, Mauro Murgi and Paola Frassinetti (AN), and Paola Balducci (Green 
Party). In February of 2007, the latter three articulated their opinions in the pressroom of the 
Italian parliament.  Buonfiglio argued that the four UltraS had been imprisoned for more than 
100 days, and that the silence from the Italian media was quite strange. Cento focused on the 
anomaly of this provvedimenti (internment without trial), claiming that pre-trial preventive 
custody was used to such an extent that would have been not tolerated in any other civilised 
country. Cento declared his confidence in the magistrates but argued that, in the Italian justice 
system, the pre-trial detention should be the exception; instead, it is a common practice. He 
argued:  
‘The four leaders of the Irriducibili are an emblematic case. Our [Cento and 
colleagues] appeal is to put the case under the magnifying glass; they, like any 
citizen, have the right to a fair trial without prejudices. It is important to assess 
whether there are conditions for ending such preventive custody.  ‘149 
 
D’Elia added to this consideration, stating:  
‘This morning [01/02/07] I spoke with the  Irriducibili leaders, for the fourth time in 
45 days. I found them nervous and anxious due to their experience. Their prison is a 
sort of ‘advance’ for a crime eventually committed: they have been not even called in 
for process… This case of the 4 Lazio fans is an ‘ordinary’ example of the Italian 
administration of justice, or perhaps non-administration. A citizen has the right of 
certainty of the length of justice. A judgment in 4 years would be unfair because the 
length of justice or has to be contemporary with the facts [to be judged] or is an 
injustice. This state has 40% of prisoners awaiting trial… the guys are not saints, they 
have made mistakes and sometimes used violence, but they are not potential 
extortionist… What I want to emphasize is that they have been found guilty already 
in the press and via public opinion they are already guilty - and for this there will not 
be any compensation for the damages suffered; the only proper place to determine 
whether or not they are guilty should be the court. The only compensation possible is 
that if convicted the length of justice should be made as short as possible.’150 
 
The accused are currently facing a very long process, while at the same time, paradoxically, 
the Irriducibili’s accuser and victim has also been charged by the Italian justice. In 2009, the 
president of Lazio, Claudio Lotito, was condemned to a two years custodial prison and fined 
65,000 Euros for the same ‘supposed’151 crime of market agiotage of a financial operation 
related to the SS Lazio in 2005 (Corriere della Sera –online- 03 March, 2009). 
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 The term “supposed” is used because the four Irriducibili have not been yet considered guilty and condemned 
by an Italian Court. 
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12.2 Italian Models of Policing 
‘…What is the objective of policing? What is the meaning of prevention? How should 
we evaluate police discretion? What is the meaning of community, etc.? Stated 
differently, the choice of a police model should give a detailed answer to the 
question: What kind of policing do we want? In this sense, a police model always 
implies statements concerning values, objectives and norm.’ (Ponsaer, 2001, p. 470) 
 
The prevention and repression of violence in and around sporting events are tasks 
given to the somewhat intricate Italian public security arrangement.152 These tasks are 
designed to protect the freedoms and rights of citizens, the maintenance of public order and 
the protection and preservation of property. Further duties seek to enforce compliance with 
laws and regulations (be they State, regional, provincial, or municipal) and the provision of 
emergency assistance in case of disasters and accidents. The apex of this system, at a political 
level, is the office of the Minister of Interior, who is responsible for national public security 
and the preservation of order and public safety. The Minister coordinates – with the 
assistance of the provincial public security –the activities of the Italian police forces. The 
Minister is assisted in the exertion of these powers by an advisory body of the National 
Committee of Order and Public Safety. Crucial to this task in each province is the titled office 
of Prefetto and Questore. To this end, they control the provincial police and coordinate their 
activities. In exercising power, the Prefetto calls upon an advisory body – the previously 
mentioned Provincial Committee – for advice on order and public security. The Questore has 
the task of the technical management, accountability, and coordination of public order and 
public safety. The Prefetto and Questore will inevitably use police for this purpose. To ensure 
security at football stadiums, the Italian State commits on average 10500 law enforcement 
personnel to the task. Of these 10500, 6300 are drawn from territorial forces (local police in 
whose remit the stadium is situated). An additional 700 are drawn from special police forces 
(transport police, dog units), and 3500 are from specialist reinforcement units, of which some 
66% belonged to the anti-riot units of the State Police and 34% belonged to the Arma 
Carabinieri153. The deployment of police personnel over the past five years can be 
summarised by the following tables. 
 
                                                
152
 Cf. Art. 1 (Powers of Public Security Authority); T.U. of laws of Public Security and Art. 24 (Institutional 
Functions of the State police), Law No. 121 April 1, 1981. 
153
 Details derived from an interview with Dr. Francesco Tagliente former President of the National Observatory 
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Table 1. The use of the Italian territorial police forces during the Football League 
championships  
 
CHAMPIONSHIPS 
SERIE 
2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008 
(up to 
5.11.2007) 
A 23,780 27,276 23,603 23,551 28.263 
B 25,918 19,253 20,137 23,626 15.367 
C 29,340 27,030 26,275 24,336 22.484 
TOTAL 79,038 73,559 70,015 71,513 66.114 
 
Table 2. Police Mobile units used as back up during the Football League championships 
CHAMPIONSHIPS 
SERIE 
2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008 
(up to 
5.11.2007) 
A 14,287 15,085 13,043 13,978 13,599 
B 13,345 8,856 10,648 13,245 6,475 
C 6,706 9,266 9,057 8,701 7,507 
TOTAL 34,338 33,207 32,748 35,924 27,581 
 
There are also entities created to work specifically for the prevention and repression of 
violence at sporting events. As underlined earlier, the most important is the l’Osservatorio 
Nazionale Sulle Manifestazioni (National Observatory on Sport Events; ONMS), located at 
the Ministry of the Interior. The OMNS was established in 1999 and institutionalised by law 
in 2005.154 It is composed of 13 representatives of sport institutions and police forces with the 
right to vote and notify public security authorities of their assessments of public disorder in 
order for decisions to be made.  
The OMNS has recently seen its powers increased. Via 2007 legislation155, the 
following functions were tasked to the existing body: a) to monitor the phenomenon of 
violence and intolerance occurring at sporting events; b) to monitor the safety of Italian sports 
stadiums; c) to examine problems linked to scheduled sporting events and assess the levels of 
risk to the public presented by such competitions; d) to promote initiatives for the prevention 
of violence and intolerance in collaboration with sport associations, fans club, and local and 
national government; e) to define measures that could be adopted by the sporting societies to 
guarantee the safety of  sporting competitions; f) to publish an annual report on the 
phenomenon of violence and intolerance at sporting competitions. The OMNS also has the 
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power, via legislation passed in September of 2007156 to implement the use of the stewards in 
sports stadiums, as well as the procedures for their training and qualification. The ONMS 
introduced a threat level classification for each game based on specific indicators: the 
characteristics and structural requirements of the stadiums, profiles of the fans (based on 
historical precedence, previous conflicts, and recent behaviors), the type of game, the 
consequences of the result, and the possible link to other events. The ONMS then make 
suggestions to the provincial public security authorities, who usually implement them. In 
such tasks, the ONMS is supported by the Centro Nazionale di Informazione sulle 
Manifestazioni Sportive (The National Center for Information on Sports Events - CNMS). 
The CNMS has been operating since 2002, and is similarly located at the Department 
of Public Security of the Ministry of Interior. The CNMS collects analyses and processes data 
on football spectator violence. It is also the national contact point for the exchange of both 
domestic and international information around the policing of football. The establishment of 
CNMS was in response to the Council of Europe’s concerns over security around 
international football. One strong recommendation was that national governments establish 
national football intelligence centers. The consequence of such powers and policing 
personnel was the end of spectating as it had been known for decades. The ONMS 
established criteria and procedures to regulate banners and other material held by fans whilst 
in the stadiums. 157 These include materials for creating choreography, i.e., drums, percussion 
instruments, and other means of disseminating sound. The ONMS regulations permitted only 
flags bearing the colors of the club teams or those of countries represented on the pitch in 
international games. Banners that displayed a content which manifested racial discrimination, 
violent messages, or anything considered to be of an ‘offensive nature’ were banned. Also 
banned were megaphones, flags that might impair other fans sight of the pitch, and all 
material not authorized in advance by the police.  
The match-going experience changed even upon entering the stadium. By 2007, all 
football clubs were required to provide stewards holding metal detectors at the stadium 
entrances. Furthermore, electronic computerised technology was required to check all 
admission tickets. The installation of CCTV cameras externally and inside any sport facility-
stadium capable of holding more than 10,000 spectators was also a prerequisite for obtaining 
a ground license. The route taken to this state of affairs was part of the action/reaction that so 
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typified legislation pertaining to football-related disorder. It is also important to note that in 
any evaluation of the Italian public order policing system, confusion is the first and most 
challenging barrier to overcome. The presence of five national police forces158 on top of 
local/municipal police forces makes for great difficulty in applying theoretical models to real 
life situations. Nevertheless, it is safe to conclude that the model that best fits the Italian 
policing situation is Ponsaer’s (2001) ‘military-bureaucratic’ model. All policing entities in 
Italy are organised using a military style hierarchical structure where little is left to discretion 
and more is left to the ethos, ‘you will do this because I tell you to.’ In this type of 
organisation, much is left to internal inquiries and very little to external accountability. The 
most important form of external accountability is provided by the Italian magistrates, who 
intervene when disciplinary procedures are required. Internal inquiries are more valued than 
external, but in some cases this presents a risk because, as Ponsaer argues, the logic of such 
engagement manifests the practice of: ‘When faced with a decision, find a rule; when a rule 
cannot be found, make a rule’ (p. 473). 
Witnessing the police forces in action against the UltraS underlines elements of the 
‘military-bureaucratic’ model. The first is legitimacy, which is the authority of a police action 
justified by the pursuit of an ‘absence of disorder’ (Cf. Ponsaer, 2001).  Consequently, 
physical force (at times excessive) is justified because it guarantees ‘peace’ in the wider 
community. The moral panics against the UltraS also justify the use of physical force; being 
evil means a police ‘beating’ is legitimate or at least unquestioned. At least in the case of the 
UltraS, the prevention strategy is linked with the logic of the bureaucratic model, which aims 
at efficiency and control as well as prevention (which, while valued, is used less than 
repression).Such procedures provoke reactions from those on the receiving end, Marco 
articulated the feelings of the Boys towards the police: 
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‘…when we see them attack our friends, or when they arrest them (and you know that 
once in custody the police will beat you up) you remember it. If one day some police 
become isolated from colleagues {during our scuffles] we will hit him and he will pay 
for everyone. I am angry; do you know that 90% of police officers use their baton 
reversed to cause more damage? They shoot tear gas at eye level and if you fall when 
they charge, they kick you. After the derby, there was a group of Laziali and 
Romanisti - 500 against 200 police - and there were several charges and at every 
charge, some remained on the ground [unconscious].  In the course of these 
disturbances, a Guardia di Finanza officer went down; he received seven stab wounds 
and they broke a flashlight on his body. His police colleagues could not move; they 
could only watch. One of the big men of the UltraS threw the officer back to his 
colleagues saying: ‘take him back because he is not good even to set on fire’. It was a 
gesture of unheard of brutality but did not tell the full story. If the police ‘take you’, 
they ask you why did you hit our colleagues and they kick your face. We reminded 
them of this on a banner that read ‘pestaggi nelle carceri, pestaggi nelle caserme 
questa e la prova che tu sei solo un verme’ [Beating in the prisons. Beating in the 
police cells. This is the proof that you are a scum]. It is not just us…. The same 
brutality can be seen in the ‘No Global’ case and the Diaz school when there were 
many beatings. The difference is the ‘No Global’ are more powerful (and supported 
by the left) and so can publicise their cause better.’  
Research conducted in May of 2007159 indicated that the State Police, together with 
the Carabinieri, occupy the first place in terms of confidence given by Italian citizens. There 
are good reasons for such admiration. The Italian police forces, together with the judiciary, 
were crucial in the defeat of domestic terrorism of the 1980s. The Italian police were able to 
draw on the benefits of greater resources and advanced technologies to face complex crime 
phenomena that require more than uninformed police intervention. The subsequent 
investigations led to the capture of the murderers and the suppression of the groups they acted 
in the name of. The police were also crucial to the successful containment of the Mafia and 
other criminal organisations, via the capture of important fugitives such as the Mafia boss 
Totó Riina in 1993 and Bernardo Provenzano in 2000.  
Though they are trusted, the police have recently been involved in few football related 
controversies. In 2007 at the match of Roma versus Manchester United, the clashes between 
rival fans also saw police intervention. Manchester United accused the Italian police of 
brutality against their fans. The statement of the Manchester United FC officials was quite 
clear: 
‘The disturbing scenes witnessed in the Stadio Olimpico last night shocked everyone 
at Old Trafford. In what the club views as a serious over-reaction, local police handed 
out indiscriminate beatings to United supporters. In those circumstances, neither 
Manchester United, nor AS Roma is able to call the police to account. As a result, the 
club warmly welcomes the government examination of the incidents and will collect 
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witness statements from fans to submit to the Home Office.’ (Telegraph –online- 02 
March, 2009) 
 
In commenting on the Italian police action, the British newspaper The Independent argued: 
‘football is still a military operation {in Italy] where its policing is about containment of 
trouble inside the ground through the use, or threat, of violence’ (The Independent –online- 
08 April, 2007). 
To date very few police officers have been successfully prosecuted in an Italian law 
court for misdemeanors against football fans. Nonetheless, the nucleo mobile or Celere, 
which has been repeatedly on duty at the stadium, has been often accused of disproportionate 
use of force. The journalist of La Repubblica Carlo Bonini (2009) describes the lives of three 
real members of the Celere in his book. He explains the Celere’s world with one effective 
catchphrase ‘odiati e hanno imparato a odiare’ (hated and they have learned to hate).  
The nucleo mobile was successfully prosecuted in 2008 for excess use of force albeit 
not in relation to their policing duty at the football stadium. During the 2001 G8 meeting in 
Genoa , disturbances occurred between the Italian police forces and the international No-
Global movement.160 Disorder arose in different areas of the city, supported by a 
heterogeneous range of international groups ranging from anarchists to extreme left and right 
groups. The center of Genoa suffered damage estimated at millions of Euros, arising out of 
disturbances between protestors and police. The event will be remembered for the tragic 
death of protester Carlo Giuliani and the actions of the police at the Diaz School. The episode 
of Carlo Giuliani occurred in Piazza Alimonda when 15 protesters armed with batons 
surrounded a Land Rover with three Carabinieri aboard. Giuliani died when shot at close 
range by one of the officers. The Diaz School episode occurred on July 21 at the school given 
by the local authority as headquarters for the protesters’ cause. The police stormed the school 
after a group of police officers was attacked at a nearby school. The police suspected that 
inside were sympathisers of the Black Bloc. At the time of the police raid, 93 people were 
reportedly sleeping. All were arrested, the majority of them taken away with injuries - some 
serious. Weapons such as batons and chains were reportedly found on the premises. Many of 
those arrested accused the police of brutality. The Italian magistrate began an inquiry under 
the collective action taken by protestors. In 2007, all the Italian newspapers published the 
following quote: ‘It was like a Mexican butcher shop’ (La Repubblica –online- 13 June, 
2007). The comment was made by Dr. Michelangelo Fournier, the commander of the ‘settimo 
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 Cf. http://repubblica.it/dossier/genova/index.html 
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nucleo mobile di Roma-Celere’ (the seventh mobile unit of Rome; one of the Roman riot 
police units), which participated in the irruption at the Diaz School. He continued answering 
the questions of public prosecutor Francesco Cardona Albini: ‘During the investigation I did 
not have the courage to reveal such a serious behavior (referring to the police) because of my 
loyalty for the unit’ (La Repubblica –online- 13 June, 2007).In 2008, after seven years the 
epilogue of the judicial process saw 12 members of the settimo nucleo mobile di Roma 
condemned for the Diaz operation (La Repubblica –online- 13 November, 2008).  
This study does not aim to support the UltraS rhetoric that ‘frames’ all police as 
violent. There are situations in which police, especially anti-riot units, need to intervene with 
firmness for public safety. It is also quite naive to neglect the fact that episodes of gratuitous 
police violence occur all over the world. 161Furthermore, when such episodes have occurred 
in Italy, the State has been able to punish the perpetrators according to the law. That said, it is 
interesting to underline that the same police unit found guilty by the Italian justice was also 
the most evident expression of the policing strategy used at the football stadiums in Italy to 
contain the UltraS violence (Bonini, 2009). During the research, the UltraS never failed to 
compare their repression with the episode involving the G8, as Marco (Boys) details: 
‘We have almost every Sunday a small ‘Diaz’ episode.  In Orvieto 200 UltraS were 
put in a caserma [police barrack] and beaten up.  Against Napoli the year Roma won 
the scudetto, the police stopped our train at Torricola and all of us in the train were 
beaten up. The train was later stopped at Formia and when two police officers entered 
to inquire about 300 of us -perhaps they believed they were Rambo- they started to 
shoot their pistols at people.  I was at a fountain getting water and the people started 
to count the bullets. Someone more cunning than them knew how many bullets the 
guns had and then when they ran out of bullets..... [laughs]…[he did not say but 
implied the police office were cornered and beaten].’ 
 
12.3 The View of the ‘Persecuted’ 
 
The UltraS target the police forces, who are asked with the duty of applying the law 
against them. The latter have chosen the strategy of tackling the UltraS problem by the use of 
tough repression. Such a strategy has its own risks. The episodes of UltraS direct attacks on 
representatives of the Italian State, such as those occurred for instance following Sandri’s 
death, underscore the power and danger of an ideology like fascism rooted in a location such 
as the football stadium, which is attended by thousands of youth and is able to contain a mix 
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 The latest supposed example occurred in the UK ,in 2009, at the G20 protests in London. (Guardian –online- 
15 April, 2009)  
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of myths, values, and beliefs that can be collectively transformed into actions.  Figures 46, 
47, and 48 show an email sent to me in 2008 titled ‘The Real Infamy of the Italian State’. The 
email illustrates the rage of the UltraS after finding out that the officer who killed Sandri was, 
at the time of the email, still part of the transport police of Santa Maria Novella in Tuscany 
(he was later suspended and in July 2009 given a six year custodial sentence for the 
shooting).162  
 
 
Fig .46: the Outrage of the UltraS about Sandri’s homicide 
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 Cf. http://it.reuters.com/article/topNews/idITMIE56D0TD20090714 
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Fig .47: the Outrage of the UltraS about Sandri’s homicide 
 
 
Fig. 48: The UltraS ‘Anger (and threat) in rhyme 
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The last page of the email (figure 48) articulates possible threats to the police officer: ‘Santa 
Maria Novella (the location where the officer was working) coffin of Spaccarotella (the 
surname of the police officer); Gabriele with us!’ The last part of the email says: ‘He has 
killed a boy and sees not even one day of prison... And there is someone who stays in prison 
for months or years without any proof” (the email refers to the prison experience of the 
Irriducibili’s leaders).  
The email is another demonstration of the UltraS oppositional logic which has 
certainly subversive traits. The only difference with the Italian ‘revolutionary’ youth groups 
of the seventies (from the extreme left and right) is a clear lack of planning. What the UltraS 
express is at the moment just rage: anger against a State –and football system- that they do 
not respect and that to erase them. If the UltraS ‘Warrior Spirit’ is not understood (and why 
should it be by non believers?) unpredictable consequences may result.   
 
12.3.1 The Danger of the Curve Radicalisation 
 
Among the most controversial norms which aimed to target the UltraS and were 
enforced by the police are the possibility to forbid the fans’ banners and the, previously 
mentioned, DASPO.  I asked Dr. Mazzilli to articulate the first norm, he answered from a 
strictly procedural point of view without allowing any comments: 
 
‘The national observatory adopted this directive the 8th of March 2007. This 
intervention was necessary to protect the security of the spectators, athletes and 
referees and all the people involved in the management of the sport event. The rule 
forbids the introduction in all the sports structures of banners or any other related 
object used for the fans choreography if not authorized before hand by the Questore.’  
 
The response of the UltraS was quite clear; they believed that via such a procedure, the 
spectacle that is il calcio was finished. Actually the whole hardcore football supporter 
movement, ‘ordinary’ fans and the UltraS alike, have criticised the prohibitions, deeming 
them alarmist responses that do not respect the rights of the individual and manifest 
discriminatory policing.163  Particular criticism was also reserved for the DASPO mainly 
because they are imposed by the Questore (police) rather than a court of law and, whilst 
ostensibly subject to judicial review, have to date not been scrutinised by the Constitutional 
Court. Supporters mainly criticise the extension of Decree-Law Amato 2007 until 2010 as 
hopelessly open to abuse permitting as it allows arrest up to 48 hours later if the suspect is 
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identified through photographs or video footage. Similarly, the minimum penalty for football-
related crimes is considered excessive compared with sentencing tariffs for more serious 
crimes committed outside the sporting context. In the eyes of the fans, this makes it 
impossible for the courts to impose fair and just punishment.  
The Italian police have inevitably invested resources in gathering intelligence 
intended to prevent violent episodes at football matches. The primary strategy of the police is 
still perceived by the UltraS to be in favor of hard physical repression. This tactic is integral 
to any pro-reactive debate around policing and the technical orientation of law enforcement. 
Such a tactic may create a massive divide between citizens and the police and may diminish 
public confidence.  
The police would argue that they do not seek either dialogue or the confidence of the 
UltraS. Such a distance is strongly perceived by the UltraS; the police are considered as a 
danger to their values and way of life. Such a reality has destroyed any possible dialogue. The 
perception that they are treated as ‘special threats’ only fosters further tension increasing the 
UltraS sense of perceived discrimination and possibly promoting their strong reactions. 
Giorgio explains this feeling: 
 
‘UltraS does not mean gratuitous violence; we need to be careful when labeling 
UltraS ‘violent’. Sometimes we are involved in violence; but then you see that in 
normal life a person can be stabbed for a quarrel in any city. Violence exists in 
society and the stadium reflects this. The stadium has been for many years a 
comfortable box to ghettoize a part of Italian youth. At the stadium there is much 
more repression and demonization of the UltraS. Simple banners such as those in 
support of Giorgio Chinaglia are no longer allowed..’  
 
The ‘perceived’ criminalisation at the hands of police is not a sentiment shared only by the 
UltraS. Other elements of the hardcore football supporters’ movement, even those who 
follow the interpretations of Marxism or anarchism, are similarly angered by policing 
strategies. The repressive policies of the Italian State have unwittingly united the UltraS and 
other hardcore supporters (regardless of their ideological connotations) around a cause. In the 
UltraS discourses, the police are the armed wing of a repressive State. Sara (Boys) explains 
this thought:   
‘I think [the police] create tension; personally I get nervous when I see police dog units 
[at the stadium] and officers in riot gear etc.. This does not help; the Italian stadiums are 
becoming fortresses; there are already emotions and rivalries among fans then if this 
climate of war is added, you can understand why these things [violence] happen. A girl 
of 20 years old as me when goes to the stadium does not want to feel criminalized; I 
 199
believe many violent acts will not happen if there were less police. Too many police 
make me [and the curve] nervous; [I would like to have] less repression and 
militarization in the stadiums. I am a female and I get angry for this militarization 
[imagine what the guys feel..] it happened that they [the police] ordered me to open my 
purse on the train to check it; I felt as a terrorist. 
When we go to see the match of the AS Roma away because of the police searches we 
always leave late; once we had to go to Messina and the train was scheduled to leave at 1 
pm, it left at 3 because of the police search. They treat you as a terrorist and this logically 
produces rancor in people; it promotes rancor in me that I am a girl imagine the effects 
on the Boys and other UltraS...’   
 
 
Figure 49 illustrates an article by the Irriducibili printed in their fanzine in 2005. The article 
is titled ‘Now let explain us the difference between the ‘right’ and the ‘left.’   
 
 
 
 
Fig. 49: Politics from the Irriducibili’s perspective.  
 
In this article, the Irriducibili criticised the media, the State, and the police underlining how 
those who do politics from the extreme left are always justified by the Italian media. In doing 
so, they reinforce their discourse around what they considered the double standards of the 
media and the State. This article strengthens the image that the UltraS want to portray as 
victims of a conspiracy orchestrated by a media-State alliance. Opp and Roehl (1990) argue 
that repression in many social movements tend to promote micromobilisation that creates the 
incentive and reduces the price of membership. Academia has also taken into consideration 
the effects of police repression on ideological motivated protestors, and the UltraS quite 
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clearly fit into this category. Because of what is considered ‘brutal’ police repression, 
protesters often gain support from people who did not suffer directly from the excesses (De 
Nardo 1985, p. 191).Not only are the UltraS interactions with outside society mediated by 
ideology, but their fighting/resisting for survival in a collective way (at micro level via their 
communitas and at a macro level via their movement) is intrinsically political. Todde argues 
that the DASPO are absurd because they deny individuals the freedom of choosing to watch 
their team. He thinks that the most hated thing about the DASPO is that even if a person is 
eventually declared innocent, he/she has still been greatly affected by the banning order. Who 
or what will compensate this loss of personal freedom?  
This strategy, although at times necessary, needs to be used cautiously to avoid a 
further radicalisation of the UltraS protest. Forced sanctions (such as the DASPO) are 
‘deprivations, the threat of sanctions is equivalent to the concept of anticipated deprivation, 
the innate emotional response to both is anger’ (Gurr 1969 in Opp and Roehl 1990, p. 522). 
The football stadium has always been an exceptional location in Italian society. It is now akin 
to a state of emergency wherein those who enter are filtered. The citizens who enter now 
have to reveal all personal data as demanded. Entry has prerequisites. Those not wanted 
cannot come near the event due to the requirement of signing-on at police stations at the same 
time. Unprecedented measures and unprecedented circumstances have acquired the status of 
legitimate repression and come with ever-expanding exceptionalist logic. The risk of failure 
cannot be considered. The police and ultimately the Italian State would risk accusations of 
incompetency if they failed to control this footballing and ultimately political carnival.  
The UltraS clearly have a social-political agenda, and in pursuing their aims have 
provoked a political response.  
‘We are defined by the police as a snake that needs its head cut off. I am one of the 
three that compose this head and this is the reason why two of us (me and Toffolo) 
are diffidati (banned from the stadium). Nevertheless, they failed because despite this 
the snake is in good health and moves. We fight outside the stadium and believe me 
we will continue to do so.’ Giorgio (Irriducibili) 
 
When asked how efficient the police are, considering the strategy of tackling the UltraS, Dr. 
Mazzilli, limiting his answer to a mere articulation of data as to reinforce the idea of a 
winning Italian State, replied: 
 
‘We need to consider that during this period we had the tragic occurrence of Catania 
(Inspector Raciti’s dead) which highlighted once again the football violence 
emergency. Specifically: 1.114 matches with injured (the annual average was of 
222.8); 3.831 injured among the police forces (annual average of 766.2); 1.557 
injured among civilians (annual average of 311.4); 1.726 individual arrested (annual 
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average of 345.2). In the current championship (2008-2009)there is a reduction of 
72% matches with injured, 81% of injured among the police forces, 83% of injured 
among civilians, 39% of arrested and 40% of reported by the police. If we want to be, 
more precise these are the latest data of January 2009 on the Serie A championship 
2008-2009 (which at the times of the writing is not yet concluded): 
 
• The number of matches with injured is decreased of 28.2% (from 38 to 28) 
• The number of matches with the use of teargas is diminished of 83.3% (from 
6 to1) 
• The numbers of injured among the police forces is decreased to 41.3%  (from 
104 to 61) 
• The numbers of injured among civilians is decreased to 66.1% (from 62 to 
21) 
• The numbers of injured among civilians is decreased to 66.1% (from 62 to  
21) 
• The numbers of persons arrested is decreased to 53.1% (from 129 to 60) 
• The numbers of persons reported by the magistrates is decreased to 46.9%  
(from 409 to 217) 
• The spectators in series A have increased of 10.7% with a match average of 
24.825 (last championship was of 22.430) 
 
So it is possible to say that the data are comforting and clearly show the decrease of all 
indices relating to violence linked to football spectatorship if we consider the last five 
years.’ 
  
                                                                              *** 
 
In March 2009, 60 Sconvolts of the Cagliari FC attacked the city prison by throwing 
stones and threatening prison officers. Their anger was provoked by the prison death of their 
leader, Giancarlo Monni, who fell ill with bronchopneumonia (Il Giornale-online-08 March, 
2009). On the 14th of  July 2009 the long lasting judicial trial that saw accused the police 
officer Luigi Spaccarotella (who killed Gabriele Sandri) ended with  a manslaughter verdict 
and  a six year prison sentence instead of a verdict of homicide and a sentence of between 14  
and 21 years in prison (as requested by the public prosecutor). The anger of the UltraS and 
the friends of Sandri immediately erupted. In court the UltraS chanted ‘shame, buffoons, 
bastards’, the carabinieri had difficulty in controlling the rage directed towards them (La 
Repubblica –online- 15 July, 2009a). During the following night, stones and bottles were 
thrown against the police in Ponte Milvio (an area in the north of the city near the Olympic 
Stadium). The same UltraS group threw petards against the Ponte Milvio carabinieri station 
damaging a motorcycle and a car. Two arrests were made and flags celebrating Mussolini 
were found in the house of the arrested which was subsequently raided by police (La 
Repubblica –online- 15 July, 2009b).  
The data of the Ministry of the Interior are undoubtedly a credit to the work done by 
the Italian police, but do they imply a reduction in the radicalisation of the curve and suggest 
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that the policing strategy is working? The appearance of the UltraS Italia and episodes such 
as those mentioned earlier suggest a move in the opposite direction. La Repubblica 
newspaper does not agree with the figures of Dr. Mazzilli; according to this newspaper there 
are now 63 UltraS groups, accounting for 75% of all Italian hardcore football supporter 
groups (La Repubblica –online- 17 March, 2009). Regardless of whose figures are correct, a 
reader should find from both sources that the UltraS are not a small collective and, from the 
various episodes chronicled in this study, are capable of resisting if their existence is 
challenged. Caution should be taken in choosing the ‘right’ strategy to tackle this problem; 
the terrorism of Italy in the 1970s provides lessons about the power of youth protest and its 
inclination to become dangerously subversive 
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Chapter 13 
Concluding Remarks 
 
 
Fig. 50:The UltraS Freedom Banner 
 
‘Certainly, we [UltraS]will not bow in front of their [State and Media] psychological 
violence, they can arrest us or isolate us from ‘our’ world, but something is sure, we 
will always be proud and faithful to ourselves [and ideals]. The UltraS, in their own 
way, are great artists.… Maybe because, differently from the mass, they are able to 
deeply understand the ills of life... or more simply because, in life, they are conscious 
of being the leading actors.’ Andrea (Boys) 
 
 
Any discussion around the UltraS needs to be addressed from two perspectives: in 
terms of method (combining the theoretical and empirical) and social spaces (both inside and 
outside of the football stadium). As this study has illustrated, these dualities are inter-
connected via a belief system within the UltraS, which   is strongly based on ideology and 
that drives participants to actions. In such a milieu, individuals make the transition from 
theory to action without the need for consistency. It is in explaining this dynamic that the 
UltraS present an academic challenge and a focus of concern for the various authorities.  
This thesis set out with the task of providing new sociological findings regarding the 
UltraS in Rome.  The main method was qualitative, with a focus on ethnographic work, while 
the evaluation sought to locate the UltraS firmly within the broader structural contexts of 
Roman and Italian football, and more generally Italian society.  In this regard, the discourses 
of the UltraS provided a potent, highly reflexive bridge between the particular and the 
general, most evident in their discussions about their wider ideologies and the perceived 
failings of Italian society (and football institutions). This study, the first ethnography in 
academia about the philosophical life view of the UltraS , has hopefully offered a basis to 
explain – to some degree at least – the meaningful sense of identity which these social groups 
provide for a significant minority of Roman (and indeed Italian) youth. Once the UltraS 
social and ethical outlooks are adequately set out, the ‘mindless thugs’ characterisation, 
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which provides a basis for their dismissal by the media and other commentators, might be 
directly confronted. 
This concluding chapter seeks to offer a reflexive overview of the highly multifaceted 
and ever-contested issues evident throughout this thesis. At the same time, I tried to draw 
together, the thematic strands that best explain the Boys and Irriducibili. It is hoped that the 
study knowledge adds to the subject of Sociology of Sport providing a more accurate account 
of the UltraS than previously known. The same can be asserted for what we might call 
‘Italian Studies’. More is now known about the UltraS and their effective location in the 
context of the Italian capital Rome (and Italy). Most importantly, such knowledge also aims 
to contribute to the mainstream discipline of Sociology in terms of uncovering and analysing 
the logic and motivations, which are at the base of the UltraS behaviour and collective self.  
The research was presented in three sections.  In Section A, I explored the UltraS 
territories-le curve- and the groups‘histories. From this analysis, the UltraS cohesion and 
elitism emerged as their primary traits. The direttivo of both groups represent not only a 
collective of individuals united by a strong friendship but a symbolic nucleus on which the 
UltraS power of identification is located.   
Section B sought to bring out the different historical, political and cultural dimensions 
relevant to an understanding of the UltraS.  In chapter 5, I examined the ideological basis that 
motivates and leads the Irriducibili and Boys ‘thoughts and actions. The chapter tried also to 
demystify the belief that Italian fascism (and its 21st century development) should be 
primarily considered as an ultra-reactionary doctrine. The chapter, instead, stressed that the 
strand of fascism, which a large section of the Italian youth neo-fascism movement promote 
(of which the UltraS are part of) has a Movimentist dimension with revolutionary-resistance 
potential. This ideological characteristic, together with the UltraS actions, can justify 
arguments that explain the UltraS as extraparliamentary oppositional groupings.   
Chapter 6 analysed the natures of the UltraS gatherings identifying them as form of 
ideological communitas. The inquiry detailed the internal order of the communitas and the 
phases of passage of an ‘ordinary’ curva fan to a fully-fledged UltraS. Two distinct 
trajectories were identifiable in the expressions of the UltraS activism: the ‘elite’ and the 
‘sympathisers’. The ‘elite’, which includes the direttivo, promotes and shares the Ultras 
ideological and cultural DNA. All of the UltraS ‘elite’ appear to display the convictions of the 
purist and at the same time, share a strong sense of mutual responsibility concerning social 
action and cultural values towards both rival hardcore supporters and the forces of 
‘repression’ (i.e. the police, the State and the media). The importance of the ‘elite’ is 
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displayed when its members are in action; such leaders – by virtue of their action and 
charisma – if not subject to the DASPO, are always in the vanguard during ‘battles’ with 
groups of other fans and police. The UltraS ‘sympathisers’ are similar to Linden and 
Klandersmans’ extreme right groups and their ‘compliants’ activists (Linden and Klandermans, 
2007).  The ‘sympathisers’ share the ideology of the communitas but are only involved as long 
as membership is considered ‘fashionable’, or as long as  specific friends are involved with the 
group’s ‘elite’. 
Chapter 6 also introduced one of the four main elements of the UltraS logic namely 
the principle of non omologazione. This concept underscores the deviant nature of this type 
of gatherings. The UltraS know they are deviant because they consider violence as 
instrumental and essential for the affirmation of their rights and values. They celebrate their 
deviation from what they obsessively dismiss as omologazione della gioventú (youth 
conformism) considered to be duped and politically servile to dominant societal logics.164 
The following chapters (7-8) tried to explain the sense of authenticity expressed by 
the UltraS communitas via the concept of ‘true’ UltraS. There are several common elements 
displayed by the two UltraS communitas that are shared by other similar ideologically led 
gatherings throughout Italy. The UltraS communitas is located in a legendary world and 
founded in a shared symbolic repertoire (such as the Celtic cross, specialist clothes, and non-
mainstream music), values (such as reverence towards Mussolini or the Fallen of the anni di 
piombo) and codes of behaviour (especially faith in their ‘deviant’ way of life). In their 
actions, banners and campaigns – what might otherwise be termed as their ‘internal figurative 
universe of liturgy, ritual, symbol, myth and commemoration’ (Gentile, in Roberts 2007, p. 5) 
– the UltraS make visible the supported shortcomings of the political and footballing systems. 
The UltraS communitas have also a strong cultural dimension, which is expressed in an ideal 
society based on traditionalism.  
The ‘Warrior Spirit’, which emerges in chapter 8 in all its significance, clarifies the 
UltraS values. The UltraS belief  in the warrior way of life promotes the logic of ‘never 
giving up’ and is at the foundation of their inclination to violence. It also provides an ethical 
justification for actions deemed important to both defend and affirm the existence of the 
communitas and its ‘traditional’ values. The ‘Warrior Spirit’ encapsulates and celebrates 
notions of self-sacrifice, honour, duty (to the communitas) and, most importantly, faith (in the 
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deviance is important to this field (extreme right ideology) because it is an area in which the deviant’s 
perception of social reality not only differs rather abruptly from that of the majority but also does so in an 
unusually coherent manner’ (p.2). 
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communitas lifeview). Such faith in the path to follow carries a ‘quasi-religious’ connotation 
in its supposed infallibility. It is difficult, though, to convince the believers of any sense of 
delusion.  
The last two chapters evaluated the nationalistic and racial dimensions of the Boys 
and Irriducibili and located them in the recent developments of the Italian football fandom 
phenomenon. Chapter 9 highlighted the importance of the concept of patria, which implies 
for the UltraS the subordination of the ego to the collective and seeks the re-evaluation of the 
concept of a nation, considering it as an organic collective of people that exists mainly in 
opposition to a liberal, ‘modern’ hyper-individualistic society. Chapter 9 also showed that the 
UltraS displays of racism is complex and at times incoherent; racist insults maybe the results 
of spontaneous outbursts (i.e. ritualised forms of insult) which aim to comment, albeit in a 
contemptible way, the events at the football match. These forms of insult can originate from 
the tribunes stands and spread to the whole curva or vice versa. These types of insult can 
intertwine with racist offences that are more ideologically motivated. However, the roots of 
the UltraS manifestations of racism –which, even if strongly rebutted by the protagonists, 
exist - should be mainly found in their way of denying entry to their territory to one 
considered an ‘outsider’. Their racism has to be seen as yet another manifestation of their 
oppositional culture, which is integral to their sense of communitas. 
Finally, chapter 10 located the Irriducibili and the Boys among similar gatherings in 
what this study hypothesise as the emerging UltraS movement. The key concepts to 
understand the UltraS as a social movement are their collective power of social identification 
and their feeling of grievance. The UltraS communitas promotes the importance of 
collectivity as the first and most important factor. This process creates strong ties among the 
members. This sense of bond can be very appealing to youth. The UltraS have (and can 
sustain) strong identification power because they have defined boundaries that cannot be 
crossed by the ‘others’. They have also an internal homogeneity that arises out of ideology 
and culture; this trait produces a well-rooted internal structure and, given the communitas 
common goals, provides a sense of destiny in the believers (Campbell 1958; Hamilton and 
Sherman 1996). Many individuals, but mostly youth, exist in an uncertain milieu. This 
context facilitates identification with groups such as the UltraS. The extreme societal 
insecurity that is evident in so many Italian youth due to the state of political affairs may 
contribute to the young becoming attracted to extreme ideology (Hogg et al. 2007; Hogg 
2005) and to promote social identification with gatherings such as the Irriducibili and the 
Boys. (cf. Staub 1989; Taylor and Louis 2004). 
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Caution, though, should be observed in considering the appeal of these gatherings as 
being primarily about a sense of rebellious, ‘anti-systemic’ logic or due to a simple love for 
football. Interactions between group members are crucially based on a defined mix of 
emotions and duty towards the sense of communitas. Members are exhilarated by the group’s 
pre-match choreographies and in playing the ‘cat and mouse’ game with the authorities in 
attempts to bypass their control be it inside and outside the football stadium. The indefinable 
‘buzz’ is also felt before conflict, be it against the ‘communists’ or the variety of other 
opponents, notably le guardie (the police). Being amongst groups such as the Boys or 
Irriducibili is for many an imaginary act of identification with both real and symbolic others and 
ideals. This allows individuals such as Todde or Giorgio or Lele to play with their self-images 
(Armstrong 1998; Glaser 1958; Strauss 1969; Lacan 1977). In the variety of situations which the 
UltraS both created and responded to, participants were able to pursue activities that collectively 
they would possibly consider repugnant – or at best strange – if practised alone (Armstrong 
1998; Simmel, 1957, p. 313). Via such performances, participants are transported from 
superficiality to fantasy in an attempt to close the gap between their imagined and experienced 
pleasures (Armstrong 1998; Campbell 1989; Bauman 1992).  
The UltraS feeling of grievance, instead, originates and is strengthened by societal 
discourses that depict them as ‘mindless thugs’ and aims to marginalise them because of their 
neo-fascist creed. The strong repression -which the UltraS fear can erase them from their 
curve- and their convictions to live by the ‘Warrior Spirit’, instead, are at the base of their 
emergence of movement and their attempts to react against the State with some forms of 
collective strategy. The most evident first manifestation of the existence of the UltraS as a 
movement is represented by the UltraS Italia.  
The final part of the study (Section C) aimed to clarify the relationship between the 
UltraS and their fierce opponents namely the media (chapter 11) and the police (chapter 12). 
These relationships were primarily explored with reference to the groups studied but also 
with reference to the wider movement. In chapter 11, the power of the media to re-present 
reality and its risk in relation to the UltraS phenomenon were highlighted. Two media 
positions emerge one is the alarmist (for the UltraS phenomenon) and the other stresses the 
excess of coverage, both might be considered to pose problems when considering the UltraS 
reactions. Chapter 12 aimed to give credit to the work done by the police in containing 
football violence but also offered a critical reflection on the strategies adopted to tackle the 
UltraS. This approach, together with a repressive and at times confusing legislation corpus –
criticised also by non-UltraS within the Italian hardcore football supporters’ world- can 
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instead unwillingly facilitate the UltraS rhetoric of marginalisation and stigma and further 
their radicalisation.     
This research acknowledges that readers may well seek answers to questions, which I 
may not have posed. This will always be the case in any sociological inquiry. All academic 
studies have limitations. The best defence that I can offer is to ask that the reader accept the 
limitations of my endeavours. The main shortcoming of this study is connected to its visual 
dimension or, more specifically, the domain of Visual Sociology (VS) wherein visual 
materials are utilised as a means of presenting the world of the social groups under 
investigation.165 Although this has been attempted via the use of photographs, the full 
utilisation of this method remains open to further work.  Two barriers limited the use of VS 
analysis. The video camera, one of the most popular tools in VS, was too invasive for the 
UltraS leaders and its use risked jeopardising access to a setting that, by its nature, is 
‘closed’. In addition, the techniques of Visual Sociology are quite complex and should be 
utilised only when the researcher is competent. If not, they risk becoming a choreographic 
complement of the research without an accompanying critical dimension.  
At least two potential directions for future inquiry have emerged from this 
investigation. Both involve ‘gender’. Whilst this study has examined the gender dimension of 
the Irriducibili and Boys, the surface of this topic has only been scratched. The issue requires 
more investigation, notably on the level of ‘presence’ of female hardcore football supporters 
in Italy in ideologically motivated gatherings. This study has highlighted the position (more so 
in the Boys than the Irriducibili) of women, and has produced new findings that have been 
generally overlooked in previous work on the gender dimensions of both Italian neo-fascist 
groups and hardcore football fan gatherings (as the UltraS might be considered to be a 
synthesis of these two worlds). The phenomenon of the female UltraS has been confirmed in 
recent times by the Italian media. In 2008, 20 UltraS were charged by the public prosecutor 
following clashes that occurred in Rome after Gabriele Sandri’s death. Among the 20 who 
were fighting the police was a 25-year old woman. The other side of the curva ideological 
barrier provides another example. In 2005, on the occasion of a Ternana versus Perugia 
fixture, 13 hardcore supporters of the former – politically Leftist – group were arrested. 
                                                
165Cf.  http://visualsociology.org; H.Becker. (1974).Photography and Sociology. Studies in the Anthropology of 
Visual Communication, I, 1, 3-26; G. Rose.  (2001). Visual Methodologies. London: Sage; F. Mattioli.(1991) 
Sociologia Visuale. Torino: Nuova Eri. 
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Among these were three women recorded on CCTV cameras throwing stones and 
rudimentary bombs (made with gunpowder) towards police.166 
More importantly, the gender dimension requires a thorough ethnographic study in 
relation to the ideas surrounding the ‘Italian fascists of the Third Millennium’. Here I refer to 
Casa Pound Italia, a collective worthy of its own specific enquiry, not only for  its links to 
the UltraS world but also because of its anti-conformist, Movimentist interpretation of fascist 
ideology which is gaining popularity in Italy. Casa Pound Italia support an organisation 
entitled Donne e Azione (DEA), identified by the media as femminismo neofascista (neo-
fascist feminism). The projects of DEA are advertised via a radio program titled FuturArdita, 
hosted by the Casa Pound radio station, Radio Bandiera Nera. Apart from the work of Blee 
(2002) that focused on the American feminine far right, the issue of women’s political activism 
in Italy has been overlooked for many years and is, therefore, in urgent need of systematic 
examination. 
 
13.1 Understanding the Curve Warriors 
 
In concluding, inspired by the anti-rationalistic ideas of thinkers such as Evola (1993; 
1996), the UltraS see their battles primarily against the ‘modern’ society that in their 
consideration is morally decadent. They might be understood as existing in a framework 
wherein tales – both football related and politically inspired – of idealised scenarios of 
masculinity are ever-present. In their behaviours, the UltraS seek to combine notions of the 
warrior with abstractions drawn from a variety of Western thinkers. They are, thus, a 
combination of theory and action, as most obviously displayed inside the football stadium. 
Shaping their self-presentation using fascist ideology’s myth and values, communitas like the 
Boys and Irriducibili seek to build an autonomous social space that confers social status. This 
strategy enables members of the UltraS to emerge from an otherwise undifferentiated crowd 
of discontented Italian youth. Like their mainstream neo-fascist counterparts, the UltraS find 
their sense of function, survival and unity in a critical and antagonistic stance toward the 
society from which they feel marginalised. Their opposition is articulated through a logic that 
they argue is antithetical to the normative, cognitive and behavioural codes that are otherwise 
promoted and defended by Italian society. The UltraS existence also demonstrates the 
consistent – and ironic – overlaps between them and Italian Leftist political movements, and 
                                                
166
 Cf. http://poliziadistato.it/articolo/12755-calcio_Polizia_Terni_arresta_13_ultras_ternana 
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their growth reflects the sense of marginalisation of non- Leftist youth movements which lack 
the political shelter available to the left – radical elements of both political and social 
movements.  
The neo-fascism the UltraS express, and which motivates their opposition, makes no 
pretence to be a new ideology, instead they espouse old ideas mixed with a heavy dose of 
Romance. Neo-Fascism is Romantic in its vision promoting, as it does, a sense of 
community, the importance of tradition and the necessity of honour and order. At the same 
time, this political genre attracts those who, whilst preaching the virtues of order, are 
fascinated by the potential the groups hold for degrees of chaos. In this sense, the UltraS 
appear to be similar to football fans the world over who follow an entity – football’s rules and 
ideology – that has not fundamentally changed since the late nineteenth century. Supporters 
ever manifest a sense of the Romantic in their club-related memories in narratives that have 
few parallels in contemporary society. Their discourse around notions of tradition fits with a 
pursuit of higher meaning and values, under what Berger (1967) called a ‘sacred canopy’. 
Anthropologists the world over have recognised variations on the ‘sacred canopy’ in both 
death-defying and finite belief systems. Such a canopy helps to vanquish the dread of the 
void. The narratives of such sacredness are often spoken by self-appointed prophets who, 
therefore, attract followers. As Griffin argues, just as modernity destroyed the tried and 
trusted certainties of myth and religion (i.e. the sacred), one should expect alternative sacred 
canopies to appear or be sought beyond mysticism and religion. Some seek a paradise in the 
here and now; their appeal often lies in offering a sense of renewal. For the UltraS, tradition, 
with all of its myths, memories and symbols, accomplishes two functions: it serves to 
increase their sense of cohesion and it reinforces the boundaries between them and ‘others’ 
(Smith, 1998). Repertoires of action that signpost the importance of past events – whether 
real or mythical – give accessible ‘points of entry’ to the UltraS, allowing individuals to 
locate and contextualise their own personal experiences within the broader collective 
(Gamson, in Mazer 2008). Even if the myths, memories and symbols contained in the notion 
of tradition based on narratives and texts are individually experienced, they are also shared 
within the communitas, creating a ‘consistency’ through communication and action (ritual) 
(Mazer, 2008).  
In contrast to their ‘ordinary’ peers, the UltraS do not see their daily life as consisting 
of the past, present and future. For them the past – its values and traditions – is more 
significant than the future and is a means to interpret their present. British historian Griffin 
(2005) best sheds light on why ideological communitas – such as the UltraS – see tradition as 
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such a crucial part of their existence. Drawing on sociologist Peter Berger’s (1967) ideas 
around the instinctive terror of nothingness and the absurdity such a feeling brings, Griffin 
questioned whether modernity is soul-destroying and if modern life has been drained of all 
senses of spirituality and transcendental purpose. Where Durkheim might see a situation that 
would precipitate anomie, and which others might see as a source of disorientation and 
despair, Griffin broadens the debate and considers the possible responses induced by this 
state of existence. The result for some is a search for a new cultural form, which Berger 
termed nomas, a condition best defined as a transcendent order that seeks higher meaning and 
values.  
Although, the UltraS can be certainly considered football supporters, they are ‘out of 
the ordinary’; they gather in the name of SS Lazio and AS Roma, but are not slavish 
followers of the entities considered at surface level to be their ‘love objects’. Both groups 
were aware that the management of the football clubs would condemn them and, given their 
primarily financial-self interest and involvement with the club, were considered liable to both 
theft and financial betrayal. Few footballers of either clubs were revered. Many were 
considered the ultimate mercenaries whose love for the team shirt and the club would last as 
long as their contract. Football manifested the confusion they were seeking to address. 
Opposed to the processes of globalisation yet enjoying the skills of foreign-born footballers 
and wearing football shirts adorned with the insignia of transnational corporate finance, the 
Boys and Irriducibili are at the same time dismissive towards the commercial logic of 
contemporary elite-level football.  Yet, the UltraS at the same time appreciate the abstract 
qualities of faith and courage that the game facilitates. Consequently, they are prisoners of the 
game that they consider to be so corrupted because they depend on football to impart 
structure and meaning to their existence, nor can they walk away from the spectacle that it 
provides. 
As is evident in this analysis, the Irriducibili and Boys hold political convictions that 
are deeply anti-capitalist, anti-liberal but also anti-conservative. Yet, whilst strongly 
supportive of an Italian nationalism, their politics oppose Italian political conformism, though 
they have little to offer by way of visions of a new social order. Their leitmotif instead is 
based around articulating a variety of fears and a sense of political, social (and football) 
disillusionment. Meanwhile they contest – with violence – their opponents and the repressive 
police. Significantly, they refuse to be defeated. As Marco (Boys) stated when questioned 
about his philosophy: meglio vivere un giorno da leone that 100 da pecore (better to live one 
day as a lion than 100 as a sheep). In living the leonine lifestyle, such individuals face the 
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possibility of injury or even, in some circumstances, death. Since 1962, more than 60 young 
men have died around the occasion of a Serie A/B/C football match and whilst such 
casualties are not all UltraS-related, their existence can be said to perpetuate the possibility of 
football-related deaths.167  
Their oppositional behaviour never formally contemplated the erasure of democracy. 
Actually, they recognised that the dictatorship model of fascism was not defensible and that 
the brand of fascism espoused by Mussolini needed to be re-considered in the context of 
contemporary Italian society. The UltraS and indeed the neo-fascists’ existence is a phantom 
politics. The ‘ideologists’ of the UltraS know the actuality of political power would be far 
from romantic. They celebrate the Saló Republic but distance themselves from the fascism of 
the regime of Mussolini because this seizing of power saw the end of idealism and the 
necessity of political pragmatism with all its iniquities. The UltraS are not pro-Dictatorship 
but are ever-seeking new ideas for a new society and will even romance about the pre-fascists 
contexts of modern Italy in the glorious past that they pursue. On the other hand, not all their 
existence was negative and oppositional. They sought consistently to set an example to peer 
groups and indeed provoked piety in their style and articulations – especially those that 
stressed non-conformity. They exemplify how to live in both a financially modest and bodily 
pure context. Their resistance to the exploitative logic of the capitalist system and their 
vehement anti-drugs message revealed these values. They sought to reach their fellow youth 
mainly inside (within the hardcore football supporters’ world) but also outside of the curve.  
However, the oppositional stance of the Boys and Irriducibili (and of the whole UltraS 
movement) comes at a price. Assuming the role of ‘social critic’ entails consequences. The 
Italian State – via both its agents and the electoral process – is tasked to control those 
disillusioned with democracy and willing to turn to violence to resist or to provoke change.  
The critical posture of the UltraS at times offends and at other times violates the social order 
however tenuous this is in the Italian context ; this creates an inevitable (and justifiable) 
reaction from the agencies of power that are being challenged.  
Claiming the stadium as their Agorà they were implicitly admitting that they preferred 
the notion of the assembly to that of representative democracy. The UltraS prefer noise, 
slogans and when necessary direct action/confrontation. Whilst the UltraS might see their 
role as bringing some sense of Athenian ‘people power’ to the football stadium we might 
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 Cf. No to Violence. More Civilization in the Stadium; More Progress in the City (2006). This document was 
produced by the Local Government office of Naples. 
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consider that debates about Democracy have been over-concerned with the notion of demos 
(people) at the expense of the role of Kratos (rule) which has frequently utilised force; 
strength and domination is integral to order and stability (cf. Runciman, 2009). When the 
Assembly was superseded by representative democracy and with it elections, political parties 
and charismatic leaders, the result was a democratic process that saw Europe become the 
global killing fields in the first half of the twentieth century. Democracy suffers from 
founding myths; it is frequently chaotic and forever needs a sense of purpose. The UltraS 
remind us of this.  
Ultimately, these ‘warriors’ of the 21st century Italy reflect some crucial aspects of 
their own society – the centrality of football to Italian public life and social identities, the 
widespread ambivalence towards modernity, the search for fundamental values within a 
social system that seems to have lost its way, the alienation of youth towards a perceived 
gerontocratic society.  Perhaps the irony is that if ‘oppressive’ forces such as the 
condemnatory media, the repressive police, and the ‘tough’ authorities, all have their way 
then the UltraS -who are in the public domain and who are known to these powerful figures, 
will be forced to disappear – and given the political and cultural history of Italy and its 
ongoing political and cultural contradictions, the UltraS may well be replaced by who knows 
what?  
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